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I. THE RULE OF LAW AS A TARGET
MR. FRIEDMAN: Take your seats in the next minute or two,
please, and we'll begin our program. This is the second panel of our
program conference. It's entitled "The Rule of Law as a Target," and
a couple of logistic announcements, the first of which is that I regret
that our speaker Monica de Greiff was unable to make her transporta-
tion connections today, and therefore she will not be with us. So that
will give us ample time to ask questions and hear answers from the
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panel. We've agreed among ourselves that we're going to save as much
time as we can. We've imposed an arbitrary thirty second introduction
rule so that will save us a few moments.
We're, also going to be guided by the constraint of lunch. That's an
action-forcing event so we're going to adjourn promptly at 12:25. We
will have a few moments before we assume our seats at the tables
which are being set in the back. Our order of speakers today will be
Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, who will be followed by Bruce Zagaris,
and then finally Rafael Perl. And when those twelve to fifteen minute
presentations are concluded, then we'll have ample time for questions
and answers, and once again, please use the microphone which is sta-
tioned at the center of the room.
Our first speaker today will be Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano. She
has. a very distinguished history, and let me just mention a couple of
highlights. To begin with, she is a native of Peru. She holds a juris
doctorate from the University of Trujillo in Peru. She has served as
Visiting Professor of International Studies at Davidson College. She
has been a prosecutor in the province of Zarumilla, Peru, and she has
published widely in the field of terrorism and narco-trafficking.
It's our pleasure to introduce our speaker.
DR. TARAZONA-SEVILLANO: I would like to concentrate on
the case of Peru, and permit me to say that the war against drugs and
narco-terrorism in the producing countries such as Peru is particularly
complex. To simply criminalize all acts associated with the production
and trafficking of drugs has proven to be insufficient. The people who
decide to participate in any of the stages of the production and traffick-
ing of cocaine believe that the possible gains, sometimes very meager,
outweigh the risk and threat of the criminal sanction.
Beyond the legal aspects, there are a number of political, social
and institutional factors linked to the problem of narco-terrorism that
need to be explained to understand the acute contradictions of the mo-
ment. I will present a case study on Peru to illustrate this thesis. Peru
enacted the first and oldest law in South America against drug traffick-
ing, Law for the Repression. of Illicit Traffic of Drugs in 1978. This law
was inspired by the South American Accord on Narcotic Drugs and
the Psychotropic Substances of 1973. It was not until six years later
that other South American countries followed with laws on drugs: Ven-
ezuela in 1984, Colombia in 1986, Ecuador in 1987, and Bolivia in
1988. The Peruvian law was also the first one in South America to
outlaw coca cultivation. Since 1980, Peru has been the seat of the most
powerful and radical terrorist organization in Latin America, Sendero
1991]
3
et al.: Transcript Of Proceedings
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
Luminoso or the Shining Path. Adhering to the theories of Marx,
Lenin and Mao, the insurgency is determined to overthrow Peru's ex-
isting socio economic . .. system and restructure the state with its
unique interpretation of communism. Sendero Luminoso has allied with
the Peruvian drug syndicate and controls the most important coca/co-
caine paste producing area of the world, the Upper Huallaga Valley.
Simultaneously, the Peruvian economy is passing through perhaps the
most critical moment of its recent history. With inflation skyrocketing
to 2,775 percent in 1989, legal and illegal segments of the population
have turned to the "parallel exchange system" to buy American dollars
to preserve, to some extent, the purchasing power of its money. Un-
doubtedly, the impact of drug money has been important.
Allow me to make a few observations about the social, political,
institutional and legal factors that are present in the Peruvian case to
help understand the complexity of the situation and the traditional ba-
sis of coca culture. The coca plant has played an important role in the
lives of the Andean people of Peru, who have cultivated it for centuries.
In those regions, the workday includes several breaks exclusively for
coca chewing, and I think a '70s survey shows that fifi:een percent of
the Andean population of Peru chews coca daily. In 1980, the first
large scale operation was mounted to eliminate coca cultivation. But
let's talk about the legal and illegal coca. Coca can be legally grown,
but only for ENACO, the state coca company that commercializes it
for commercial purposes. The 1978 law outlaws all other coca
cultivation.
In the Upper Huallaga Valley, a rain forest valley region to the
northeastern Andes, coca was first introduced as part of the subsistence
agriculture brought by the Andean colonists in the mid 1960s. The val-
ley provided ideal conditions for the growing of the coca. The expan-
sion of this crop was due to the inability of the state to provide techni-
cal assistance for farming rain forest soil and proper marketing of
goods.
As I mentioned to you, in 1980 the first large scale operation was
mounted to eliminate coca cultivation. It accomplished little. Govern-
ment forces were ordered to confiscate land and destroy coca crops.
Farmers and landowners were to be incarcerated. These measures
proved almost entirely counter-productive. The mandate of the police
was logistically impossible to fulfill and had the unexpected counter-
effect of causing higher prices for black market coca leaves. By 1988,
coca cultivation was estimated to incorporate 211,000 hectares in the
Upper Huallaga Valley alone. This growth has led the valley to become
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a major center of cocaine paste production. Sendero Luminoso pene-
trates the area. Sendero's presence in the Upper Huallaga dates from
the early 1980s.
Police sources believe that it was Osmd.n Morote who established
the region as Sendero's northeastern front in 1983-84. By 1985,
Sendero had become an armed presence in the region. The movement
of strength and support has continued to increase since then, filling the
political vacuum long present in the Upper Huallaga region. Predict-
ably, Sendero's visibility led to heightened military occupation of the
area. A development that Sendero Luminoso has also exploited to its
own advantage. The Peruvian government unwittingly fueled the grow-
ers' resentment by implementing programs designed to reduce or eradi-
cate coca grown in the Upper Huallaga.
Simultaneously, a narcotics police unit was introduced. Known as
umopar, this police force was immediately perceived by the local popu-
lace to be a threat, and it added considerably to their hostility toward
the state. These programs undertaken in conjunction with the U.S.
agencies have served only to aggravate the populace and augment per-
ceptions of official ineptitude. In the eyes of the farmers, these regula-
tions and programs are aimed at taking away their only means of sur-
vival, coca cultivation. The group that benefitted the most from the
state's anti-narcotics initiatives was Sendero Luminoso. The govern-
ment's programs provided insurgencies with the fortuitous opportunity
to denounce the United States as the primary culprit for the growers'
problems.
Sendero also contends that it protects the growers from exploita-
tion by traffickers. The rebels provided support for farmers seeking to
organize themselves against both the police and the traffickers. Organi-
zation has also made it possible for the growers to negotiate better
prices for their coca leaves.
The narco-terrorist alliance.
Drug money shifts the balance of power. Each hectare of coca in
the Upper Huallaga produces at least two metric tons of leaves annu-
ally. Growers sell each ton of leaves for processing into cocaine paste to
middlemen for around $600 (U.S.). The cocaesl of the valley encom-
pass 211,000 hectares. Of these approximately 200,000 enter the illicit
drug trade. Each metric ton of dry coca leaves yields twenty-one kilo-
grams of cocaine paste. The paste is purchased by traffickers for $890
per kilogram. These traffickers transport the past to hidden jungle labo-
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ratories where it is refined into pure cocaine hydrochloride.
Approximately three kilograms of paste are required to produce
one kilogram of pure cocaine. One metric ton of coca leaves is required
to produce seven kilograms of cocaine. The finished product is then
smuggled to the United States where it's sold to wholesalers in Miami
for at least $10,000 per kilogram. Will you please show figure three?
This figure is for coca leaves and cocaine paste yield, an estimated
wholesale value of $28 billion for the Peruvian originated cocaine upon
reaching the United States. According to these projections, it will yield
revenues of approximately $7.24 billion for the paste producers and lo-
cal traffickers, and $240 million for the growers who are cultivating
coca.
Of course, there are a great many other expenses to be considered.
Nevertheless, the gross amount of U.S. hard currency entering Peru
through these illegitimate channels is equal to approximately twenty
percent of the legitimate Peruvian GNP. Foreign exchange earnings
from copper, Peru's largest legal export, pale in comparison comprising
only 1.4 percent of the GNP. As of 1990, the Upper Huallaga ranks as
the primary region of coca cultivation in the world. The massive influx
of narco dollars has given the local traffickers unprecedented power and
created abnormal activity in the region. Even the smallest of the towns
in the coca region may boast several branch outlets of Lima's major
banks. All are strategically placed to capitalize on the high volume of
dollar transactions.
The estimated remaining $20.52 billion generated by the sale of
Peruvian originated cocaine remains in the hands of international traf-
fickers. Why has this alliance proven so cohesive? Alliance benefits
coca growers. Coca farmers initially associated with Sendero Luminoso
for one fundamental reason: it was in their economic interest to do so.
The Ministry of Interior indicates that there are 66,000 families culti-
vating coca in the Upper Huallaga. Assuming only two full harvests
per year, a low yield, the average annual family earnings come to about
$3,636 U.S. dollars before expenses, a handsome sum compared to
Peru's per capita income of $1,470 according to the World Bank.
The insurgency has shrewdly won the farmer's confidence by eas-
ing their two primary burdens: the coca eradication programs activated
by the government and exploitation from the traffickers and their in-
termediaries. Alliance benefits traffickers. It seems paradoxical that
Sendero Luminoso will associate with the capitalist oriented traffickers.
Nevertheless, a mutually beneficial alliance indeed exists. Sendero jus-
tifies its participation by explaining that narcotics contribute to the ero-
800 [Vol. 15
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/13
Proceedings
sion and demoralization of "Yankee imperialism". Sendero offers co-
caine producers and traffickers three important benefits: discipline
among the growers; protection from police and military interference;
and the promise of further government destabilization.
Traffickers believe that because Sendero poses a far greater threat
to Peru's national security than they do, Sendero provides them with a
margin of freedom. They have also utilized the guerrillas to protect
their many clandestine airstrips scattered throughout the region. An
official from the Ministry of Interior has set the number of hidden air-
strips at 168. Compounding the problem is the fact that the small air-
craft traffic in the region is completely unregulated. The police do not
have radar, and planes come and go at will. On the occasion when a
police plane does sight a presumed trafficker's aircraft and orders it to
land, the radio commands are generally answered by a derisive
laughter.
Alliance benefits Sendero Luminoso.
Sendero, on the other hand, also benefits greatly from its-associa-
tion with the traffickers. Besides its commitment to undermining- the
United States through drugs, Sendero's presence in the valley has facil-
itated recruitment of thousands of new supporters and access to previ-
ously unavailable funds. Yet, Sendero Luminoso has done more than
simply take possession of the territory. It has also won the hearts and
the minds of the inhabitants. The Upper Huallaga may be counted as
one of Sendero's greatest successes.
In some areas, Sendero has also branched economically into other
fields. In some, for example, the rebels have become involved in cur-
rency exchange. This is the hard currency that is mainly exchanged in
the streets of Lima named the parallel exchange system. The actual
amount that Sendero receives for its services is obviously difficult to
determine, but it's generally thought to range in the tens of millions of
dollars annually.
Exactly what the movement does with these vast sums is unknown.
Present power of the narco-terrorist alliance-will you please put num-
ber one again-the Upper Huallaga, in effect, has become a state
within a state governed by Sendero and supported economically by the
cocaine syndicate. The two groups working together have given rise to
narco-terrorism. The informal governing system set up by the two
groups in the Upper Huallaga has actually proven quite successful
lending legitimacy to the eyes of the populace to two marginal social
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groups who, in reality, are delinquents. On a trip along the major high-
way of the region, one now finds walls blanketed with revolutionary
slogans, "Coca or Death," "Viva Presidente Gonsalo [sic]," "Out with
the Junkies, Viva La Revolucion."
The ubiquitous hammer and sickle is frequently carved into the
pavement itself. Many stretches of the highway itself has also been
claimed and are controlled by Sendero Luminoso.
Government response in the Huallaga Valley.
Ironically, almost every attempt made by the government to un-
dermine the narco-terrorist alliance has played directly into the hands
of the narco-terrorists. The situation is further complicated by the
state's refusal to acknowledge and address narco-terrorism as a single
social, military and political entity. Instead of formulating a policy that
will combat narco-terrorism as a whole, the government insists upon
addressing narcotics and terrorism as separate elements.
Drug trafficking in Peru is fought by police forces. Terrorism, on
the other hand, is considered a threat-to the national security, and is
therefore fought by the military. These two services are utterly uncoop-
erative. As a result, the narco-terrorist alliance presently faces little
tangible challenge from the Peruvian government. On May 31, 1987,
200 armed Sendero guerrillas stormed the civil guard station of
Jauchisa [sic]. That's one of the towns in the Upper Huallaga. Many
state officials have long feared these acts. The state was no longer the
dominant power in the Upper Huallaga. As a result, an immediate
state of emergency was declared in the department of San Martin.
That's in the Upper Huallaga. Although it was Sendero initiative that
actually led to its implementation, it was the police who were put in
charge of the operation.
The government was attributing the source of the problem to the
narcotics trade and not to the insurgency. For a short period of time,
the police were able to establish order in the emergency region. Over
the next few months the sales of coca leaves and cocaine paste slowed
significantly. But the growers grew hostile towards the police, and with
the help of Sendero Luminoso began to work against them. The police
soon found themselves out-gunned and out-manned by the insurgency
even though it was the traffickers that they had come to apprehend.
The government, alarmed by the state of total disorder in the Up-
per Huallaga, reacted by declaring the entire department of San Mar-
tin-it's equivalent to a state-under a state of emergency in early No-
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vember, 1987. This time the operation was placed in the hands of the
military, not the police. This policy change meant that the emphasis of
the fighting had been shifted from narcotics to terrorism. Here, the
complexities of fighting narco-terrorism are manifested as are the dele-
terious effects of such profound inter-service rivalries.
Despite a government implementation of a state of emergency in
the region, Sendero Luminoso continued to grow in strength and the
narco-terrorism phenomenon continued to spread. Sendero's strategy is
rooted in the Maoist invisibility principle. Senderistas [sic] wear no
uniforms, making them hard to distinguish from inhabitants of the
area. They have no base camps giving the opposition no opportunity for
debilitating counter-attacks, and they shy away from face-to-face fight-
ing, preferring surprise attacks and bombings. In addition to this, the
traffickers have used the corrosive influence of their wealth to further
turn the armed forces against one another, a shrewd maneuver that
even has led to one confrontation between umopar and army officers.
Military intervention.
Military intervention in the Upper Huallaga has had the effect of
alienating the populace from the state. The people of the region, al-
ready hostile toward the government eradication programs and police
occupation, are even more aggravated by the ominous shadow of the
military as can be seen by complaints of military abuses filed with local
district attorneys. Sendero Luminoso, in contrast, is well-positioned to
manipulate the people's distrust of the state. The district attorney's of-
fice in the Upper Huallaga receives countless complaints of army
abuses every day. Disappearances rank among the most frequently re-
ported. Unfortunately, the state of emergency status subordinates the
legal apparatus to the military command.
District attorneys are categorically denied access to areas that the
military has defined as critical, and cooperation from police forces op-
erating in the area is virtually non-existent. Thus, while Sendero Lumi-
noso and the narcotic traffickers work together to achieve their goals,
the forces of law and order are deadlocked in a senseless and counter-
productive power struggle.
In conclusion, geo-political control of the region has been almost
completely arrested from the Peruvian government. As a narcotic ter-
rorist alliance has created what amounts to a state within a state, gov-
ernment officials now realize that the fight against narco-terrorism has
been lost, largely because there are no comprehensive programs to
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counter it. Narco-terrorism must be aggressively approached with a
comprehensive strategy deserving serious multilateral solution. Impor-
tantly, an intensive, well-financed crop substitution program should be
initiated in the Huallaga Valley. Anything short of this integrated ag-
gressive approach is doomed to fail.
(Applause.)
MR. FRIEDMAN: Our second speaker is Bruce Zagaris. Very
briefly, Bruce has had an outstanding educational background. I dare
to say that he's the only one in the room among all of these lawyers
who has three-count them three-master of laws degrees, one from
Georgetown University, one from Stockholm University, and the other
from the Free University of Brussels in 1976. He has also served in
exotic places such as the faculty of law of the University of the West
Indies. He currently is associated with the law firm in Washington,
D.C. of Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, where he specializes in inter-
national legal affairs.
He is widely published in the area of international business law,
and among other things he serves as editor of the International En-
forcement Law Reporter, and for those of you who have: not seen it, or
are not acquainted with it, it's an outstanding publication. There is
some literature regarding it on one of the back tables as you leave the
room. It's our pleasure to introduce Bruce Zagaris.
MR. ZAGARIS: So pernicious and pervasive have become the
problems of organized crime, their involvement in drugs, and the
problems of organized crime, their involvement in drugs, and the prob-
lem of narco-terrorism, that the rule of law is indeed under assault and
in dire need of protection. I have recently had occasion to look at this
problem as a consultant for the United Nations Crime Prevention
Committee late last year where I did a study on developing new modal-
ities to combat new forms of international organized crime. The way I
will address the problem today is to first look at the way in which law
is under attack, and for discussion purposes, I will look first at interna-
tional law that's under attack, and then look at national law that's
under attack. Then I will look at some proposed solutions to the prob-
lem and I will first look from the macro-view at developing new re-
gimes of international criminal cooperation by marrying international
organization theory with public international law and criminal law, and
then I will look at some more specific solutions.
Let's now turn to the rule of law under attack. International law is
under attack in the fight against narcotics trafficking and organized
crime because international law has not been as flexible and as dy-
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namic as either organized criminals or the narco-terrorists. Interna-
tional law develops mechanisms only over time. Normally, for instance,
it takes two to four years to negotiate a bilateral treaty, and it takes a
far longer time to conclude a multilateral convention of the type that
Irving Tragen at CICAD was discussing today. The absence of effec-
tive cooperation in extradition and mutual assistance in the fight
against organized crime and narco-terrorists has resulted in the circum-
vention of international law.
Because international law is not effective, countries and govern-
ments tend to take shortcuts. For instance, the cases of Alvarez
Machain, Verdugo Urquidez, and Manuel Antonio Noriega are notori-
ous examples of this. In my opinion, the Noriega case was especially
egregious because partly in order to arrest the narcotics trafficker, the
U.S. used masses of troops in wholesale violence that resulted in the
deaths of innocent civilians, wiped out neighborhoods and caused
thousands of people to lose their businesses.
The case of Alvarez Machain is also important because the United
States in that case did not even try to use the extradition treaty which
exists between Mexico and the United States. Instead, in the case of
Alvarez Machain, and for those of you who are not familiar, he was
the medical doctor who is alleged to have participated in the torture of
Mr. Camarena. In the case of Alvarez Machain, he was one of three
people who had been brought back from Mexico by way of kidnapping.
The United States did this in the face of diplomatic protests by the
Mexican government, and as a result, the judge, Judge Raffertie, in the
District Court of Los Angeles ruled that because of the protests by the
Mexican government that court did not have jurisdiction to try the
case. As a result, the case right now is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
This case is very important to persons who are interested in na-
tional security and the law, and the reason is because now the Mexican
government has requested the extradition of the persons responsible for
the kidnapping including Mr. Beterase [sic] who is a high level official
for the Drug Enforcement Agency. It is quite probable if the United
States does not succeed in extraditing those individuals and does not
release Dr. Alvarez Machain that there will be a wave of kidnapping in
the case of the U.S. officials involved. Indeed, as many of you remem-
ber, that was one of the ways that the Jaffe case was resolved. That
case involved a kidnapping of Canadians by people in Florida, and in
the end Canada started playing the same way, and after a while the
governments resolved the case and basically agreed not to resort to kid-
napping in the future.
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Now if the United States democratic system, including its execu-
tive and judicial branches, cannot force the United Sta:es government
to follow international law, especially extradition treaties, then I believe
a wave of kidnappings will follow. And although the case of Mexico is
important, what should concern those people who deal with U.S. na-
tional security is the threat from other countries. For instance, the gov-
ernment of Iran passed a law providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction
and announced that they were going to apply it first against the captain
of the U.S. vessel in the Persian Gulf when the Iranian airbus carrying
civilians was shot down.
I think there is a severe threat to our national security from other
countries unless there is more international law brought to the process
of the way that governments arrest individuals wanted for crimes.
Another area in which the rule of law and especially international
law is important, and it has been addressed by several people this
morning, has to do with international drug policy. Many people in vari-
ous countries including our country hear the policy of their national
government, but they're not aware that there is actually an interna-
tional policy. Indeed, Mr. Tragen referred to the United Nations multi-
disciplinary program, which the Organization of American States
(OAS) has also adopted and has begun to follow.
Now this program has four major themes: one is the prevention
and reduction of illicit demand; the second is control of supply; third is
suppression of illicit trafficking; and the fourth is treatment and reha-
bilitation. Under each of these four categories, there are many specific
targets. Unfortunately, some countries only want to follow one or two
of these major program categories. What needs to be done is for the
international community and for lawyers and bar associations to ensure
that each of these program targets are being followed.
Another problem in the area of international law is that the inter-
national organizations which are charged with the policy and with the
implementation of the policy do not have .the resources to do their job.
And here national governments including the United States govern-
ment must pay the dues for which they are obligated. And if they don't
pay their dues, then the inability of international organizations to un-
dertake their obligations cannot be met. You may recall Rachel
Ehrenfeld mentioned the fact that although there are many interna-
tional laws, they are not being followed, and this is partly a problem of
resources. Some of this problem is being dealt with. As Irving Tragen
said, there are both new mechanisms such as the U.N. Drug Conven-
tion of 1988 and the series of declarations and new conventions of CI-
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CAD of the OAS, and within these conventions there are new enforce-
ment mechanisms. For instance, the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention
provides at the end for the U.N. Drug Commission to monitor, report,
and make suggestions on the improvement of the operation of that con-
vention. I think what you'll see happening is that eventually the com-
mission is going to start recommending that sanctions be taken against
certain governments that are not following the law.
Another innovation in that convention, which I think is very help-
ful, is that governments can share the funds of confiscated assets. This
is also a new legal initiative which has been pioneered by the United
States in the '86 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, and which. I think has been
effectively used because that helps provide incentives for governments
to cooperate in investigation of narco-terrorism and organized crime.
National laws have also been under attack, and I won't spend
much time on that partly because of the timq, but also partly because I
think a number of speakers today such as the speaker before me have
talked about the problems that many of the developing countries are
faced with.
Another problem has been the overreaction by certain countries,
and the fact that in overreacting countries, governments are trying to
deny wholesale the rights of defendants. And in this regard, for in-
stance, the confiscation of drug profits and the denial of effective assis-
tance of counsel, in my mind, undermines the integrity of our legal
system. In addition, another problem has been that in enacting money
laundering laws, some countries have gone so fast that the accumula-
tion of "know your customer," suspicious transactions, and criminaliz-
ing involvement by negligence, has resulted in wholesale deterioration
of relationships between professionals such as bankers, lawyers, ac-
countants and their clients.
Policymakers mist be cautious in this realm because the rights of
individuals in their confidential relations are also very important. An-
other factor which we are seeing right now in the United States is a
downturn in foreign investment in the U.S. The statistics in the first
quarter of the Bureau of Economic Affairs of the Department of Com-
merce have shown a downturn, and this is continuing even more in this
quarter, and this is, in part, a result of the severe reporting require-
ments of the United States with respect to money movement in com-
parison with other countries.
To be effective in controlling money laundering, and it is very im-
portant to take the profit out of organized crime, narcotics trafficking,
and especially out of narco-terrorism, the world community should act
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multilaterally because if only one or a few countries act it, the organ-
ized criminals will simply use other countries. Let me now turn to
mechanisms to counter organized crime developments and specifically
narco-terrorism. I only have a few more minutes before I want to turn
the mike over, and my task was basically to focus on the rule of law
under attack. So I've focused on that rather than too much on
solutions.
One solution, which I think is very important and which really
hasn't been dealt with, and I think is especially useful for a group like
this dealing with national security and the law, is that international
organization theory can be used much more adeptly with public inter-
national law and international criminal law. Right now the law en-
forcement fight against organized criminals that are engaged in inter-
national narcotics crimes and narco-terrorism has really been confined
for the most part to the nation-state, using the classical definition of the
state centric paradigm in which only the nation-state is a chief actor in
international relations.
The world community needs to go beyond that and to foster and
enhance relationships between the nation state and international gov-
ernmental organizations, on the one hand, such as the United Nations
and Interpol and especially intergovernmental regional organizations
such as the European Community, the Council of Europe, and CICAD.
The academic and governmental communities must explore and im-
prove these relationships, so that nation states have more means to
combat organized criminals. In this regard, there is a need then to de-
velop an international criminal cooperation regime, and to also look at
developing subregimes such as the subregime of regulating illicit money
movement. This involves utilizing several areas of the law and also sev-
eral components of law enforcement both in our country and other
countries tend to be compartmentalized and which require better
integration.
With respect to other mechanisms, in my formal paper I have out-
lined about thirty different specific mechanisms, but in closing, let me
focus mainly on the need to develop more direct enforcement mecha-
nisms for international criminal cooperation. In this regard, recently
there have been developments towards creating an international crimi-
nal court which would have jurisdiction over some of these illicit nar-
cotics crimes. Although that is a long way away from happening uni-
versally, there is a much better chance that it will be implemented
either regionally, especially in the Americas, or subregionally within,
for instance, the Commonwealth Caribbean.
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There is also a need for an international police constabulary force,
and again, it won't happen internationally. It will first happen on a
regional or subregional basis. I also think, and I wrote in 1986 a paper,
which I had presented first to the Inter-American Juridical Committee,
suggesting that there really needs to be a Council of the Americas'
Crime Problems at an attorney general level which would meet daily to
focus not just on problems of illicit narcotics or problems of terrorism
or problems of arms trafficking, because all these criminal problems, as
several speakers have said, are integrated.
This organization already has a model. It is the Council of Europe
Committee on Crime Problems which has been functioning since the
'50s and which has just in the last two months prepared and adopted
through its committee of experts a new convention on laundering and
searching, seizure and forfeiture of assets. And this organization, I
think, has much for the Americas to emulate. And by doing that, gov-
ernments will find solutions to these problems on a multilateral level
and only if there is a solution on a multilateral level will this problem
be solved.
In conclusion, let me just say that in the post-Cold War era, where
the powers of major countries are becoming increasingly diffuse, the
success of U.S. diplomacy, in particular its narcotics policy, will in-
creasingly be determined not by force, but rather by adept ability to
persuade other countries to innovatively design and implement new le-
gal mechanisms. And with that, I thank you.
(Applause.)
MR. FRIEDMAN: The third and final presentation on this panel
will be made by Rafael F. Perl. He is a specialist in international nar-
cotics policy with the Congressional Research Service, which is, as you
know, an arm of the United States Congress. He received a doctor of
jurisprudence from Georgetown Law School. He's an author, an editor
of numerous publications relating to international narcotics, control,
and let me name just a few of them, to give you a sense of the richness
of his interest.
He has published the Andean Drug Strategy and the Role of the
U.S. Military. Another publication is Congress and International Nar-
cotics Control. He has also published Narcotics Interdiction and the
Use of the Military: Issues for Congressional Deliberation, and also
Combatting International Drug Cartels: Issues for U.S. Policy. He has
a very wide background in the area of development and policy, and
we're very anxious to hear the remarks of Dr. Perl.
DR. PERL: Thank you very much. The title of today's panel is
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"The rule of Law as a Target." And in my remarks I will focus on or
highlight briefly six ways in which drug trafficking organizations and
groups target the rule of law and impede its implementation, and then
I will briefly add some personal comments and observations of my own
on related issues. Drug trafficking organizations threaten the rule of
law by the very multinational nature of their criminal operations.
Bruce talked of the need for a multilateral or multinational solution or
regime, and a multinationalization of criminal enterprises engaged in
the drug trade and the methods that such groups emiploy. Methods
outside of the law pose a major threat to the rule of law.
Never before in history have criminal groups or insurgent groups
had access to such funding, such easily available funding on such a
massive scale. Irv Tragen spoke of the drug trade generating some-
where in the neighborhood of income equal to that of the arms trade.
Rachel Ehrenfeld spoke about income equal to that of the oil trade,
and figures we've heard range between $100 and $500 billion a year.
These staggering amounts of money in the international marketplace
can buy the best in communications equipment, can buy the best in
weaponry, can buy the best in transportation equipment, as well as the
best intelligence information, political power and other support.
As Irv Tragen said, power comes from drug money. And where
silver does not produce the desired results, lead and terror are routine.
Take Colombia for an example. Drug trafficking organizations and
groups do not respect international boundaries or borders. They do not
respect the law. In contrast, democratic governments and their policy-
makers and particularly those who implement their policies are pledged
exactly to do that, to respect the rule of law. And the drug trade, by its
international character, poses major policy dilemmas for national
policymakers intent on respecting the rule of law. Traffickers can with
impunity fly across national borders. They can transfe:r money across
national borders.
However, those who pursue them often have to follow cumbersome
procedures. They have to stop at customs. They have to check in. They
have to make arrangements. The law is often its worst enemy when
offenses, procedures and remedies differ from country to country. And
efforts at harmonization of laws and efforts to create cooperative mech-
anisms to combat drug trafficking, while often effective, nevertheless
require the means to implement such measures.
Remember Rachel Ehrenfeld spoke about the need for training, to
train people in the field. People must be trained, and funding has to be
made available for hiring the personnel as well as training them. And
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we have to keep in mind that law alone is not always an effective solu-
tion. The rule of law is stronger in some countries and weaker in
others. Policymakers recognize that whereas the rule of law may not
always prompt a foreign nation to enforce its laws, diplomatic or other
pressure may. Drug trafficking organizations also target the rule of law
by developing an economic and political base in the regions in which
they operate. They generate income-what was the figure-$240 mil-
lion for Peru in 1988 for Peruvian growers, and they buy political sup-
port. Just look at the power of the farm lobby in the United States.
Well, the farmers in Peru have political clout, too. The traffickers
also will support and fund high visibility public works projects. And
they often find powerful allies and industries which seek to avoid exces-
sive regulation: the arms industry, the chemical industry and the bank-
ing industry, just to name a few. Drug trafficking organizations also
target the rule of law by violence, intimidation and terror. And differ-
ing legal systems and political systems and economic systems have dif-
fering abilities to withstand sustained violence, intimidation and terror.
Such organizations and groups target the rule of law by seeking to ex-
ploit differing perceptions of the priorities nations -should assign to com-
batting drug production, trafficking and use.
For some countries, and perhaps rightly so, the drug issue is a rel-
atively unimportant one when compared to overall national problems of
debt, unemployment and insurgency. And many also suggest that drug
trafficking organizations target the rule of law by seeking to exploit
differences of opinion over what type of drug related activities should
be subject to criminal sanctions. Remember Gabriela spoke about
traditional coca production and use in the Andes. And also by exploit-
ing differences of opinion as to whether or not any criminal sanctions at
all are appropriate, Bill Ratliff suggested examining the option at least
as to whether or not marijuana should be legalized. In many countries,
including the United States, such perceptions are often deeply rooted in
moral values and intense feelings of nationalism.
And finally, drug trafficking organizations may target the rule of
law by destroying the power of the state to control territory within its
jurisdiction-the creation of a state within a state like the Upper Hual-
laga Valley-in some instances by destroying the state itself.
Now, before closing, I'd like to add a number of personal observa-
tions. The United Nations Anti-Trafficking Convention which comes
into force and effect next month offers a vehicle to help individual
states confront the international drug trade by internationalizing the
means to fight it, and basically by providing a framework for interna-
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tional cooperation. But there are a number of policies, general policy
issues here, that still need to be resolved, and in my opinion the central
policy issue or question underlying the success of the convention is to
what degree will the major drug producing and transit and consuming
nations be willing to diminish contacts and approaches on the bilateral
level and substitute multilateral ones instead.
Now let's look at which countries have ratified the convention to
date. There are some twenty or twenty-one such countries. Ratification
by countries such as Uganda, India and Togo is, of course, very impor-
tant. And important producing and transit countries such as Bolivia,
Ecuador, Chile and Mexico have ratified as well. But aside from the
United States, no major drug consuming nation has ratified the conven-
tion to date. Much more important than some of these other countries
would be ratification by consuming nations such as the United King-
dom, Germany, France, and the Soviet Union, just to mention a few.
And if this list of twenty or so countries, which have ratified or ex-
ceeded the convention to date, is any indication of enthusiasm to coop-
erate or levels of cooperation in the future, it would seem that prospects
for an enhanced international effort to tackle the drug trade may not
hold much promise.
In closing, I'd like to raise and address the issue of technology. In
wars, very frequently, technology provides the leading and the winning
edge. And one of the panels that we'll have tomorrow will be looking at
what types of regimes and what types of solutions can we be looking
towards in the future. I think it's very important to keel technology in
mind as we examine these issues. As one begins to do more research
into the causes of drug addiction, and what mAkes drugs addictive, one
begins to acquire more information on how to make more addictive
drugs. And I'm speaking about synthetic drugs, and I'm talking about
the possibility-let me just throw out two scenarios, and they're not
that farfetched- -a synthetic drug, which is not necessarily very harm-
ful to the health, which is unbelievably addictive, that everybody can
manufacture. Our kids can manufacture it in the garage. What will
this do to the whole order of the cartels and insurgent groups that gen-
erate their income or some of their income from this type of activity?
Or the other scenario. An equally addictive drug that I absolutely
have to have if someone slips it to me by design, where the formula is a
closely held secret, perhaps by a Pablo Escobar or a Muammar
Qadhafi or a Fidel Castro or an Abu Abbas or a Yasir Arafat. And
although these ideas and concepts are a little bit down the road, I be-
lieve that we will see this developing, more and more use of synthetics
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and more and more use of very powerfully addictive drugs. And with
that I'd like to end my comments.
(Applause.)
MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you for all those presentations, and
we're almost on schedule. We'll have about twenty minutes for a ques-
tion and answer session, and I would ask those of you who have ques-
tions of our panelists to do two things. One, address the panel by using
the microphone, which is located in the center of the room, and if you
feel compelled to make an observation, make sure it's limited to an
observation rather than a speech, and please define your questions. Sir.
MR. BOYLAN: Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'm Robert Boylan.
I'm with the Department of Justice, and I have something that's going
to turn into more than a question. It is an observation directed to Bruce
Zagaris who has suggested that part of the attack on the international
legal system might be coming from potential law enforcement commu-
nity, and he referred specifically to the ruling out in California in the
Machain case. I wanted to, first of all, observe that the extradition
treaty with Mexico that was at issue here has, to my knowledge, not
resulted ever in the surrender of a Mexican citizen to the United States
for the purpose of prosecution here. At least, it has not in recent years.
I would also observe that the conduct that is complained of in that
case, namely the alleged kidnapping, appears to be entirely consistent
with United States law, as announced by the Supreme Court in the
Ker-Frisbee line of cases, and if you take it by analogy, to the cases
that authorize the Bank of Nova Scotia's subpoenas, and also to the
cases that authorized discovery pursuant to our Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, as opposed to limiting discovery in international cases to
being taken in accordance with the Hague Evidence Convention.
So that is, as I said, a comment, but it's a comment which is in-
tended to focus on the commitment of the Department of Justice to
acting in the international spirit in accordance with the rule of interna-
tional law as we understand it. His solution for this alleged attack on
the international legal system is the development of new and different
kinds of mechanisms that would involve a multilateral approach, and I
would caution that the International Law Commission has been study-
ing for almost forty years the international criminal court that Mr.
Zagaris referred to, and while we're talking, the criminals out there are
doing stuff. We need to keep in mind that action needs to be taken,
action consistent with law and consistent with the rule of international
law, but we can't allow ourselves to be confused by the suggestion that
multilateralism provides a solution to these very real problems.
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MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you for your observation. I don't know
for purposes of conserving time whether a response is required, but if
any of the panelists have a short response, please feel free to do so.
MR. ZAGARIS: Yes, I have a brief response. With respect to the
fact that the extradition treaty has not successfully worked, that is cor-
rect. However, I think that before the United States or any other gov-
ernment resorts to extra-legal measures, they should at least exhaust all
alternatives. In that case, there was no attempt by the United States to
make a- reqhest for extradition, whereas the Mexican government in
seeking the persons responsible for the kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez
Machain has at least made an extradition request to which there has
been not even an acknowledgement by the United States.
Although multilateral measures are important-an example is that
although, as Rafael said, certain European governments have not
signed the U.N. Drug Convention or have not ratified it--the European
Community is a signatory and already the Council of Europe, which
includes sixteen countries, has adopted a convention on money launder-
ing and asset forfeiture to further implement the U.N. Drug Conven-
tion, another example of the potential and the immediate example of
action by international organizations. I also think that despite this
problem between Mexico and the United States, there have been at-
tempts by the United States government that have been successful bi-
laterally with Mexico.
An example would be the February '89 bilateral narcotics agree-
ment. Another example is the conclusion of a mutual legal assistance
convention and so while I think multilateral solutions are important,
it's also important to pursue bilateral ones.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you. Sir, would you identify yourself
and your association, if you could.
MR. EMERSON: I'm Terry Emerson, formerly counsel to Sena-
tor Barry Goldwater, and my question is addressed to Mr. Perl. Narco-
terrorism is an area where the lines between what is foreign and what
is domestic policy blurs. So it seems the Congress as well as the Presi-
dent has an important role to play in shaping answers to this problem. I
wonder if you have any thoughts to share with us on how the two politi-
cal branches might cooperate with each other in developing American
initiatives to tackle the problem?
DR. PERL: First of all, I have to make clear these are my own
personal thoughts, and I'm not talking on behalf of the organization
that I work for. But just shooting from the hip, and I don't like to do
that, but I will do that, I think it would be important to create some-
[Vol. 15814
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/13
Proceedings
thing comparable to the Helsinki Commission by statute where you had
members of Congress from key committees and members from the ex-
ecutive branch from key agencies to work together on a policy planning
board to set national drug policy.
I think that would improve communication and unity of policy. I
think it's important. Drugs are an extremely fragmented issue, an in-
terdisciplinary issue. There are health aspects, national security as-
pects, agricultural aspects, all sorts of aspects, trade aspects, to the
drug problem. And it gets fragmented. Policy gets fragmented in the
Congress, and policy gets fragmented in the executive branch. Congress
created in the executive branch an Office of National Drug Control
Policy, not a real czar, but kind of a mini-czar, or some people say a
"czar-deen."
(Laughter.)
DR. PERL: But if Congress, and I don't think this is realistic, but
if Congress were to create a similar joint committee on drug policy,
something comparable to the Joint Economic Atomic Energy Commis-
sion in the '50s, this would produce more centralization to policy. But I
do not see this happening, so I think more coordination and communi-
cation, and I think some sort of a committee, where you have got key
people in power positions on the Hill, drug power policy positions on
the Hill, together with key people in drug power policy positions in the
executive branch.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Sir, next question.
MR. HALL: My name is Chuck Hall. I'm with the Washington
Office on Latin America, a non-profit public education and research
organization. My question is for Ms. Tarazona-Sevillano, and it re-
gards Peru. You stated that the Peruvian government has refused to
combat narco-terrorism as a whole, preferring to separate issues of
anti-narcotics from those of counter-insurgency. I'm not an expert on
Peru, but it seems to me that there is some sense in separating these
two. For example, you mentioned the alliance between Sendero Lumi-
noso and drug traffickers. There is also some aspect, as I understand it,
of conffict between these two in two areas. One is that Sendero has
aggravated the drug traffickers by imposing higher payment for coca
farmers.
Another is that they have also imposed taxes on trafficking, which
cuts into the profits of drug traffickers. And it seems that General Ar-
senaga [sic], who is the most well-known of the advocates of putting
counterinsurgency before anti-narcotics effort, pointed out that anti-
narcotics efforts really feed into Sendero's base of support by growing
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coca farms over there. So would you talk about this and what implica-
tions this aspect of conflict has for U.S. anti-narcotics policy, and par-
ticularly the legal issues involved?
DR. TARAZONA-SEVILLANO: All right. Yes, that is true. The
acknowledgment by the Peruvian government of the issue has been a
separate matter. And I think this is very counterproductive. For one
side, we have the military that was placed in the area just for control-
ling terrorism. And that was the stand of General Arsiniega. He was
one of the last military chiefs in the area that tried to address the issue
of narcotics and terrorism as completely separate entities. And in a way
he wanted to win the support of the farmers for the military, and not
do a thing with narcotics trafficking. That, the narcotics trafficking,
since it was the problem of law enforcement, had to be dealt with by
the police. So what General Arsenaga did is tried to gain this base of
support, and he was widely criticized for that.
Right after his commitment to fight this insurgency, but only the
insurgency as a separate manner, you know, he had tremendous
problems. The U.S. was one of the major critics of General Arsiniega,
and he was even said to be involved in drug trafficking himself, because
there was no tangible help from his part to the U.S. efforts in the Up-
per Huallaga. When I refer to the interservice rivalries between the
military and the law enforcement or police, actually there are areas of
the Upper Huallaga that are just in the control of the military. The
police cannot enter those areas. And it's said that the military also pro-
tects the activity of the local traffickers.
Now, when the police want to enter to a particular region that is
controlled by the military, there are confrontations. So no single area is
placed into the hands of the two forces at the same time; you know if
one has priority over the other in one given area. So that is why I said
there are two separate entities-that even though they work in con-
junction against the state, the state doesn't work together against them.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Next question.
MR. PRADO: I am Antonio Prado, Chief of the Legal Depart-
ment of the Embassy of Mexico, Sir. I'd like to make a brief comment
on what Bruce said about the probability, if the Ninth Circuit will not
return Alvarez Machain to Mexico, that Mexico would resort to kid-
napping of American officials, the way it happened in the Jaffe case
when Canada attempted to do something like that. No, we will not. We
believe that we should not resort to .illegal acts to further the rule of
law. We prefer to take whatever redress to our national sovereignty,
but we will not resort to illegal acts. This doesn't mean that we will not
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make our best efforts toenforce the rule of law.
If you have seen the papers lately, the Mexican Air Force has
been shooting down the Colombian planes that get into Mexican air-
space without asking for permission. We have been very clear toward
our South American friends that we do not want private planes in
Mexico that do not have a flight plan, and if they fly into Mexico re-
gardless of what their motives might be, and then won't abide by the
signals of the Air Force, they will be shot down. And two months ago,
we shot down two.
Now, referring to the comment that Mexico will never surrender a
Mexican national, the treaty says that our President is empowered to
surrender Mexican nationals. But in the case of Alvarez Machain, the
crime took place in Mexico. Mexico was the jurisdiction where Alvarez
Machain committed his crimes. Camarena was no diplomatic officer.
He had no diplomatic immunity. Why should we surrender one of our
criminals to a foreign jurisdiction? But the U.S. has lately resorted to
the same idea. We have requested the surrender of Michael Joseph
Carter from the U.S., an American who committed a crime in Mexico
as a result of drug trafficking, and the U.S. said "no, because according
to our discretionary power, we do not surrender 'Americans, but we
prosecute them here." And this is the case.
The U.S. prosecuted Carter here, and we in Mexico are very. satis-
fied because at least now we are operating in relatively the same way.
We don't get it. You don't get it. But we prosecute. You prosecute.
Now we have requested of the Department of State that they give Al-
varez Machain back, not to party with senoritas--
(Laughter.)
MR. PRADO:-because under Mexican drug trafficking laws,
there is no bail for traffickers, no bail for accessories before or after the
fact, no parole, and absolutely no chance of civil rehabilitation after
they get out. So that's what we want Machain for. And regarding the
Ker-Frisbee case, I'd just like to say that I'm also a member of this
bar, and I know a little of my American law, too. I went to Columbia
Law School. So the Ker-Frisbee doctrine says that whoever came to the
court wrongly seized but has been indicted or arraigned will remain in
the court. But Ker is an 1890 case. Kerr versus-the man was ab-
ducted, he was not a Peruvian citizen. He was an American citizen
living in Peru who claimed that he had the right to remain in Peru
because he had received a permanent residence from the Peruvian
government.
The case, the one in which the Frisbee doctrine is spelled out, is a
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domestic case. It has absolutely nothing to do with an international
situation. In none of those instances have the governments requested
that the culprit be surrendered to them. But there is no fear that we
will start kidnapping Americans. We resort to the rule of law, and after
all of this, I'm saying that we don't want Alvarez Machain for too
much. We are not requesting amicus curiae because we will need leave
of the court, and we support that a sovereign should not be asking any
other court to say what it wants. In contra-distinction, in my country
any officer of the American government is allowed to go to the Mexi-
can courts to file amicus curiae with the permission of no one. I just
hope this has clarified some of the issues.
(Applause.)
MR. FRIEDMAN: Your presence here is very important to us,
and your observations clarifying the issues are also very important. We
have a response.
DR. PERL: I just wanted to say, not necessarily speaking for my-
self, but many Americans feel very strongly that this whole issue could
have been avoided in the first place. One of the things that countries do
is avoid incidents between countries, and had the Mexican authorities
arrested this man in Mexico and investigated the case a little bit
stronger to begin with, it might have been avoided.
MR. FRIEDMAN: We have time for one more question. If not,
we will adjourn, and let me give you the logistics, I think we are
booked 101 percent for lunch, and I hope that all of you have your
luncheon tickets available. You can have about four or five minutes. I
think the luncheon tables are set and please take your seats. There are
no reserved tables. Thank you.
(Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the meeting recessed, 1:o reconvene at
1:35 p.m. for the luncheon session.)
II. STRENGTHENING THE REGIME OF EXTRADITION
MR. LEIGH: Ladies and gentlemen, could I ask you to take your
seats so that we may begin the [next] panel of the day'? I realize that
even if we start in the next few minutes, we will have only approxi-
mately an hour for this subject. We have an agreement among the pan-
elists that we would like to leave as much time as possible for questions
and answers and so the speakers have agreed that we would probably
be best advised to keep each participant's remarks to about ten, not
more than fifteen minutes, and hope that we can save enough time for
a lively question and answer period.
[Vol. 15
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/13
Proceedings
My name is Monroe Leigh. I've been asked to chair the panel on
Strengthening the Regime of Extradition. We have four speakers, and I
think you'll find that each of them has something very special to bring
to this subject matter. Our first speaker is Mark Richard, Deputy As-
sistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division. Mark is an old col-
league and friend of mine. We were involved in working out the details
for the first prisoner exchange agreement, the one between the United
States and Mexico.
He has had nearly every position of importance in the Justice De-
partment in connection with the Criminal Division, and it's a particular
pleasure to welcome him to this program. I think you will find that he
has a perspective and an experience in this field which is quite unique.
I give the microphone to Mark.
[This is a report on Mr. Richard's comments:
Mark Richard is responsible for processing the over 1400 U.S. ex-
tradition requests abroad, and the 450 foreign requests pending in U.S.
courts. He described various barriers to this expanding area of interna-
tional interdependence. Many treaties are obsolete, and fail to embrace
our most effective narcotics enforcement laws, such as RICO. The Eu-
ropean Court may be an obstacle in the future, taking jurisdiction even
after European countries have authorized extradition to the U.S. In
South America, if extradition is not allowed because of a "nationality
principle," fugitives may never be brought to justice, because those
countries cannot effectively apprehend and prosecute. That is less of a
problem with our European allies. The "political offense exception" has
been a significant impediment to extradition in certain cases, related to
the scope of habeas review. Finally, he expressed uncertainty about
how to handle cases in which the fugitive has already received a grant
of political asylum prior to the extradition request. All these factors are
impediments to mounting an efficient and effective program.]
(Applause.)
MR. LEIGH: Thank you very much, Mark, for that insightful
presentation indicating what the future difficulties are going to be. We
are very grateful for your presentation. Our next speaker, ladies and
gentlemen, is John Murphy. John is a professor of law at Villanova
University Law School. He received his law degree from Cornell Uni-
versity. He has also served with great distinction on the faculty of the
'law school at the University of Kansas. I should also mention that he
has held the Charles Stockton chair of International Law at the Naval
War College in Newport.
Among his publications, there are many which are relevant to to-
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day's discussion. He is the author of State Support cf International
Terrorism: Legal, Political and Economic Dimensions, published in
1989. Another work, Punishing International Terrorists: The Legal
Framework for Policy Initiatives, published in 1985; United Nations
and the Control of International Violence in 1982; Legal Aspects of
International Terrorism: Summary Report of an International Confer-
ence, in 1980. I could give others. At the present time, Professor Mur-
phy is chairman of the ABA Committee on International Institutions
Law and the ABA's Alternate Observer at the United States Mission
to the United Nations. He is also a member of the U.S.-Soviet Task
Force to Prevent Terrorism, and serves on the board of editors of Ter-
rorism: An International Journal. It gives me great pleasure to offer the
microphone to Professor Murphy.
DR. MURPHY: Thank you very much, Monroe. Just one small
correction on your very generous introduction. I'm the past chairman of
the Committee on International Institutions Law of the American Bar
Association. We've just had a changing of the guard.
In the brief time that is given to us this afternoon, I'd like to set
the question of Strengthening the Regime of Extradition Against
Drugs and Narco-Terrorism in a slightly broader context than Mr.
Richard has. I'd like to set it in the context of the general question of
how we ensure that those who have been accused of engaging in terror-
ism or narco-terrorism or trafficking of drugs are brought before a fo-
rum where the due process rights of the accused will be protected.
That, indeed, is the primary goal of extradition. It's a method for
ensuring that the individual who has been accused of the crime is
brought to justice. I think it's important to note also that extradition is
only one of the methods of bringing an individual before a forum that
may exercise criminal jurisdiction over him.
And indeed, it is not the primary method. In addition to extradi-
tion, and in part because of the barriers to extradition as a methodol-
ogy, two other methods are often employed, one being deportation
where the individual is simply sent back to a country which would like
to exercise jurisdiction over him, and the other is kidnapping or the
seizure of the individual abroad. I think it's worth just a moment to
distinguish among these three different methods.
There are a couple of major distinctions. Extradition, of course, is
the only method that is truly bilateral or for that matter in some in-
stances multilateral. It is also the methodology that in most instances,
although not all, provides the greatest protection for the rights of an
accused necessarily involves the greatest amount of international
[Vol. 15
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By contrast, deportation is basically a unilateral method of ensur-
ing the return of an individual to a country that may be seeking him,
and of course, by definition, the seizure of an accused abroad is unilat-
eral, at least in the situation where there is no cooperation on the part
of the country where the individual is sought. Extradition has not been
utilized as much as the other methods because it does not serve as an
efficient method of ensuring the individual is going to be brought to
prosecution.
However, I would suggest that there is another goal to be served
here besides that of efficiency, and that is ensuring the due process
rights of the accused. And in most instances, as I mentioned, extradi-
tion is a method that is designed to ensure that the accused gets a fair
day in court.
Now let me turn to some of the problems of extradition. These
have been identified to some extent by Mr. Richard, but I'd like to add
one or two and maybe put a different spin on a couple that Mr. Rich-
ard mentioned. One barrier to extradition that was not mentioned is
that in the case of the United States there is a need for a bilateral
extradition treaty for the United States to send back an individual to a
country that is requesting his presence.
It is, at least in theory, possible, and perhaps even as a matter of
law possible, that the United States could use some of these multilat-
eral conventions in the antiterrorist area, hostage taking, attacks on
diplomats, and most recently the U.N. Drug Convention as an extradi-
tion treaty. However, U.S. law has been interpreted as not permitting
this. One of the problems with U.S. extradition law is that it's sadly out
of date. There was an attempt to amend extradition law that would
have allowed the use of these multilateral treaties as a basis for extra-
dition. Unfortunately, the law was not amended, not because of that
issue, but rather because of another problem we'll talk about in a sec-
ond, the political offense exception.
Another barrier to extradition is that there are a variety of de-
fenses, some of them quite technical, under the average extradition
treaty. Some are non-spectacular defenses. They don't get much atten-
tion: the need to establish probable cause; the need for double criminal-
ity; the need for specialty, i.e., that the individual be tried for the crime
for which the country is requesting his presence. The nationality bar-
rier that Mr. Richard has mentioned is another one, especially with
Latin American countries.
The political offense exception, I would suggest, while a major
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barrier in the terrorism area, is normally not going to be a barrier to
extradition in drug trafficking cases because, absent some extraordinary
circumstances, drug trafficking is a private act by private individuals.
Moreover, it is worth noting that the recent U.N. Convention expressly,
unlike other multilateral conventions, say in the terrorism area, rules
out the political offense exception as a defense.
So as the U.N. Convention gains more and more parties, the polit-
ical offense exception presumably will become less of a problem. An-
other barrier that is particularly relevant narco-terrorism is the situa-
tion that we see in Colombia and some other countries. That is, the use
of terrorist attack tactics against the law enforcement officers, the
courts and so forth, in an effort to prevent extradition. Colombia has
been the most spectacular example.
Now let me, in the brief time left, turn to some possible resolutions
of these problems. One resolution is to amend ,the United States extra-
dition law. It would be helpful from the point of view of efficiency to
amend the extradition law, especially with regard to this question of
what constitutes an extradition treaty. Moreover, the law badly needs
to be streamlined.
Second, with respect to the problem that a requested country may
not extradite its nationals, it seems to me there are two possible resolu-
tions. One is a change in the legal position of the potential requested
country, and this has happened to some extent. Another is the ap-
proach taken in the U.S.-Netherlands extradition treaty, which pro-
vides that a national may be extradited on the understanding that the
requesting country, if the individual is convicted, will send that individ-
ual back to the requested country in order to serve the prison term.
With respect to the political offense exception, there are a couple
of approaches. One, of course, is to eliminate drug trafficking as a pos-
sible political offense, as was done in the U.N. Convention, which was
done with respect to terrorism in a regional convention, the European
Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, and more generally has been
done in U.S. bilateral treaties which eliminate as a political offense any
crime covered by multilateral criminal law conventions.
A second way to do it that is much more controversial is illus-
trated by the sharp debate over the U.S.-U.K. supplementary extradi-
tion treaty, where the political offense exception was simply eliminated,
not with respect to the specific so-called terrorist crimes, but more gen-
erally as to crimes of violence. The final outcome on the debate was the
insertion of a provision in that agreement which, in effect, changes the
rule of non-inquiry. The rule of non-inquiry is that a court will not look
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into the issue of whether a country is seeking a person for purposes of
persecution based on political opinion or race or nationality or religion.
This is a decision normally to be made by the executive branch.
The U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty gives that func-
tion to a court. It was the price to be paid for substantial elimination of
the political offense exception. Moreover, the Ahmad case was men-
tioned in connection with the political offense exception. It's worth not-
ing that Judge Weinstein in the Ahmad case, while deciding that an
attack on an Israeli bus with civilians was not a political offense, also
decided not to apply the rule of non-inquiry and looked into two issues:
was Israel seeking to get this individual because of his nationality or
political opinion; and could he get a fair trial? Judge Weinstein found
that the answer to those questions was no, it was not seeking him for
purposes of persecution; and yes, he could get a fair trial.
There was an appeal by the accused. The Second Circuit upheld
the lower court's decision, and by way of dictum questioned Judge
Weinstein's waiver of the rule of non-inquiry. Judge Weinstein's deci-
sion and the appeal court opinion are well worth reading. Finally, I
want briefly to address the issue of an international criminal court. I
am not as negative on that prospect as Mr. Mueller is.
I'll just make a couple of quick points. First, those who are sup-
porting the idea of an international criminal court, at least at this junc-
ture, are talking about a very limited jurisdiction, just relating to drug
trafficking, not relating to terrorism. Terrorism is a different game.
Terrorism is too political and too controversial. Second, as far as the
U.S. perspective is concerned, the court would in all probability be sim-
ply an alternative forum. So if a country in the Caribbean decided that
it couldn't try an accused because of political or legal difficulties, and it
could not extradite him to a country such as the United States, it
would have available an alternative forum, namely, an international
criminal court. The issue is complex. I myself have been highly skepti-
cal of an international criminal court in the past. But I think that this
idea is one that deserves more thought, and I would hope not an a
priori rejection, until we've examined all the possibilities. Thank you
very much.
(Applause.)
MR. LEIGH: Thank you very much, John. We are moving along
now. We have had one governmental point of view. We've had now an
academic point of view. We next turn to a practitioner point of view.
Our next speaker is Joe diGenova, who has had a varied experience and
only recently has begun to concentrate in the private practice field. He
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is a graduate of the University of Cincinnati and of the Georgetown
Law School. He's held numerous important posts with the Congress of
the United States, and more recently he was for four years, a very
important four years, the U.S. District Attorney for the District of Co-
lumbia. Joe is a very much sought after person by the talk shows. You
can hardly name one that he has not appeared upon.
Joe, as I give you the microphone, I assure you that although we
cannot guarantee you the same audience that you would get on the
MacNeil-Lehrer Program, you nevertheless are very welcome.
MR. diGENOVA: Monroe, thank you very much. I'm delighted to
be here today, and particularly with this distinguishel panel, and I
wish to begin by expressing my respect and admiration for Luz Nagle,
who is here from Medellin, Colombia as a judicial officer with grave
responsibilities and who represents in the finest tradition the strength of
the rule of law in the area which we are seeking to address here today.
It's a privilege to share a podium with someone like her.
I will be very brief because I think the question and answer period
promises to be much more interesting than anything I might say.
Strengthening the Regime of Extradition. I don't think there is any-
thing more important that could be done in this area than the follow-
ing, and it is something which has been repeated by many people, and
it bears repeating again, and that is that extradition will only work if
countries never modify their behavior with regard to extradition based
on violence or the threats of violence.
There is nothing more fundamental to the regime of extradition
than never, and I underscore never, giving in to the threats of any or-
ganization, be they narco-terrorists or political terrorists, either within
your country against your citizens or threats against your citizens in
other countries, if people are going to be extradited by your country.
We have many examples of countries who have provided safe haven in
the false belief that by negotiating faustian bargains with either politi-
cal terrorists or narco-terrorists, they would secure for themselves some
form of political, legal, criminal and terrorist immunity.
It simply does not work, and the reason it doesn't work is when
you negotiate with terrorists or narco-terrorists or political terrorists,
they don't have to obey any rules ever at any time. And any deal you
cut with them is by definition a non-deal because it takes two parties of
equal strength to negotiate a bargain, any time you negotiate a deal
with a terrorist, narco, or otherwise, there is, in fact, no deal.
We know from our own experience in this country that such nego-
tiations not only serve no useful purpose, but they tend to discredit poli-
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cies which are important in encouraging the rest of the civilized world
to modify their behavior and to emulate ours. Our own recent experi-
ence in the Iran-Contra affair, I think, obviously underscores vividly
the danger of breaching the rule that you do not do the things that we
have long said you do not do.
Another point I would like to underscore is that strengthening the
law of extradition by virtue of better case law, which is beginning to
come our way with regard to interpretations of the political offense ex-
ception and other rules such as going behind or looking behind the rea-
sons and the likely outcome of proceedings in the requesting country,
are extreme developments. And it is important in those instances where
treaties are excluding the political offense exception to try and have
that repeated as much as possible. We must continue, the United
States must, and indeed has, thanks to the leadership of people like
Mark Richard and others in the State Department, to renegotiate trea-
ties, to modify treaties, to modernize treaties to include the offenses,
some of the offenses which have been alluded to.
I think, however, we must be realistic and understand that many,
many countries simply will not accept the expanded view of the crimi-
nal law which the United States has written into its statute books over
the last few years, and indeed, in order to be successful they need not
do so. It is quite fine with me if countries choose to use rudimentary
crimes as the basis upon which to extradite either their nationals or
somebody else's nationals to our country. Whether or not they choose
to enact copycat continuing criminal enterprise statutes, or the unman-
ageable, unannulable, unreviewable RICO statute, is a matter which I
would prefer to have left out of an already quagmired area of the law,
and I don't believe that we are going to be very successful in convincing
civilized countries that RICO is something that they should adopt.
Indeed, many of them look at it and wonder in amazement how we
ever could have structured something that is so complex that at least
four members of the Supreme Court have already said they don't un-
derstand it. We may not have RICO to worry about after the next
session anyway because there appears to be enough votes to question its
validity in some areas, at least. But that's not really the point. The
point is that we can modernize our treaty relations with a number of
countries, and this is vital, to add narcotics offenses and other types of
violent crimes, and other types of crimes involving financial matters
such as money laundering. I would prefer to spend much more time
worrying about money laundering additions to treaties than the more
complex issues of RICO and CCE.
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Those, I think, certainly would prove to be extremely helpful in
extradition matters. I will not say anything about the area of non-ex-
tradition seizures because that's the next panel. But I just want to al-
lude to it in the sense that it is important that we do, in fact, proceed to
strengthen the regime of extradition by all of the things which have
been mentioned by the panelists today because by doing so, we obviate
the necessity for countries who do abide by the rule of law to have to
resort to tactics which might not be acceptable to a lot of people under
very difficult circumstances, particularly when a country cannot provide
civil rule within its own borders and do all the things that we expect
from a neighbor in a civilized world.
That will be dealt with next, however. I do want to underscore,
however, once again that I don't think there is anything more impor-
tant, and I know it's repetitive, but I'm going to say it again, that there
is nothing more important in this exercise than a country never modify-
ing its behavior based on violence or threats of violence. From my own
experience in the area of extradition, which includes not only narco-
terrorism cases as a proponent for the United States, but financial
crimes in Western Europe, terrorism crimes in Western Europe and
narcotics offenses in Colombia, in my office in 1983, we brought back
the first Colombian ever to be extradited under the new treaties which
had been ably negotiated by the two governments.
It was not an easy task, and it took a great deal of courage on the
part of the Colombians, and I applaud them again fo: the risk that
they have taken because of the rapacious appetite of the American
public for illegal drugs. And while I have repeatedly criticized the Co-
lombian government for having taken too long to realize that it's own
faustian bargain with the major traffickers had led to the problems that
we were facing and they were facing, there is just no question that the
major responsibility for this problem lies with the people of the United
States who have created this problem as a result of their incredible
demand for illegal drugs.
And may I express my apology today to the representative of the
people of Colombia who is here for the conduct of our current mayor of
the nation's capital who singlehandedly has done more to damage the
relationships between our two countries, as a result of his conduct if not
his trial, than perhaps any single person in the United States. We in
America owe the people of Colombia a sincere and deep apology for
the level of our self-indulgence, and an apology on a grand scale for the
conduct of an elected official of this city.
Once again, we should never ever modify our conduct with regard
[Vol. 15
32
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/13
Proceedings
to extradition based on the threats or actual carrying out of violence of
terrorists and we must do more to modify current law with regard to
extradition and make it streamlined, modern and accessible so that we
can stop the misuse of the extradition process as I believe it has been
misused in many, many cases, all of which are well-known to you, so
that extradition remains a viable tool to prevent countries from seeking
the options that none of us like.
(Applause.)
MR. LEIGH: Thank you very much, Joe, for those very trenchant
observations. Our next speaker brings a perspective which we are prob-
ably more in need of receiving than any other person could bring. She
comes from Colombia. Luz Estella Nagle has come to us, however,
most recently from the University of California Law School where she
is a student and a candidate for an LL.M. degree. But before that, she
had a very distinguished career in her native Colombia.
She is a doctor of law in political science from the Universidad
Bolivariana in Medellin, Colombia. In addition, she has served on the
faculty of law at that institution. She also has been a district judge in
the ministry of justice of the Republic of Colombia. She presided over
the investigation and expedition of civil and criminal cases. She arbi-
trated and mediated labor conflicts in the capacity of an amiable com-
positor. She also supervised law enforcement throughout the jurisdic-
tion. She served on the bench of Colombia from 1983 to 1986. She has
been a lecturer also on sports law at her University in Colombia. It
gives me the greatest pleasure to welcome Ms. Nagle to our panel.
(Applause.)
DR. NAGLE: Thanks. First of all, I'm going to tell you briefly
about where I lived when I became a judge. This was a small village
close to Medellin, a town called Sevanata [sic], close to where the drug
lords have the big farms. Even as judge, I had to buy my pencils, my
pads, and sometimes I had to take the bus or ask my mother to give me
her car because I didn't have enough money to get to work. But the
worst part was in 1985, when we had the big crisis and the Palace of
Justice, as you all know, got blown up and so many people died. We
received a communique from the government that they couldn't bring
any forces to any judges or protection to anyone, and by that time the
guerrilla groups had said that they were going to attack Sevanata
where I was working.
The strike was a national strike. There were no buses,-no one went
to work, yet we had to work. Otherwise, we were going to be punished.
I had to go out and try to see who could take me to work. I had to
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change cars three times, but I got to work. They told us to wear tennis
shoes to work because if you have to run, you run. And that is no joke.
I wore my tennis shoes, and that was one of the days; in which the
government couldn't provide the judges with any protection at all.
Once on a Sunday, in this small village, a seven year-old child
came to me and his shirt was all bloody. His father had been stabbed
with a knife, with a machete, by another person. I called the police, the
police station was twelve kilometers away from where my office was,
but the officers said they were taking their lunch. They said they had
no car, and could not respond. I was shocked, and begged
them-knowing time was short and this attacker could escape. They
said they had no transportation, so I had to take my car and go down
and pick up the police officers, so that they were able to go and chase
this person before he escaped.
All this, just to tell you that in Colombia, the judiciary system is
the Cinderella of the three branches. It's the Cinderella because the
judiciary system hasn't had the respect that it should have. I mean all
of you know that being a judge should be something that will bring
respect because they are imparting justice. But no, in Colombia, the
judiciary system is the one that is begging left and right. Judges don't
even have enough money to take buses sometimes. How can we expect
judges to sit comfortably on the bench and be able to provide justice
when they receive so little respect from the other two branches?
That is very difficult. But judges do apply the law in Colombia. Of
course, some of them were and are corrupt, but others aren't. Others
are trying to really do their duty, and the Colombian system is one
which is positivist. In Colombia, what's important is the statute. If
there isn't a statute that is going to tell the judge that certain conduct
has to be criminalized, that judge cannot say this person has committed
a crime. So the judge has to follow the law, and some judges do try to
apply the law. But during this period of time in which I was on the
bench, so many changes occurred, the government was trying to find
more statutes to help solve the problem, to try and resolve this crimi-
nality that was really eating alive the judiciary system in the whole
Colombian society.
But that wasn't the answer. We had many rules in the criminal
code and many cases were taken away from the judges, yet they cre-
ated new judges, provisional ones to deal with the drugs, because they
thought that the existing judges were not doing their job. But they
didn't realize that sometimes it was very difficult because even the ex-
ecutive power, the politicians, were getting involved in criminal sen-
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tencing. Politicians had their hands in the solutions that the judges
were trying to implement, because some politicians, too, were and are
corrupt. They had their own interests.
So, again, we have judges in the middle. They are like a sandwich.
They are caught in the middle of the crisis. And the problem is not one
that is going to be resolved by imposing higher punishment, or by re-
ducing the penalty for narco-traffickers, because not even these people
are secure. They know that as soon as they are seen talking to the
judge, they might be killed also.
I think that the problem is that we have too many statutes, and
that those statutes that we have already are not applied. If someone
that's going to commit a crime knows for certain that the rule is going
to be imposed on his behavior, and he's going to be punished because of
that, maybe he will think twice. But if we are going to start changing
the rules and changing the treaties and changing the statutes, we are
going to be creating more of a crisis. And then judges and people who
will have to make decisions are going to get lost.
- Some comments were made this morning that drugs run Colom-
bia. Drugs don't run Colombia. And the proof is that Colombia had
elections last year. We couldn't say that the elections were bought. No,
people in Colombia do believe that there is democracy, and they want
to believe that they do have a democracy. They elected a new presi-
dent, and they are putting all their faith and hopes in this new presi-
dent. They are doing business, they are contracting, they are still going
before the judges, asking the judges to give them justice.
So I think that although there are so many problems, Colombia
does believe in democracy, and the problem in a sense is the infrastruc-
ture. If the United States is going to help Colombia, it should be will-
ing to give advice in that infrastructure. As soon as the Colombian gov-
ernment rebuilds the judiciary branch, Colombians will be able to take
the judgment of those that we're calling extraditables into their own
hands.
President Gaviria talked about the extradition. I don't think that
what he expressed was that Colombia wasn't willing to cooperate with
the extradition. He was talking about narco-traffickers and narco-ter-
rorists. He was talking about two different figures that within the Co-
lombian system we call peoples, which means they are two different
conducts. And if an individual behaves in a way that his conduct has
every single element of one or another, the sanction for that one will be
imposed on him as a punishment. And he said that one of them will be
the extreme sanction, which will be extradition.
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That prospect scares the extraditables. By President Gaviria say-
ing that, he meant not that he was going to talk with the extraditables.
No, a judge is going to judge their conduct and simply apply one or
another sanction for that conduct. And he meant, for certain conduct,
even extradition.
(Applause.)
MR. LEIGH: Thank you very much, Dr. Nagle. We have, I think,
heard a most extraordinary presentation, and we have to be grateful to
you for coming here to share your experience and to share the record of
your extraordinary courage in your country. The floor is now open for
questions. I will ask those who wish to speak to find the microphone,
which unfortunately has been turned in the wrong direction. Take it a
little father back down the aisle. In any case, are there questions for
any member of the panel?
I think all of us are somewhat numbed by the realization of the
experience that you have lived through, Dr. Nagle. My question really
goes to John Murphy where he was talking about the question of using
multilateral treaties for the purposes of extradition. I remember a good
many years ago when I was in the Pentagon, and my job was to super-
vise the administration of the status of forces agreement on a world-
wide basis, and annually my colleagues would have to go up to the
Senate of the United States and make a presentation on how we were
doing. And that brought us before a most extraordinary man, Senator
Sam Ervin, himself a great lawyer. And very sympathetic to our pro-
gram. But one of the issues that we discussed with him, John, from
time to time was the question of the provisions of the NATO status of
forces agreement, which require the sending state to cooperate with the
host state in the punishment of crimes, especially where there was par-
allel jurisdiction. We had cases where servicemen were actually
brought back to the United States, discharged from the service with
honorable discharges, and nevertheless thereafter it was discovered that
they had committed a crime abroad.
So the question is should we use the treaty as a basis for picking
up a former soldier now a civilian United States citizen and returning
him to Germany in order to stand trial for a criminal offense. During
the time that I had responsibility for this program, we never had to
face that question. But we discussed it from time to time with Senator
Ervin. I would wonder what your reaction would be to that?
DR. MURPHY: Well, the question of using the multilateral trea-
ties as a basis for extradition requests arises in the case of the anti-
terrorist treaties and the Drug Convention, because i-; is specifically
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provided in those conventions that, if there is no bilateral extradition
treaty between the two parties concerned, they can use the multilateral
convention. In that context, it seems to me that there is something to
be said for at least considering these multilateral conventions as a pos-
sible basis for extradition, because there is an extradite or prosecute
protection that is built into most of those. If, for example, the United
States were to try to get an extradition from a country with which it
does not have a bilateral extradition treaty, that country could refuse
the request, but it would be obligated to submit the individual to prose-
cution under its own system of driminal justice. There is a requirement
that submission to prosecution be done in good faith, and that would
require a prosecution free of the political dimension.
It also would require-in fact, this is often written in-the imposi-
tion of severe sentences if it appeared that the accused indeed had com-
mitted the crime. The problem may be most acute going the other way.
That is, where the other country uses the multilateral convention as the
basis for a request to the United States that it send an accused to that
country for trial. The fear has been that the accused will not get pro-
tection in terms of due process.
In that kind of situation, however, under the multilateral treaties,
the United States itself would be under an obligation to bring the indi-
vidual to justice if it declined to extradite. Indeed, it's an obligation
under the convention that the United States enact legislation which
would give extraterritorial jurisdiction over the crime in the situation
where it declines to extradite. So if the United States is worried about
the protection of due process rights, it would be able, indeed it would
be obligated, to submit the individual to prosecution in the United
States.
My problem with the United States requiring in all instances that
there be a bilateral extradition treaty is that there may be instances
where we want to trigger the mechanisms of the multilateral conven-
tions and ensure that the individual is submitted to prosecution some-
where, in the United States or abroad. But under a regime that will not
allow extradition from the United States in the absence of a bilateral
extradition treaty, and requires a bilateral extradition agreement for
the United States to make an extradition request, you may never get
the extradite or prosecute mechanism into operation. And so, as I said,
in the draft legislation that was before Congress at the time there was
this huge battle over the wording of exceptions to the political offense
exception, the law would have been changed to permit the use of these
multilateral conventions as a basis for an extradition request.
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MR. LEIGH: Thank you very much. I have another question I'd
like to direct to Mark Richard, and that is the question about extradi-
tions. I must confess I'm not too familiar with the recent history of the
U.S. government position on amendments to the extradition treaty. We
have categories that permit the extradition of U.S. nationals and cate-
gories which have been interpreted in the Valentine case as not permit-
ting the extradition of nationals of the United States.
MR. RICHARD: Well, the Valentine case, which is fairly old,
does not reflect a policy position of the U.S. government. We have con-
sistently taken the position that as an issue of policy, we are prepared
to extradite our nationals. What we have is a drafting defect, if you
will, reflected and picked up by the Supreme Court in the Valentine
case that suggested that given the underlying statute, and the almost
discretionary terminology of some of our older treaties, there was insuf-
ficient treaty language to accomplish the extradition of the nationals.
We have been consistently trying to, as part of the process of updating
the extradition treaties, to take care of the Valentine situation which,
as I said, is at least in my perspective essentially a drafting problem.
As a question of policy, we take the position that if we're prepared
to enter into an extradition relationship with a country, it is a reflection
of our confidence in the integrity of the system and the fairness of the
processes employed by our treaty partner, and therefore, we would be
prepared to see the U.S. nationals be subject to the extradition. We are
confident that if there is any deviation from the capability of the re-
ceiving country to provide adequate due process protection, regardless
of whether we're dealing with a U.S. national or otherwise, we're confi-
dent that the State Department would not issue the final warrant and
allow the extradition to a country where it, the State Department, did
not have confidence the individual would receive a fair trial.
If I may, Monroe, I wonder if I can just go back and elaborate or
comment on some of the implications, as I see it, of utilizing a multilat-
eral as a basis for extradition out of the United States? Aside from
questions of treaty interpretation whether these multilaterals are for
our purposes self-executing and could constitute an adequate treaty ba-
sis for extradition, we have a variety of very real practical concerns
with that approach. One, it at least raises the specter of us entering
into potential treaty relationships, extradition relationships with coun-
tries that we are not particularly ready to do so. If you look at some of
the multilaterals you have some interesting countries that are signato-
ries to those multilaterals.
I'm not sure that we want to, at this point in time, enter into bilat-
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eral extradition relationships with Libya and other countries that are
members of these multilaterals. Moreover, our concern with the extra-
dite or prosecute language in a lot of these multilaterals is a very real
one. By and large, to fulfill the requirement of prosecute, the country
will turn around and ask us for our evidence. This is not always, as a
practical matter, an easy task to provide the country with the evidence,
depending on the source of the evidence, the willingness of witnesses to
cooperate with the foreign government and what have you.
So the technical arrangements that are engendered by this trigger-
ing of the requirement do pose at times-some real problems. That's
reflected, for example, in the German decision on Hamadei to exercise
their right to try him rather than extradite him. One final point that
gives us concern, and that is the triggering device and its implications
for subsequent efforts to extradite the individual from third countries.
For example, you have a lot of countries who are signatories to these
multilaterals who would like nothing better than to have the opportu-
nity to prosecute pursuant to their obligation. Thereafter, the acquittal
or lenient treatment of that offense, in effect, may very well give the
offender an international bath and protect him or her from subsequent
extradition from third countries who would see the individual as having
already been prosecuted for the offense being sought for.
So we in the enforcement community have to be very careful
whether we wish to expose ourselves to this consequence depending on
which country is involved and the anticipated reaction of the country to
a prosecution. We have had difficulties in this area. We have gotten
burned in the past involving some very notorious offenders, and it is
something that I would suggest warrants a very cautious attitude on
our part.
MR. LEIGH: Thank you very much, Mark. I hope no one in the
audience is being discouraged from making a comment by not having a
microphone in front of him or near him.
DR. MURPHY: Could I comment on his comment?
MR. LEIGH: Yes.
DR. MURPHY: The case of Hamadei is an interesting one in the
sense that this was not a situation where there wasn't a bilateral extra-
dition treaty. We had both the anti-hijacking convention and a bilateral
extradition treaty, and Germany refused to extradite Mr. Hamadei and
instead submitted him to prosecution, and it had a perfect right to do
so. That is, under the multilateral convention the requirement is extra-
dite or prosecute, and so Germany fulfilled its obligations under the
multilateral convention, and there is an exception to the U.S.-German
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extradition treaty in a situation where the requested country deter-
mines it has jurisdiction to try the individual and exercises that
jurisdiction.
It's worth noting that Mr. Hamadei was convicted and sentenced
to a rather substantial sentence, despite all the hostags in Lebanon.
Moreover, with respect to possible difficulties of using the multilateral
conventions, my basic point is that it ought to be an option that's avail-
able. That is, the decision may be made that we shouldn't use a multi-
lateral convention, and indeed there is a lot to be said for using bilat-
eral extradition treaties instead. But as interpreted presently, U.S.
extradition law does not provide the option.
It seems to me that having the option available might be desirable
in certain circumstances. The decision whether to use it could be made
on a case by case basis.
MR. diGENOVA: May I address the issue of the Hamadei case,
please, because I think, Professor, while what you say has the ring of
truth to it, there is a problem with what you have said, and it's very
simple. The Germans had absolutely no equities whatsoever in the
Hamadei case, none. That crime was not committed on German soil.
No German citizens were involved. It was an American aircraft. An
American sailor was murdered on the Tarmac in Beirut. American citi-
zens were held hostage, and an American airline was involved. The
only reason the Germans got Mr. Hamadei was an accident by which
he was arrested upon entering their country.
The only reason the Germans did not extradite was because their
citizens were taken hostage in Beirut at the time of Mr. Hamadei's
arrest. Their conduct was absolutely and unequivocally modified with
regard to extradition conduct because their citizens were taken hostage.
You are absolutely correct that Mr. Hamadei was tried and convicted,
and I know a lot about the case because I went to Germany and tried
to convince the Germans to extradite Mr. Hamadei.
Indeed, there is a very wonderful story about the courage of a se-
ries of Americans who were asked to come to Germany in an unprece-
dented request by the Germans to appear in a line-up in an attempt to
identify Mr. Hamadei, which was an outrageous request, totally illegal,
not required by any extradition treaty. But the United States did it at
the request of the German government because the Germans feared
that if they extradited Mr. Hamadei to the United States and found
out later that he was not the right person, even though that is not the
law, that they might have lost two citizens in Beirut who might have
been murdered if he were extradited.
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We responded to that immediately and found three courageous
Americans who were willing to drop what they were doing, risked their
own lives by going to Germany with me and a number of other people,
appeared in a line-up and absolutely identified Mr. Hamadei on six
separate occasions with each one of them, unequivocally. Upon our re-
turn to the United States and landing in Dulles, we were told that not-
withstanding the identification, the Germans decided not to extradite.
And the reason was very simple: they modified their behavior because
of threats against their citizens who had purposely been taken hostage
in Beirut to prevent the extradition of Mr. Hamadei.
The Germans had no choice but to try Mr. Hamadei, and they did
live up to their legal obligation under the treaty. It is true, but it is also
true that they clearly and unequivocally modified their behavior, and
while he has been given a lengthy sentence, it remains to be seen
whether or not he serves it. There are many countries in Western Eu-
rope who have dealt for a long period of time in the undercurrents of
the Middle East, and made what can only be called, and I'll repeat it
again, faustian bargains, and it remains to be seen how iuch of his
sentence Mr. Hamadei will serve.
I have great respect for the prosecution authorities in Germany
who came to our country and my office and spent months working with
Mr. Richard and myself and others to get all of the evidence, which
was only in the United States to prosecute that case with only Ameri-
can witnesses and only American experts in a German court. It's very
important to realize that the Hamadei case, while it ended with Mr.
Hamadei being convicted properly in a German court, was a frustra-
tion of the extradition process because the Germans modified their be-
havior out of fear of the murder of their two citizens taken hostage.
Their two citizens were released, I might add, and there have long been
undercurrents of deals going on between the German government and
factions in the Middle East with regard to the release of Mr. Hamadei.
But whether or not those undercurrents are accurate, I do not
.know. But it's important to understand what happened in the Hamadei
case. And it was a fascinating display of the modification of behavior
by a country on the basis of threats by terrorists.
MR. LEIGH: Thank you very much, Joe, for that intervention.
We have a question from the floor and another back there later.
DR. TARAZONA-SEVILLANO: I just wanted to recall some of
the remarks made by Luz. Actually they remind me of many exper-
iences back home, and I was shocked by our speaker at lunch, who
referred to the Peruvian case as a discrete case in the situation of
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narco-terrorism. Actually I didn't want to embarrass him in public, but
I think it essential to make the situation clear. Producing countries
such as Peru have these tremendous problems with infrastructure, as
Luz has mentioned. Our infrastructure is practically non-existent.
Funding for the judiciary is minimum. In Peru with a massive eco-
nomic crisis that can allocate the proper funds for law enforcement, the
judges are paid terribly and prosecutors are also not well compensated.
Well, anyhow, we can say that this is the sickness of the country in
general, but what I want to stress here is that what happens in the
capital sometimes does not receive the same attention by the media.
What happens, for example, in coca and cocaine growing regions that
are far away something that is too far away from the capital so that
people just do not care. At least it seems that neither the government
nor the international community has the knowledge of what happens in
this remote region.
Also, in rural Peru, in areas where the trafficking is high, such as
where I've been a prosecutor, in a sparsely populated province which is
at the border of Peru with Ecuador, you have to really be able to take
the law in your hands to make it work. And you have this problem of
not having an infrastructure to assist you, having to pay for the gaso-
line to go on raids, having to practically ask here and there, you know,
to be able to complete some assignment. And this cannot be something
that can continue forever if we want the rule of law in these producing
countries to be something that will be strengthened. I think something
also very important to consider is not just the military factor of it, but
also that the institutions of the state should be strengthened.
And one of these institutions is the judiciary. I have a friend who
was killed and blown up by dynamite with a special police force when
he went on a raid for cocaine. Myself, I had to change routes everyday
to go to work which was thirty kilometers away from the place that I
was living. And these remote areas are practically no-man's land. You
are exposed to a number of dangers so that you are fearing for your life
every single minute. So what Luz has said that she had to buy some of
her supplies and all of that, is something that seems to be a common
denominator in other countries such as Peru, too.
Actually, you know, to enforce the law, I had the good fortune,
compared to hers, of having protection. (You know I had protection.) I
had a body guard with me 24 hours a day. I had police in my office and
police in my home, but eventually that doesn't protect very much be-
cause the police sometimes are not very trustworthy. If you had to do
something very important, you had to do it in high secrecy, tremendous
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This secrecy had to be enforced practically by yourself. In my
case, I was the only prosecutor and I was on duty 24 hours a day. And
so the judiciary is there. The institutions are there. What is needed is
for these institutions to be strengthened, and the only things that might
ameliorate what is happening in these producing countries is for the
judiciary to have enough support to really fulfill its mandate. It's true
there are some members of the judiciary that have been bought by
drug money, but they are not the majority. There are a 'number of
people who are fighting this war on drugs that seem to have
no-anywhere. Okay. Thank you very much.
(Applause.)
MR. LEIGH: Ladies and gentlemen, we are somewhat over time.
We have time for only one more question, and I agreed to let Harry
Almond give the last question. Then we must adjourn to allow the next
panel to resume.
MR. ALMOND: Thank you, Monroe. This question is very brief.
It's raised in connection with a slightly hypothetical set of facts in the
Hamadei situation and addressed to John Murphy. Our treaties provide
for prosecute or extradite. Suppose that in this hypothetical case the
Germans go ahead and prosecute and then we bring up a claim for an
entirely different crime based on the same facts. I'm trying to get away
from double jeopardy. Do they then have an obligation under that par-
ticular clause to extradite?
DR. MURPHY: I assume that the hypothetical crime that you're
talking about is something other than aircraft hijacking?
MR. ALMOND: That's right.
DR. MURPHY: The question would arise under the bilateral ex-
tradition agreement. And the question would be whether this really was
another crime so there was no double jeopardy problem. As long as you
asked a question about Hamadei, I want to respond to Mr. diGenova's
comments, and I'll make it very brief.
First, you'll remember that when I talked about Mr. Hamadei, I
was not giving a general comment on the Hamadei case, but rather
pointing out that the Hamadei case involved both a bilateral extradi-
tion agreement and a multilateral extradition agreement. So the ques-
tion of using just the multilateral agreement did not arise. I suspect
that the German officials who made the decision to -prosecute Mr.
Hamadei would not agree with the evaluation that they were giving in
to pressure although to be sure they can speak for themselves. Perhaps
this particular case raises the issue of whether we can find a more dis-
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interested forum, which brings us back to the international criminal
court issue. Thank you.
MR. LEIGH: Ladies and gentlemen, I think-
MR. diGENOVA: Let me just respond because it's important to
respond to it. The prosecution authorities didn't make that decision.
MR. LEIGH: The prosecutor gets the last word.
MR. diGENOVA: The political authorities in Germany made that
decision. Secretary Shultz asked that Mr. Hamadei be extradited, and
Helmut Kohl, for reasons which are legally justifiable in one sense, de-
cided not to extradite in the interest of protecting his citizens who were
then hostages. The problem with the hypothetical is that given the facts
in Hamadei, if the United States were to come up with another crime
which had separate facts, the Germans would do the same thing again.
They would try to try him in Germany because presumably there
would still be hostages. And, in fact, their conduct was modified, and
we know that for a fact. They decided not to extradite because German
nationals had been taken hostage as a result of Mr. Hamadei's arrest.
There just isn't any question about that. It's a matter of record,
and while it is wonderful that the Germans spent all that time prepar-
ing that case with U.S. citizens as witnesses, U.S. physical evidence,
FBI agents, American experts, the truth is they had no connection with
that case whatsoever and no equities whatsoever except their citizens
who were hostages. It is the quintessential example of the modification
of a country's behavior because their citizens have been taken hostage
and threatened by terrorists. And it has nothing to do with multilateral
treaties.
MR. LEIGH: I think we have to adjourn in 6rder to allow the
next panel. So may I ask you all to thank our four panelists for their
contribution.
(Applause.)
MR. LEIGH: Please come back in about five minutes for the next
session.
(A short break was taken.)
III. SEIZURE OF NARCO-TERRORISTS ABROAD
MR. diGENOVA: Please be seated so that we can-some of our
panelists, this is the middle of their business day, and they need to get
back to their positions of employment, unlike the rest of us who are
lounging around here learning today. We'd like to get started on the
3:30 panel which is entitled "The Seizure of Narco-Terrorists Abroad,"
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an issue which has become current as a result of a number of recent
cases, most particularly the case currently pending in California
against Rafael Caroll Kentaro [sic] and a group of defendants in mat-
ters dealing with the seizure of a Mexican doctor and his rendition to
the United States. The moderator for today's panel was to be Victoria
Toensing. She is in trial in Boston, Massachusetts, and I am substitut-
ing for her today under orders from my wife, Victoria Toensing, to do
that.
(Laughter.)
Mr. diGENOVA: I'm going to introduce each of our panelists
right now, and then we'll just run through them in the order in which
they are on the panel. Our first speaker will be William P. Barr, who is
the Deputy Attorney General. Mr. Barr is a lawyer of great distinction
in this city. He has been the Deputy Attorney General since May of
1990. Prior to that time, he served as the Assistant Attorney General
for the Office of Legal Counsel, a very, very important job where legal
advice is rendered to the Attorney General, a position in which he used
to render some very significant legal advice in the subject matter of our
panel discussion today and about which he will speak. Mr. Barr has
served throughout the government in the Central Intelligence Agency,
and as a law clerk to a very respected member of our D.C. Circuit,
Malcolm Wilkey.
The next speaker will be someone who is known to all of you,
Judge Abraham D. Sofaer. He is currently with the law firm of
Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, and is formerly the State Department of
Legal Advisor and was involved in many of the issues about which we
will speak on this panel and which were spoken of both earlier today
and in the previous panel. He has served as United States District
Judge in the Southern District of New York and has been a professor
of law at Columbia University. His resume is much longer than what I
have just given you but in the interest of time we will stop at that
point.
The final panelist will be Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld, the
Charles L. Denison Professor of Law at New York University School
of Law. The professor specializes in public and private international
law, international economic transactions, aviation law as well as inter-
national litigation and arbitration. He is an author of books on interna-
tional legal process, conflicts, aviation and international economic law.
He has also written widely on various aspects of international trade,
investment, finance and dispute settlement, and perhaps most relevant,
has recently written a series of articles on U.S. law enforcement abroad
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in which he takes the position that constitutional restraints on govern-
mental action apply or should apply abroad as well. as within the
United States, a position which has recently been repudiated by the
United States Supreme Court. We will now begin our discussion.
(Laughter.)
[This is a report on Mr. Barr's comments:
The June 1989 OLC opinion addressed the legality, but not the
policy implications, of United States law enforcement agents making
arrests overseas without consent of the local government in contraven-
tion of customary international law. The Court held. that domestic
United States law grants such authority. In so doing, it overruled a
1980 opinion and its two arguments to the contrary: 1) that the United
States was powerless to take action that impinged on the sovereignty of
other nations; and 2) that statutes authorizing FBI action abroad were
to be construed to comport with customary international law.
The current position is that the President or Congress can, when
necessary, override customary international law, because what is "cus-
tomary" is not a static concept, but rather an evolving concept. By
making judgments which are sometimes out of bounds, the United
States plays an important role in shaping those rules. Our Constitution
demands that our political branches, and primarily Congress, not let
foreign ministries impose rules on the people of the United States with-
out their consent. If customary international law constrains our govern-
ment from what it considers to be an appropriate response to a situa-
tion, it must be rejected.]
JUDGE SOFAER: It's a pleasure to be here and to talk about this
very uncontroversial subject-
(Laughter.)
JUDGE SOFAER: -that one can always feel confident one is go-
ing to be quoted with impartiality and accuracy. Nonetheless, since
we're used to being bashed with pieces out of our own words repeatedly
after five years of Washington life, I'll plunge ahead. I completely con-
cur with Bill Barr that the 1980 opinion should have been overruled. In
fact, Joe and others in the Attorney General's office before this present
administration came in had reached that conclusion, and Bill came
along and did the work and implemented the policies that made a lot of
sense, it seemed to me, in reversing the earlier opinion, which I think
was extreme in the assertions it made.
On the other hand, I do think it's very important to say two things.
One, to confirm that Bill's opinion did not address the international law
and international relations aspects of such seizures abroad, non-consen-
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sual seizures abroad. The President and the Attorney General and the
Secretary of State made it crystal clear that there were important legal
and policy concerns in connection with any such seizure that had to be
addressed. There are always, in any of these situations where you don't
have a seizure in international waters, at least three laws, or sets of
laws involved. There is the U.S. law, there is international law, and
then there is the domestic law of the country in which the action is
taken. However authoritative the Office of Legal Counsel may be on
the U.S. law, and the Legal Adviser combined with the Attorney Gen-
eral may be on international.law, we are not authoritative with respect
to the meaning of the local law of the other state.
We cannot pretend to dictate to other states about their local au-
thorities and what steps they can take when a foreign state acts within
their borders in a manner that they have not authorized. Bill has been
emphatic in passing this on internally, as I have, that when an action of
this kind is taken in a foreign country, the individuals involved, acting
on behalf of the United States, might be considered kidnappers if
someone dies as a result of this kind of action.
So it's a very, very serious business and obviously the United
States keeps that in mind all the time in connection with these matters.
Now the second basic point I want to make is not anything new. I want
to emphasize this because people always jump on you, you know.
You're saying something new. You're out of the government. I have
always said that the issue of whether U.S. law has already authorita-
tively overridden customary international law, is undecided. The ad-
ministration has a position. There is undoubtedly going to be at some
point an interpretation of that issue, and I think it is incumbent on the
administration to consider the rule that statutes are construed very nar-
rowly when it is clear that to construe them otherwise would violate
established principles of international law.
That is a doctrine that the administration, any administration, is
going to have to come up against when it argues that a generally
worded statute combined with the direction of the Attorney General
overrides customary international law. It is crystal clear that if Con-
gress has clearly authorized an action in violation of international law,
and the President has joined in that and orders some action to be
taken, however, clearly it violates international law, the courts, our
courts, have repeatedly said that they will not intervene; that is a politi-
cal decision.
But the question is, is it clear that Congress has intended a viola-
tion of customary international law in this area? So I think those two
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conceptual issues are worth touching on, and then I'd like to talk about
some practical things that give me some concern. First of all, I have
defended the importance of international law repeatedly, both inside
the government and outside the government in connection with these
matters, not only because I believe in international law. Anyone who
doesn't believe in international law is just closing his eyes to reality.
And in that connection I might say that every now and then I hear how
there is no such thing as customary international law, and a head of
state who happens -to be visiting the country or is planning a visit to the
country can be arrested by the local U.S. Attorney, and I'm forced to
write a little memo over to the White House pointing out that some
idiot in the Department of Justice is claiming that he can arrest the
head of a friendly state because there is no such thing as customary
international law, and that person, that idiot, and I certainly feel he is
an idiot, hears from the White House about the fact that, well, we
don't care if there is no such thing as customary international law, you
will keep your hands off the head of state of this friendly country with-
out our particular approval.
Now, whether there is or isn't such a thing as customary interna-
tional law, I feel that message that goes from the White House to the
Attorney General's office is an important reflection of reality, and if
you want to call that reality customary international law, as I do, then
there is such a thing as customary international law. And it might well
be based not on something that happened early in our nation's foggy
childhood. I didn't think that John Marshall was particularly a foggy
thinker, but rather because our head of state wishes to go to other
friendly states and doesn't particularly want to be ar:rested by some
idiot in the Department of Justice over there.
So there are very real concerns that I think may be appropriate for
a certain degree of security that is helpful in the day to day operation
of government. But I want to go on from there and say, yes, I stand up
for international law and stood up for international law in the govern-
ment, but I am appalled when I read publicly over and over again ar-
guments about why it is so terrible and so outrageous that any for-
eigner ever gets grabbed overseas, brought to the United States, and
prosecuted for some heinous crime.
I would just like to say that I don't think it's so terrible. First of
all, it's been going on a long time, and we're not the only ones who do
it. Foreign countries have done it repeatedly in human history. Now I
would submit to you, having read every reported case of seizures
abroad and having heard about many non-reported cases that I could
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get my hands on, and I have some wonderful people working for me in
the Legal Adviser's Office, that almost always these seizures occur with
the consent of the state involved.
Now that consent doesn't have to be official. I'm not saying it oc-
curs with a signed, sealed and delivered body and an order and every-
thing else. It happens. Consent comes in all kinds of forms. And I don't
understand why people are so keen on ratcheting up the rules relating
to consent. Why do we have to have formalized consent of a foreign
government? What interest are we serving by demanding a rigid and
high degree of consent? It seems to me our law enforcement authorities
know what they're doing in this area. They work with other law en-
forcement authorities, particularly with respect to narco-issues today,
where narcotics violations are international crimes that almost every
nation has agreed to enforce. I don't understand what interest we're
serving by ratcheting up the requirements relating to consent.
If a colorable case of consent and good faith is present, why does a
court have to even examine the issue? It seems to me that if the Attor-
ney General's office in some kind of an affidavit makes it clear that a
colorable basis for consensual action existed in the cooperation of the
two law enforcement agencies involved, or even with some higher level
official, that ought to be the end of that as far as any law is con-
cerned--domestic, international or even the law of that foreign state.
Now, with respect to those situations where the foreign country really
is offended, and, in fact, no one in authority consented, I am also puz-
zled there as to why the issue is made an issue for our criminal law.
Why is it in our interest, in any nation's interest or in the public
interest, to convert what is a very, very sensitive and extremely impor-
tant issue of international relations into an issue of criminal defense
procedure? It is a massive, it seems to me, expansion of the exclusion-
ary rule at a time when we have learned after years of practice of all
the lying, of all the corruption, and of all the injustice and cost and
delay that the exclusionary rule generates, why apply such a failure of
a rule in this area where the remedies, my God, can hardly be said to
be inadequate.
I'm looking at my friend from Canada who happens to be here in
the audience, and I'm sure there are many other foreign lawyers
around who represent their countries so ably here, when we took an
action (I take the rap in the sense that I was the Legal Adviser here)
when some American goon takes the action of grabbing a foreigner in a
foreign country and bringing him here, the roof caves in if there was no
consent, in fact. The roof caves in, and we're not going to get into a
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war with Canada, for God's sake. The issue here is friendship. Our
friendship with our neighbor is threatened. We have hundreds of legal
issues with Canada.
We don't need this kind of a garbage issue to deal with on top of
all those other important questions. And so we go into action, and we
go looking for that guy, and the Attorney General generally gets right
along with us, and we go and we try to catch that person and punish
him. These individuals, in fact, were prosecuted and sent to prison, and
the Canadian was released and sent back. I think the remedies are ade-
quate, the political remedies and all that flows from them are adequate
in this area.
Finally, one more point: the issue of extraordinary circumstances
is something that must be touched upon. Because even in this area of
consent, I would submit to you we are in a world where international
law itself is changing. Ten years ago there wasn't an international law
relating to drugs that we have today. The international law relating to
drugs is different today than it was ten years ago. The international law
relating to terrorism is different today. The international law relating
to human rights is different today. And the international law relating to
self-defense is different today.
And if a bunch of narco-terrorists take the position that they're
going to kill my President, or that they're going to send someone here
to find him or catch him in Bogota when he's on a visit and kill him, I
can tell you as Legal Adviser, I would construe that as a threat to the
United States. Whether it amounts to an attack under Article 51 is
something that I will leave to others to finagle over.. Because in the
history of human relations an inherent right is not changed by adding a
few words after it, and the inherent right of self-defense has always
included the right of a state to protect its nationals and particularly its
head of state.
And finally, the issue beyond self-defense, in the human rights
area, if you're for international law, you better wake up. If you think
that international law is not going to support some of these seizures
some day a lot mere extensively than some people may want. While
some people are arguing for the rights of defendants, which I don't
think is going to go anywhere in terms of restraining states from seiz-
ing people abroad, the great trend-of international law is foclised on the
rights of decent human beings, people whose moral rights are outraged
by inhuman conduct, by monsters who kill innocents, who sell drugs
that ravage communities. That's the course of international law in this
world, and you better start planning for it because Adolf Eichmann
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was only the first of the line of cases in that course of human history.
When there was outrage over the seizure of Eichmann and the
state involved went to the United Nations and raised that, and clearly
it was a violation of law, what was the remedy ultimately issued and
accepted by the state involved? An apology. No payment, no request
for his rerendition, nothing. And history now has a precedent that no
one questions the propriety of. I mean certainly someone says, oh, well,
-it was a violation of law, but you go out in the world and ask, is what
happened to Adolf Eichmann morally improper?
Even the state involved, in its final statements in the Security
Council, made it clear that they were not going to seek more than an
apology. So I think we're living here in a world that's dynamic. There
are some uncertainties as to what's going on, and I've touched on what
I think they are. But the trend, I would submit to you, is one where the
courts of this nation and of all civilized nations, and the highest offi-
cials of those nations, are going to come back to what counts. And
what counts is justice in the great sense of the word.
That is going to either lead states to be more forthcoming in the
rendition of these criminals or to the development of international law
of external seizures that is far more robust than you can imagine today.
Thank you.
Mr. diGENOVA: Thank you, Abe.
(Applause.)
DR. LOWENFELD: I'm sort of debating whether to depart to-
tally from my prepared remarks and respond to the not very subtle
accusations. I agree with Mr. Barr that he's not an international
lawyer.
(Applause.)
DR. LOWENFELD: I'm not sure I agree when by implication he
regards me as a member of a small fringe element. I did after all labor
for a good many years on the American Law Institute's Restatement,
and with minor exceptions, most of what my colleagues and I wrote
was adopted by what you might call the establishment, legal institu-
tions. And Mr. Sofaer, by implication, says you'd better wake up. He
did say it, and I think in part he meant me, and I hadn't thought that I
was asleep. But let me just start with a couple of propositions. One I
think is self-evident. The other, I regret to say, is controversial, though
when Mr. diGenova said it's old hat and eliminated, I'm not sure I'm
willing to concede that.
The first proposition is that kidnapping is a bad thing. It's a crime.
It's a crime of violence. It's an assault on human dignity, and there are
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no nice kidnappings. I'll come back to that in a minute. My second
proposition is that the Constitution, including in particular the Bill of
Rights, governs all conduct of officers of the United States in line of
duty. At least figuratively speaking, I think an officer of the United
States, wherever he is, carries the Constitution in his pocket as Hugo
Black and Sam Ervin, and I, at least today, do. I don't think you can
say it's like an overcoat, and when I cross the border I take it off.
It seems that the Supreme Court doesn't agree or at least doesn't
agree completely with that. In the Verdugo case, the court draws a
distinction between the fourth amendment and the fifth amendment. It
talks about beneficiaries, and it says, well, citizens are b -neficiaries and
aliens aren't unless they're resident aliens or have some other affilia-
tion. I find none of that very persuasive, and I think I can give you a
fairly simple example. Suppose, for example, the DEA has a program
in South America, and it says for that program we reject all blacks.
Don't want them. Doesn't matter because the Constitution doesn't ap-
ply. I can't believe anybody would support that.
Or suppose they say anybody who works for the DEA in Brazil
has to go to Church every Sunday whether he likes it or not. Nobody
would believe that. So the notion that somehow the Constitution isn't
relevant to American official conduct seems to me really quite unper-
suasive. As I wrote in my article in the American Law Journal, I would
not have been upset in the Verdugo Urquidez case if the Supreme
Court-remember that was the case, partly of kidnapping, although
that's not what went to the Supreme Court. The part that went to the
Supreme Court was that while he was already in American custody
north of the Mexican border, some guys, in a joint cooperative venture,
and I'll come back to that, too, went to his two houses and conducted a
search, a search that apparently would not have passed rauster, at least
the argument was it wouldn't.
I would not have been upset if the Supreme Court had said what
Justice Stevens did, which is to say, well, the fourth amendment pro-
hibits unreasonable searches, and in this context it wasn't unreasona-
ble. I suggested that in my article, and then I had the P.S. in galley. I
added something to it at the risk of writing for journals. But the notion
that somehow the Constitution becomes irrelevant, I think, is unpersua-
sive. I think the historical argument induced by Justice Rehnquist is
really just not there. I mean he quotes a page from Madison's state-
ment when he introduces the Bill of Rights, and you read it and it just
doesn't say what the Chief Justice said it did.
The notion that people is different from persons, I can never even
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restate it. It just, I think, is unpersuasive, and I think we'll see that
over time they'll take that back. We have a case now, you know, which
is technically statutory construction about discrimination and employ-
ment, but I think you'll see that those issues just don't come up. But
my main purpose here isn't to argue about or reargue the constitutional
question. Perhaps I'm too late for that. I don't know. But my point is I
think the United States government ought to learn to behave better. I
don't think you win the war against thugs by behaving like thugs.
My friend Judge Sofaer says, well, these days things are different.
I put in my article-forgive me for repeating for those of you who read
it-I put the example of the killers of Mr. Herrhausen. Herrhausen
was the most important banker in Germany. He was the chairman of
the board of the Deutsche Bank. He was assassinated by terrorists in
one of those sophisticated operations where his car apparently broke a
beam of light, and that set off a bomb. Now suppose suspects in that
terrorist operation show up in the United States. There's no doubt the
German government would demand their extradition, and let us sup-
pose they come with probable cause sufficient to arrest the person.
Well, then the suspects go before the courts. We have a variety of
defenses. I agree with John Murphy and others that the political of-
fense exception ought to be narrowed. I don't agree with Judge
Sprizzo, for example, the way he defines it. But it is certainly possible
that a judge might have problems with the political offense exception
that there are habeas corpus proceedings. You can appeal from a de-
nial of habeas corpus.
Suppose at some point along the way, the German government
gets a couple of agents and puts them on and grabs the guy who, let us
say, is out on bail and they find him in Philadelphia and take him back
to Germany. I can't believe that the United States wouldn't be totally
outraged, would regard such an act as a violation, yes, of the domestic
law, Abe, as you say, but also of international law. But now comes the
next point: suppose it isn't quite that simple. Suppose the law enforce-
ment officials of the Federal Republic have friends in, say, the FBI or
the local police force, and they make a deal. And it is the local officials
or the FBI or the police in Philadelphia who put the guy on a Luf-
thansa plane, and then he's taken back, and when the American gov-
ernment protests, the German government says, oh, -there was consent.
I can't believe that that's the kind of behavior that we would ac-
cept. This, of course, is a hypothetical case, and it's doubly hypotheti-
cal, first, because we haven't seen it, and second because it's with Eu-
rope, whereas everything we've been talking about here tends to be
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with Latin America. But I'm suggesting that the notion that these are
not shared values is just wrong. Now I want to talk for a minute about
the Toscanino [sic] case. Most of you know the Toscanino case in
which the Second Circuit said that if allegations of kidnapping and
brutality and torture in bringing a guy back from South America were
correct, then the U.S. court would have no jurisdiction to try him. In
the actual case, as some of you know, he was not able to prove those
allegations. And I don't really know the details of that.
Toscanino alleged that he had been blindfolded for seventeen days,
and whether he was lying or whether he just couldn't prove them, I
really don't know. I don't believe anybody in any of these cases, as I've
written. But what I want to talk about is the follow-up of the Tos-
canino case. There were two cases almost immediately afterwards
which involved apparently the same alleged conspiracy. One was a fel-
low called Lujan [sic], and Lujan was lured from Argentina to Bolivia.
He was there seized by Bolivians Working for the United States. That
is, they were some kind of law enforcement officers, but they were act-
ing as agents of the U.S. He was put on a plane for the: United States,
and he said I'm like Toscanino, and the Second Circuit said, well, what
happened to you wasn't so bad, you weren't brutalized and tortured.
You were merely kidnapped.
I started out, if you remember, my proposition was there are no
nice kidnappings. Then, the second fellow, Lira, all these three cases
within a very short time, he was arrested in Chile. He said he was
tortured. There were electric prongs on his bed of steel. HFIe had all kind
of horrible disgusting things that happened to him, and then after sev-
eral weeks he was put on a plane with a couple of D EA agents and
taken once more to New York, and he made the same argument, and
the court held, well, it's true you were tortured, or at least you made
credible assertions of torture, but you haven't proved that the United
States officials did it. They may have just been bystanders.
Well, I think both of these cases are wrong. As I say, I think Lu-
jan is wrong because it suggests that there are acceptable kidnappings,
and I reject that. And Lira is wrong because I think we'll never know
who did what. I think I've read most of the cases of the so-called joint
ventures or cooperations. If some of you want to look at the citations,
they're in the notes to section 413 of the Foreign Relations Restate-
ment. And whenever you read a case like that you wonder what really
did happen.
For instance, just to take a not very political case, a case called
Marzano, the decision says the FBI agents accompanied the local po-
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lice superintendent while the latter made the arrest, put the suspect on
the plane, seated between two American agents and took him away.
Well, who did what? I don't know, and I'm not sure that we'll ever
know. We had this problem in the United States in the period between
the Weeks case in 1914 which essentially developed the exclusionary
rule for federal officials, and Mapp in the 1960s which applied it to the
states. There were lots and lots of cases, if you read LeFevere [sic], he
spells them out in great detail where federal officials take evidence and
take a person who was arrested by state officials, and the holdings are,
if it was truly a joint venture, then you suppress.
And on the other hand, if the government, federal government, got
the evidence on a silver platter, then it's okay. It can use it. I think
those cases were all unpersuasive, and I think the cases say that the
foreign guys did it, and the Americans just watched are equally unper-
suasive. Whether it's in a technical sense a partnership, an agency, a
joint venture or whatever, I don't know. But I do know one thing. The
foreign officials acting in their own country act with much less restraint
than they would if they had to bring the suspect before their own
courts or their own police authorities. They know that what they do
won't ever be tested in front of their own authorities or courts because
the guy is going to go on a plane to America.
Well, that brings me-if I can have just a couple of more min-
utes-to the famous Ker-Frisbee doctrine. The Ker case, which hap-
pened in 1883 in Bolivia, of course, well before our due process revolu-
tion, well before the intervention of the international law of human
rights, but also interestingly enough, it happened when there was no
Peruvian government. Chile was occupying Peru. There was a rump
Peruvian government somewhere in the hills. The lady from Peru who's
here will know the details of this much better than I do.
But the notion, the Supreme Court suddenly said, well, a claim of
violation of international law can only be made by the duly constituted
government, has a kind of ironic twist about it, and even if there is a
firm government, you get really the classical catch-22 situation. Some
of you may remember the Argaud case. Argaud was a former colonel
or maybe brigadier general in the French Army who defected and
joined the OAS, not the Organization of American States. I forgot
what the initials stand for. It was the group that was against de Gaulle
because they thought de Gaulle was giving Algeria independence, and
he was hunted for awhile, and he was found in Germany and brought
in some kind of a bundle in a van, and then guess what, he showed up
in Paris, and they picked him up.
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And he challenged the way that he was kidnapped, and the court
said, the lower court said, well, if you think there is international law
violated, that would have to be a protest by the German government.
Well, the German Parliament read about this, passed a resolution. The
lower court said you're out of time. The pleading-it's too late for the
pleading. The Supreme Court in France said, well, the lower court
should not have done that. They should have accepted a late pleading
in these circumstances, but after all, if the German Parliament is
claiming a violation of international law, that can be settled on an in-
tergovernmental basis. Too bad for Col. Argaud.
So I think the notion of relying on the foreign government protest
tends to be not meaningful. I think it's also obsolete or Et least obsoles-
cent, and maybe here, Mr. Sofaer and I have differing views about the
trend of international law. I think we are in a period of ascendant indi-
vidual rights to international law. We no longer think that international
law doesn't care when a country tortures its own citizens, for instance.
And so I think to simply say that a suspect has no basis for asserting a
violation of international law is, or at least ought to be, wrong.
And third, I think-you say be practical-I think there are lots of
reasons why a state may not want to raise the issue of violation of
international law or violation of the treaty. Sometimes there's actual
consent. Often there is consent at some level, and you don't know at
which level. I wasn't here this morning. I just came at lunchtime from
New York, but I understand there was talk about the Alvarez Machain
case. Well, the interesting thing about that case is that the American
officials involved in the Alvarez Machain case thought they were deal-
ing with Mexican officials. And then the high officials said, no, you
weren't. Who will ever know?
I don't know that anybody, that anybody can tell when somebody
says we're going to do it, but off the record, and don't tell somebody
else. I'm really, I'm suspicious about all those things. I think when we
have consent, joint operations should be done by the political branches
of the government. I was going to say something about the shortcom-
ings of extradition. You heard that already today. I certainly would
like to see extradition strengthened, and I don't need to go over the
details of that. I Just think extradition has three purposes: it is to pro-
tect the interest of the requesting state, the requested state, and indi-
viduals, and I don't think you should forget that.
I'm far from being on the side of criminals. Since I wrote my arti-
cles, several people have called me up and said would you help us with
our brief and so on. And I've said no. And I continue to say no. That's
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not my purpose. My purpose is to have my government-it's been
twenty odd years since I've been a part of it, but I'm a citizen-to have
my government behave properly, and I think in the long-run, it's those
values that are the best, that are really the best remedy. I was very
moved by the speeches of the two brave ladies from Colombia and
Peru. And I think it's no accident that they come to America because
America is the country with the lasting values.
I think it's more important to preserve those values than to grab a
few thugs who will be replaced by other thugs the next month. Thank
you.
Mr. diGENOVA: Thank you very much, Professor. I want to open
up a bit of discussion in the time remaining between our panelists, but
I want to underscore something that's very important here, particularly
in light of the Professor's last remarks. And that is that frequently in
our hemisphere, particularly in Central America and South America,
the American government receives requests not to extradite people and
to use other means of an extraditable nature for political reasons of
that host country. It is a very common practice for internal political
reasons for those countries that wish that there not be extradition be-
cause they don't want to deal with that, and they prefer the rendition
method, and they are fully consenting in that process.
And there are recent cases to that effect, which I'm not going to
discuss, but they're there, and they're well-known. Bill, you wanted to
respond to some comments?
DR. LOWENFELD: What are those?
MR. diGENOVA: I'm not going to talk about the cases that I
know about, but the truth is that they are legion.
MR. BARR: I think there are two ways, you know there are two
perspectives of looking at renditions. One is from an international law
perspective, and the other is from the perspective of domestic law, basi-
cally U.S. criminal law. And I think from the perspective of interna-
tional law, there is very little disagreement, and I agree with Abe's
remarks about the importance of adhering to international norms. The
United States has a strong interest in developing a just set of interna-
tional norms that promote peace and stability in the world, and it is a
very serious matter with potentially grave consequences whenever the
United States chooses to ignore those aspects of customary interna-
tional law.
Now, let's look at it, however, from the standpoint of domestic
law. If the President directs the arrest of someone overseas without the
consent of the host government, there are a number of legal challenges
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that can be interposed, and that have been interposed. One challenge
relates to the legality of the arrest under U.S. law or under interna-
tional law. And it has been advanced that the United States cannot,
officers of the United States cannot arrest people overseas. They lack
the power. Therefore, you should throw out the case. It's also been ad-
vanced that while they may have the power as a matter of domestic
law, they violated customary international law, and a violation of cus-
tomary international law should be made an exception to Ker-Frisbee,
and you should throw out the case on that basis.
There have been other constitutional arguments interposed that
the arrest is a violation of the fourth amendment, the principal argu-
ment being that if it violates the law of the host country or if it violates
international law, it is, therefore, unreasonable, and therefore a viola-
tion of the fourth amendment. I don't think that line of argument is
going to get yery far in the wake of Verdugo. And then there is the
argument that the arrest overseas is a violation of the fifth amendment,
and I think Toscanino has been greatly narrowed, and basically stands
for the proposition that absent extremely cruel treatment by the arrest-
ing authority such as torture of the arrestee, that there will be no viola-
tion of the fifth amendment.
And what we basically have being played out in the criminal
courts of the United States are these attempts to interpose irregulari-
ties in the arrests or the apprehension of those people, as a way of
escaping trial and ultimately punishment. And what we have in-and
I'm not going to comment extensively on Machain because it's on ap-
peal right now, but the rendition opinion of June of '89 basically says
that the United States does have the authority to violate customary
international law, and therefore an arrest in violation of customary in-
ternational law is lawful under U.S. law, and therefore, t does not pro-
vide a basis for the defendant to challenge the jurisdiction of the U.S.
court.
I think also the rule of law that is in the United States and will
continue to develop is that a violation of customary international law
will not provide a basis for escaping Ker-Frisbee. That once he had
been apprehended, even though there is a violation of customary inter-
national law, that's a matter between the states-it doesn't create indi-
vidual rights in the defendant. The defendant must stand trial. If we
have offended the sovereignty of another country, that's a matter be-
tween the United States and that country. And that was basically ap-
proached in the Eichmann case.
In Machain, what you have is an attempt to get around Ker-Fris-
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bee by suggesting that the rendition violated the extradition law, the
extradition treaty. And I think basically the position of the United
States is that we didn't violate the extradition treaty. We operated
outside the extradition treaty. We ignored the extradition treaty. We
did not go under the extradition treaty. It was obtained by other
means. The second basis of Judge Raffertie's opinion in Machain is
that you violated the treaty, and the violation of a treaty provides some
kind of special exception to Ker-Frisbee. That you can violate the Con-
stitution, you can violate federal statutes, but you can't violate a treaty.
If you violate a treaty, Ker-Frisbee must fold. Now we disagree with
that. We don't see a special exception for treaties under the Ker-Fris-
bee doctrine. In fact, it's counter-intuitive.
One would think that violations of the Constitution, the fundamen-
tal law of the land, would be more severe, and if anything-
DR. LOWENFELD: But you said it doesn't apply.
MR. BARR: Well-a violation of someone's constitutional rights
is more serious, and if anything would give rise to the Ker-Frisbee ex-
ception. It would be a violation of an individual's constitutional rights,
which hasn't been the doctrine under Ker-Frisbee, not the violation of a
treaty, which basically derives its authoritative nature from the Consti-
tution itself.
One thing that's interesting is to think about our own experience
as a federal republic. The United States has had a lot of experience
with extradition because of our early experience with extradition was
among the colonies, and then among the states. And we do have an
extradition treaty in our Constitution, as part of our compact as a Con-
stitution. I think it's Article IV, and we have the procedures whereby
one state governor can request another state to extradite somebody
back for punishment, trial and punishment. So that's our extradition
treaty built right into the Constitution. And let's not forget, while we're
dumping on Ker-Frisbee, we have a lot more current case law dealing
with snatches within the United States, where state governors have
filed protests against people being kidnapped from their states, and yet
the Ker-Frisbee rule has been applied, and that is that even though
there is a violation arguably of Article IV of the Constitution, our built
in extradition treaty in the Constitution, that's not enough to defeat the
jurisdiction of the court.
Just very briefly I want to say two things about points Abe raised.
And one is I think Abe is right that-and I think one of the great
services he performed in his capacity as Legal Adviser is focusing inter-
national law on where it should be focused, the basis of law, all law,
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including international law, should be protecting the innocent from
predators. And I see all too often among international publicists and
international journals and so forth a tendency to treat international law
as sort of the strands by which you tie down Gulliver so that the inter-
national predators and thugs can use it as a shield and go about the
world willy-nilly, and not enough attention paid to how the rule of law
must be made to protect the innocent against the predators. And that
leads to the other point that I think Abe adverted to, which is the con-
cept of self-defense. Many of the situations where the United States
might be tempted-I would not say it would ultimately be the deci-
sion-but many of the circumstances where renditions are talked about
are situations where we should think about the scope of the right to
self-defense and perhaps help the law evolve in a direction where the
right to self-defense is understood to permit some of the activities that
we're talking about.
Massive narcotics trafficking, sometimes with the complicity of the
government or the tolerance of the government, is a threat to our na-
tional security, and perhaps, you know, actions of self-defense that are
focused on apprehending the wrongdoer and then providing some due
process, are a better form of self-defense than more indiscriminate
ways of retaliating against that kind of conduct. And the same thing
can be said for terrorist activities whereby if you can bomb Qadhafi,
then why can't you arrest a terrorist as an act of self-defense.
Arresting a terrorist is far more focused with less collateral dam-
age and more due process than retaliatory measures. That's my
response.
JUDGE SOFAER: I think that it's interesting to me that Andy,
who I deeply respect and obviously I agree with most of what he says
in his articles, that Andy takes exception to the Supreme Court repeat-
edly, and so do so many people in this field who want to restrain these
seizures overseas. It isn't-the notion that people who are opposed to
these kinds of seizures want to convey to the world, and the press, of
course, joins them in trying to convey this notion-that "the government
is some kind of a monster that's going out there and acting illegally
repeatedly and in every way. Well, the fact of the matter is that the
Supreme Court has made clear that certain things are the law, and
people are very unhappy with that law, and to the extent that interna-
tional law is relevant, and it certainly is, the principle of consent is a
principle that relates to the state of mind of two states. It isn't a matter
that they should have to convince Andy Lowenfeld or judge anybody
about. It is a sovereign matter, and I don't understand why Andy needs
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to know all these things. Why are you so curious?
DR. LOWENFELD: You told me I should wake up, didn't you?
JUDGE SOFAER: Yeah, wake up.
(Laughter.)
JUDGE SOFAER: Wake up to what I think is a reality that is
behind this kind of instinctual notion in American lawyers that the only
way to deal with a problem is to give some criminal the right to com-
plain about it in a federal court. That is not the only way to deal with
the problem. If we are doing something wrong as a government, as a
society, my God, there are plenty of ways of stopping us, and every one
of us who serves in the government as a lawyer, who has any guts, and
we all do, and certainly the people at this table do because I've seen
memos from Joe and Bill, we'll complain and we'll stop things from
happening that shouldn't happen.
Isn't that the first test? And if there isn't a lot of complaining, my
goodness, why are we letting this guy who maybe watched somebody
get cut up in pieces, vicious human being, have some rights that we
don't need to give him? Why are we doing it? It's ridiculous. Now, if
the state did complain, well, then let's go and deal with that problem
because that's a serious problem. In fact, some officials violated the
sovereignty of a state and did not have any consent, well, I think that
remedies are appropriate and there are plenty of them. Look at the
historical record.
Sure, in Eichmann, they did not get Eichmann back. I don't think
they really wanted him. And I would tell you, though, that very often
people are given back, very often, historically. The record is quite ex-
traordinary that when there, in fact, is no consent, these people are
frequently given back politically, not because some federal district
judge decided that a murderer or someone who participated in a mur-
der, should be given some kind of human rights treatment.'
I just want to accept the hypothetical and let's face it right in the
eye. I was the one who raised with Senator Specter this hypothetical of
the British coming and taking an IRA suspect because Sprizzo
wouldn't extradite him, and Herrhausen's killers would be another one,
but not as fair because there we don't have in international treaty, and
it isn't clear that they violated an international criminal law. And I
think that's a very important thing that when some person who has
violated international law concerning which the state involved a duty to
extradite that adds a very important international legal dimension, but
let's take that hypothetical and I would stand by my position.
I would think the Attorney General would join me, and Bill would
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join me in saying we would not seek the exclusion of evidence in the
case of a murderer in a foreign court to enable a person to be acquitted
in a criminal prosecution for the murder of the banker Herrhausen,
whose wife I met at dinner once in my travels around the world, who I
sat with and heard her talk about their only child, and had to remem-
ber that for the rest of my life that this man was murdered like he was,
as viciously and as mindlessly. I would not seek in any way, shape or
form any alleviation of his problems even if he were picked up in the
United States.
I would protest to the German government, and I would insist on
something being worked out that was acceptable to the United States
relating to him, but I would think that if he were punished criminally
for a crime of that kind of seriousness, it would be perfectly acceptable.
DR. LOWENFELD: May I get in a quick word? Just a couple of
quick remarks. I'm really anxious to feel how the parliament feels here.
Bill Barr keeps using the word "customary" in front of international
law as if that somehow weakens international law. I don't think that's
right. I think traditionally customary international law has, if anything,
a higher standing than treaty law, and I think without digressing too
much, we've got 200,000 troops in the Persian Gulf right now to defend
that principle of international law so I think it's a mistake to just de-
preciate it.
Now Judge Sofaer says, well, I don't like what the Supreme Court
does. Of course, it's interesting that the Supreme Court has not heard a
kidnapping case as this kind of a kidnapping case since Frisbee was a
domestic case, and it came to the Supreme Court in 1952 before Earl
Warren and before that whole revolution. It's interesting also that the
Judge Rafeedie, a Reagan appointee, and as far as I kiow a conserva-
tive Southern California judge, looked at this whole controversy-I
mean the whole conspiracy in the Camarena case which was certainly a
brutal-and said I've had enough. This is the third or the fourth guy
they've snatched and stop a minute. And finally Abe's plea about these
terrible killers, that, of course, is the whole argument against the exclu-
sionary rule in any case. We can deter the police by punishing them.
Mr. Miranda and Mr. Escobedo were not lovely people either.
Somewhere along the line-I'm not a criminal law specialist, and
maybe it was a mistake-but somewhere along the line over the last
twenty, thirty years, we developed the position that it's better-that we
have no other way to make the police behave properly than to say if
you misbehave, the suspect walks no matter how evil he is. And I re-
gret to say that I would like to have if Mr. Barr were able to say I'm
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going to issue an order that this kind of thing stops, that's fine. I don't
make this great plea for the exclusionary rule. My plea is that the
United States government ought not to behave in a way that fights
crime with crime.
MR. diGENOVA: Let's open it up to some questions from the
floor in the little bit of time we have remaining. Perhaps we have gen-
erated some interest with this rather lively discussion. Can we speed it
up here and ask as quickly as you can?
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Mr. Barr, I believe you also au-
thored an opinion earlier last year that the Posse Comitatus Act doesn't
apply outside the United States. Can you l'ut together that opinion
with the opinion that you spent so much time talking about here, and I
guess the question would be if the President has the authority to order
the FBI to act outside the territorial borders of the United States in
violation of customary international law, can he do the same thing with
the 82nd Airborne? This is self-serving, I realize.
MR. BARR: Yes. The Posse Comitatus opinion dealt with the ex-
traterritorial effect of the post-Civil War, the Reconstruction Era re-
striction on use of military for law enforcement purposes. And the con-
clusion of the opinion was that it was meant to be restricted to the
territorial United States. That it really was intended to prevent federal
troops from interfering in state law enforcement activity. It was never
intended to have extraterritorial effect. That opinion was consistent
with the only circuit court case that has been decided on the issue is
well as a number of Defense Department opinions on the issue.
So under the Posse Comitatus opinion, the military overseas can
be used for law enforcement purposes, if they are directed by the Presi-
dent to undertake law enforcement activities. Under our view of it, the
President does have the authority to authorize military personnel to en-
gage in law enforcement activities including arrests outside the United
States, and, in fact, in the operation in Panama, the President did au-
thorize the military to apprehend people who were indicted, members
of the PDF who were indicted in the United States. Now those appre-
hensions were not made by military personnel, but they did have the
authority at the time of the operation to do that.
JUDGE SOFAER: And the government, the legitimate govern-
ment of Panama, accepted that, agreed to it.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: But the rest of that question was
based on that second question. Sir, could the President use the United
States military as he could use the FBI in violating customary interna-
tional law outside the United States?
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MR. BARR: Well, strictly speaking, as a matter of law as opposed
to whether that's good policy or appropriate from an international law
standpoint, you could use as a matter of domestic law, it would be our
view that you could use the military then in the same way you use the
FBI.
Mr. diGENOVA: Yes, Sir. Please.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: My name is Professor Abraham Abramov-
sky from Fordham Law School and I would like to ask you, Mr. Barr,
let's assume-let's forget about Germany and England, for a second.
Let's assume that you had an Iraqi unofficial delegation coming over to
the United States saying that we don't like Aramco people because
they have divested our soil against Iraqi law of natural resources, and
consequently we're taking four of them with us as guests. Would you
say that international law has no part to play over here, and would you
rely strictly on the Ker-Frisbee doctrine?
MR. BARR: Well, obviously, you haven't been listening to what I
said. I think it's clear that under customary international law, that
would be a problem for the United States. That would be a violation of
customary international law. So, yes, it does have international implica-
tions. It's violating international law. It's a serious business.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: What would you say to the Iraqis when
they said to you, and I believe they would, we're relying on Ker-Frisbee
doctrine?
MR. BARR: Well, see, Ker-Frisbee is not a doctrine of interna-
tional law. It's a doctrine of whether there should be an exclusionary
rule in the U.S. courts for violations of law that bring about, you know,
where the body has been produced before the court because of a viola-
tion of law. It's a domestic rule of law. I don't know whether the Iraqis
have a Ker-Frisbee or not.
MR. diGENOVA: It would not apply, for example, in Iraqi
courts, which I understand don't exist anymore.
(Laughter.)
MR. diGENOVA: It would not apply in Iraqi courts, if that's your
question. There's also a secondary question.
JUDGE SOFAER: Ker-Frisbee is universally followed.
MR. diGENOVA: There's a secondary question which is that
under the conditions which attend in the world today and have for the
last decade at least, various terrorist groups from all kinds of countries,
Arab and otherwise, have essentially declared war on the United
States, in essence, without formal declaration of war, have acted as if
they were at war with the United States, and have issued religious gen-
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eral warrants of arrest for American citizens all over the world and
have taken them into custody, have tortured them, have killed them,
have denied them their rights and privileges as citizens of the world.
The United States has acted with exceeding restraint during that
period of time, and has seen allies succumb to pressures, deal with ter-
rorists, cut side deals, think they were insulated and subsequently find
themselves the victims of terrorist activities notwithstanding their se-
cret faustian arrangements.
JUDGE SOFAER: Our record is not perfect, Joe.
MR. diGENOVA: Indeed, I alluded to that during my own re-
marks with the regrettable reference to the Iran-Contra affair. The
United States, however, retains the right of any free nation to defend
its citizens wherever they may be even if, even if it violates the sover-
eign law of a nation which is, in turn, violating the sovereign rights of
American citizens. It is regrettable, for example, that the United States
has had in some instances to resort to rendition, but the truth is there
are some countries which have purposely acted in violation of all inter-
national norms of conduct, and, in fact, if people had a little guts in the
1930s we might not have had the Holocaust.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: Well, I would agree with you to a certain
extent, and you're sort of preaching to the choir a little bit because I'm
of Israeli background myself. But the thing is, what I'm trying to ask is
this. In this particular situation, Kerr, would you agree was a fluke
case?
MR. BARR: No, it's been followed repeatedly in the courts.
JUDGE SOFAER: You can look at the domestic law of every for-
eign country.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: I know that it was followed by the Ameri-
can courts.
MR. BARR: It was also followed by foreign courts.
JUDGE SOFAER: I don't know of any foreign court that doesn't
follow the same rule.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: Well, I could think of a couple who don't,
but the thing is, you know, let's get away from that for a second.
Would you say that the Toscanino exception-
JUDGE SOFAER: It comes out of the Roman system. I mean it's
not just something that was made up in the 1930s.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: I understand. I just wanted-
JUDGE SOFAER: It's an old thing, you know.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: Let's go one step at a time. You say that
the Toscanino exception, although well meant, has never been applied
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in any case in the United States, even when medical records have been
presented-
MR. BARR: Well, as I said, the Toscanino case, I think, has been
substantially narrowed, and now requires egregious conduct, and to the
extent, and basically the United States has a good record. We don't
engage in that kind of conduct.
JUDGE SOFAER: You know the reason all those people keep
calling Andy to help him with their cases is because they figure Andy's
only motive must be to be going in the business of criminal defense law.
They can't understand any other purpose in his taking the position he
takes.
(Laughter.)
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: I would believe that, and believe me that
I'm not a spokesman for the Guadalahara cartel or any other. But the
notion that I'm getting at is I think that there's a substantial difference
when you're talking about the regular rendition, which is this sub rosa
agreement on the bottom between two law enforcement agencies, which
is either affirmatively supported by the asylum state or acquiesced to
by the asylum state, or in the case of Alvarez, we're into Mexicans,
who said, hey, this one is out. Now the question is, the next question
that I have, do we have a little bit of a double standard over here say-
ing, well, when it comes to Canadians and Jaffe, the Canadians are
little bit more cultured? They're a little bit more humane? They're a
little bit more trustworthy? They're a little bit more whatever?
Are we saying that, okay, but in the case of Mexicans, right, even
though they feel that their sovereignty and their territorial integrity has
been violated and they're saying-and I have no reason not to believe
them-that they will prosecute Machain to the full extent of the law,
here we're not going to repatriate a la Jaffe. Is there or do you feel that
there is a sort of-and I'll ask Abe Sofaer the same thing at the same
time--is there a little difference over here? Is there a double standard?
MR. BARR: Well, as I said, I'm not sure there's a double stan-
dard and I don't want to get into Mexico, but let me say generally that
Abe raises a good question. Why should the consent of the state or
whether in fact there was consent bear upon the jurisdiction in a subse-
quent criminal proceeding? That's really a matter for the sovereign
states to deal with, and, you know, unfortunately we live in a world
where sometimes it's very difficult to ascertain whether we have consent
or not. We may hear: and that's why I wonder why that should be the
pivotal rule for an exclusionary doctrine.
Suppose we're told by a country, look, you can have this guy, but
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as a matter of, but publicly, we have to complain because we're going
to get zapped by these terrorists? Our Arab brethren out there aren't
going to like it if we're playing footsie with you. So you can take them
but don't ask us. We may have to protest it just to cover ourselves on
that. What are we supposed to do? Or you may have a situation where,
in fact, we do get consent from an element of the government, and then
there is a subsequent debate in the government and there is political
embarrassment, and although they, in fact, legitimate officials con-
sented, and we thought we were operating with consent, they changed
their mind. Or in some cases you could have bribery of foreign officials,
because in the drug area there's a lot of money washing around.
So it's very hard to go back and reconstruct exactly what the state
of mind was. I think Abe's point was that as a matter of international
law, if a country ultimately determines or wants to take a public posi-
tion that its sovereignty has been violated, the remedy is between the
states. That's what international law is all about.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: So you think that Mexico should-
MR. BARR: There should not be an exclusionary rule in criminal
law.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: So you think that Mexico-rather than to
the Justice Department, the courts, et cetera? Is that the answer?
MR. BARR: Excuse me. I didn't hear what you said.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: What I'm saying is did Mexico do wrong
or err?
MR. BARR: I didn't say anything about Mexico. I didn't say any-
thing about Mexico.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: No, but I'm talking about Mexico. Insofar
as Alvarez is concerned, should they have gone directly to Baker and
forgotten about supeivisory powers of federal courts, forgotten about
the fact that there is a right, you know, for an individual, albeit he's
accused of nefarious offenses? I'm sure this is not a great human being.
Is there some sort of a problem of going through the judicial system
concomitant-
MR. BARR: Well, the issue is whether-I'm saying there should
not be an exclusionary rule for the body of a criminal to enforce inter-
national obligations between states. Customary international law does
not create individual rights. It deals with the rights between states.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: Precisely. But the individual derivative
right-
JUDGE SOFAER: Could I just say-
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: Just one second--derivative right, okay,
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which is then followed by his government. Here you have the govern-
ment saying-I'm sorry-but here it's not just Alvarez just like it was
in Toscanino, like it was in all the other cases, here it is the Mexican
government itself saying you violated our territorial integrity and sover-
eignty. We are not going to bring this guy and throw a bachelor's party
for him. We are going to incarcerate the man. We're going to prose-
cute him to the fullest length of our laws. And now they're under the
magnifying glass.
MR. BARR: Well, I'm not going to talk about the Mexico situa-
tion. As I say, again, there are two ways. I think Abe's point was cor-
rect that if there are violations of international law, there are remedies.
We should not adopt an exclusionary, some exception to the Ker-Fris-
bee doctrine.
JUDGE SOFAER: And incidentally, we have given back people
that were seized in Mexico several times in the last hundred years, sev-
eral times.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: Okay.
JUDGE SOFAER: In fact, generally we have given them back.
DR. ABRAMOVSKY: Thank you.
MR. diGENOVA: Thank you. Thank you very much, ladies and
gentlemen. We appreciate it.
(Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the meeting adjourned, to reconvene at
9:00 a.m., Friday, October 12, 1990.)
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I. PARAMETERS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE
MR. SPURLOCK: It's a great pleasure for me to chair this panel,
which I think is an extraordinarily significant one. Our hemispheric
partners perception of our commitment to the rule of law will to a sig-
1991]
69
et al.: Transcript Of Proceedings
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
nificant extent be governed by the way in which we use our military
forces in the hemisphere. And what complicates that issue for us is that
we're dealing in our country with a multiplicity of agencies performing
a multiplicity of functions under multiple legislative mandates, and
we've heard some comments in previous panels about the lack of over-
sight or coordination in terms of those multiple functions and agencies.
And added to the equation as far as the use of military force is
concerned is the fact that we've created some extraordinary capabilities
within the Department of Defense which are capable of being used in
the drug war and against narco-terrorism. Most specifically I'm refer-
ring to the new special operations command, which now has its internal
intelligence or organic intelligence capabilities, and which has the ca-
pability of operating covertly.
Additionally complicating application of rule of law are the new
technical means which have been developed during and in response to
the Soviet threat and which are now capable of being used in these
efforts. But U.S. persons are so intimately involved in hemispheric com-
merce and normal relationships that our intelligence capabilities can
come under the same kind of scrutiny encountered during the late '60s
and early '70s. The credibility of our commitment to the rule of law, I
think, will be significantly determined at least in the eyes of our hemi-
spheric partners by the way in which we use these military structures.
The seriousness and meaning of this issue as it relates to the overall
topic of this conference is exemplified by the responsibilities and the
scholarship of the members of this panel.
Terrence O'Donnell is the Department of Defense (DOD) General
Counsel. He's coming up on his anniversary, which I believe is October
30, in that position. He's a graduate of the United St:ates Air Force
Academy, Georgetown Law School. He served in Vietnam where he
was honored as a recipient of the Bronze Star. He was a special assis-
tant to President Ford and from- 1977 to assuming his position in the
Department of Defense he was a partner in Williams &. Connolly. Mr.
O'Donnell.
MR. O'DONNELL: Del, thank you. I was asked to address the
program now in place at the Department of Defense with respect to the
counter-narcotics mission, and to briefly address the legal parameters
and limitations under which we operate on a day to day basis. Last
month, as many of you know, the Department marked the first anniver-
sary of its enhanced commitment to international counter-drug effort
and counter-narcotics mission. The Secretary of Defense, Secretary
Cheney, on September 18 of last year described the effort as a "high
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priority national security mission."
Those words in the department are extremely significant because,
for the very first time, the leadership of the Department have identified
and described this counter-narcotics effort as a national security mis-
sion. As all of you know, the military has been involved in counter-
narcotics efforts for quite some time. But it's fair to say that involve-
ment did not represent a full departmental commitment with the bless-
ing of the Secretary and the President, as a national security mission.
I think we have made significant progress within the limitations
that we must live with over the period of the year in attempting to
define and pursue this mission assignment. Actual Department expend-
itures for counter-drug activities have increased from roughly 425 mil-
lion in FY '89 to 875 million in FY '90, and DOD expects its budget
for '91 counter-narcotics activities will exceed a billion dollars. The ac-
tual expenditures of the department in support of those activities in '91
will probably approach two billion when all training activities and re-
lated activities are taken into account.
The increase in the DOD counter-narcotics budget has been ac-
companied by a drastic increase in the level of DOD support to the
counter-drug effort. The Department has placed particular emphasis on
assisting the Andean nations of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru, the source
of virtually the entire world's supply of cocaine. While much of the
support currently being provided by the armed forces is classified, I can
tell you, for example, that the Southern Command has sent some 49
mobile training teams to train South American counter-narcotics policy
and military forces in such areas as air intercept, operations, riverline
operations, the use of radar, communications, and intelligence.
Logistic support to various joint U.S.-host country operations has
also increased significantly. The Department has emphasized its human
intelligence and analytical intelligence capabilities in support of the
U.S. counter-narcotics activities. In addition, DOD has provided ap-
proximately $65 million in draw down of equipment, training and re-
lated services to Colombia under the Foreign Assistance Act, including
C-130, A-37, and UH-1 aircraft, assault boats, fuel trucks, sidearms,
ammunition and the like. The President recently directed delivery of
another $53 million in similar support to Colombia and five other na-
tions in the region. During the past year, the United States armed
forces have steadily increased their effort in the fight to intercept drugs
in transit to the U.S., as well.
The Department has applied a wide array of technical assets in
this mission including Airborne Early Warning and Control System
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(AWACS), aerostat radar balloons, and an expanded interagency com-
munications network. DOD reconnaissance activity since '89 has in-
creased to over 3,800 ship steaming days and 40,000 flying hours in
1990, increases of approximately eighty percent and 100 percent re-
spectively. AWACS flying hours dedicated to the counter-narcotics
mission have grown from 38 percent to a high at one point during last
year of approximately fifty-one percent of the total AWACS flying
hours available to the Department of Defense.
A particularly important need of the many law enforcement agen-
cies has been the challenge to find a way to communicate with each
other and to transmit up to the minute intelligence. DOD is now over
two-thirds of the way to completing a secure interoperable communica-
tions network called ADNET allowing federal law enforcement agen-
cies to talk with and send data to each other instantaneously. Origi-
nally, eighteen ADNET sites around the country were planned. Due to
the success of the system, 75 sites are now planned and 48 are cur-
rently operational.
Eventually, the system will be available to agents in the field who
will be able to communicate in secure fashion from lap-top computers
operating via cellular telephone. This communications ability is an area
where the military has been able to help significantly. The agencies, I
think it is fair to say, simply were not wired together in the past.
Translating intelligence into operations and action quickly is essential
in successful counter-narcotics operations. Along the southwest border,
Joint Task Force Six was established in November, 1989 in El Paso,
Texas to spearhead DOD support to the law enforcement agencies in
this critical area of trafficking.
This is the third DOD Joint Task Force dedicated to counter-nar-
cotics. Working closely with Operation Alliance, a consortium of fed-
eral, state, and local border state law enforcement agencies, the mili-
tary has supported numerous requests by law enforcement agencies for
assistance along the southwest border. DOD missions have included
long-range border patrols, tunnel detection, surveillance, cross-training
of military and law enforcement personnel, and improvements of bor-
der access roads. In May of this year, with the help of the tunnel detec-
tion equipment provided by DOD, a joint Customs-military mission un-
covered a football field long concrete tunnel under the Mexican-
American border: a major artery for transport of drugs :from south and
central America to the United States.
I visited Joint Task Force Six, and saw that they operate under
significant problems. For example, on the inside of the Texas-Mexico
[Vol. 15
72
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/13
Proceedings
border, approximately ninety percent of the land immediately contigu-
ous to the border is private property. The Immigration Service and bor-
der patrol can cross and access that property. The military cannot.
The question of whether Congress will provide legislation to per-
mit the military to carry out its mission, which Congress has directed,
to train to the maximum extent possible in border areas, is a difficult
one. Should the military transgress private property? It's a difficult is-
sue. Fifty percent of the entire border between Mexico and the United
States is private property. So while DOD is permitted to conduct train-
ing missions and other activities on the border, we cannot access that
property without permission of the landowners. And there is reasonable
basis to believe and good intelligence to support the notion that private
land is being used to receive narcotics that are being run through a
very porous border.
If you ask a landowner for permission, and if that landowner is
engaged in illegal activities, you can be sure that either the answer will
be no, or if the answer is yes, he's not going to be running any opera-
tions during the period of time that the military is training with night
vision capability on his property.
In addition to the operations conducted on the border, the Atlantic
Command in the Caribbean, the Forces Command on the Southern
Border and the Pacific Command in the Pacific have also been actively
engaged in counter-narcotics activities. Those commands have been di-
rected by the Secretary of Defense that counter-narcotics support is a
mission-not an activity-that will be persued. It is a high priority
mission. These activities are indicative of the changing role of the De-
partment in the fight against drugs. In recent years, we have witnessed
as well a gradual expansion of DOD's legal authority to assist in the
fight, both at home and abroad.
In 1982, Congress began to loosen the nineteenth century stric-
tures of the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the use of the Army
or the Air Force to execute the law except where expressly authorized
by the Constitution or by statute. Specifically, in the area of drug en-
forcement, it authorized a "slight narrow departure" by permitting
DOD personnel to operate equipment in support of drug law enforce-
ment operations. It also authorized the transportation of law enforce-
ment personnel outside the United States to enforce the drug laws, but
only in conditions determined by the Secretary of Defense and the At-
torney General. However, the 1982 law prohibited military equipment
from being used to interdict or interrupt the passage of vessels or air-
craft and specifically prohibited military personnel from participating
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directly in the interdiction of such traffic, or from participating in
search, seizure, arrest or similar activity unless otherwise authorized by
law.
DOD was further prohibited from providing assistance if it would
adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States. From
this cautious beginning, the opening in the Posse Comi;tatus wall and
the principles behind it has increased, and has slowly widened as com-
peting factions in Congress have struggled over the proper role of the
military in the war on drugs. In the 1989 National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act, Congress continued to expand the Department's role by mak-
ing it the lead agency of the federal government for the aerial and
maritime detection and monitoring of the transit of illegal drugs, rather
than interception, interdiction, arrest, search and seizure.
Congress also established a requirement that the Department, to
the maximum extent practical, as I mentioned before, take into account
the needs of civilian law enforcement officials when planning and exe-
cuting military training exercises. So we are attempting wherever possi-
ble to schedule training exercises using night vision devices and the like
in border areas and to conduct reconnaissance training missions in a
manner that serves the needs of the civilian law enforcement
authorities.
The congressional conferees, however, rejected proposals that
DOD directly participate in domestic law enforcement activities and
termed that proposal a radical break with the historical separation be-
tween the military and civilian functions. The conferees noted that "the
American experience has been marked by a traditional and strong re-
sistance to any military intrusion into civilian affairs." Thus, the De-
partment of Defense was instructed to continue providing indirect sup-
port in the form of intelligence, equipment, expertise, training, and the
like. As international drug cartels gained prominence, and as countries
in the Andean region were further subverted by their activities, we
have received some additional authority in the international arena. As
you know, in 1989 the Department of Justice issued a. legal opinion
which concluded that neither the Posse Comitatus Act nor the prohibi-
tions of section 375 of Title 10 apply outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.
The significance of this opinion is that the criminal proscriptions
against the use of the Army and Air Force to enforce criminal laws
does not necessarily apply outside the United States. There are many
other implications to military action outside the United States which
were addressed by Mike Matheson. I'm going to skip over these so we
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have time for questions and a discussion of domestic law as it pertains
to some of our international operations. But note that the Department
of Defense in the last year has taken so seriously the mission assign-
ment from the Secretary of Defense that it is beginning to organize the
effort as if it were a war effort; with intelligence communications cells
within the Joint Staff and within the unified commands.
But make no mistake about it, the Department labors both domes-
tically and internationally under numerous policy and legal restraints,
which in significant ways undermine the type of assistance we can per-
form. We also operate with respect for the sovereignty and the expres-
sions of that sovereignty of the countries in the region and with respect
for their air space. We operate under limitations that have been negoti-
ated and placed on the nautical mile standoff under which our ships
can approach the land mass and perform intelligence, tracking, board-
ing operations and the like. These are very significant factors. The an-
swer is one of continued pressure, negotiation, training, and working
with these countries to make the effort more effective.
I think intelligence capabilities of the military are enormous and
can perhaps be the single factor that can make the difference in this
war on drugs. But intelligence has to be able to be translated into oper-
ational action, and we are not, we are precluded from going out and
participating in specific operations in these countries to interdict labo-
ratories and to interfere with the cartels' activities which are carried on
with impunity in these countries. But we can train and support-and
that training and support is much needed in those countries if they are
going to effectively deal with the internal power and growth of the
counter-narcotics activities within their borders. Thank you, Del.
MR. SPURLOCK: Thank you, Terry.
II. RouND TABLE DISCUSSION: TOWARD NEW LEGAL
INITIATIVES
DR. MOORE: Let's begin this panel. The important objective of
this conference is to begin to focus more specifically on what it is that
we might do by way of new initiative that could make a difference.,
How can we have changes, either in policy or new articulations of pol-
icy, or changes in the legal structure and suggestions for such change,
that might make a difference in this struggle against narco-terrorism?
We have a particularly distinguished and experienced panel with
us today. I'm going to follow the order as they are appearing here on
the program, and we'll start with my colleague on the Government and
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Foreign Affairs faculty at the University of Virginia, Ambassador
David C. Jordan. Ambassador Jordan was the United States Ambassa-
dor to Peru in March 1984 to July 1986. So obviously he has hands-on
experience in this whole subject matter.
Long before he became an ambassador, he was a colleague that
many of us in Virginia working in international affairs depended on
particularly. He was, for example, the chairman of the Department of
Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia from
September 1, 1969 to August 31, 1977. He is certainly one of the na-
tion's top experts in Latin American affairs. He was a member of the
Founding Committee of the Latin American Studies Association. He
has written extensively in the area of Latin American a-ad national se-
curity affairs and international relations. I could go on and on as to all
of his extensive qualifications, but I think it would be more appropriate
to hear directly from one of the nation's top Latin American experts,
Ambassador David Jordan.
AMBASSADOR JORD5AN: Thank you, John. The more I looked
into the problem of coming up with solutions, the more frightened I
became at the magnitude of that problem. I thought what I might do
briefly for you is to give you a very straightforward assessment of what
I think is the scope of the problem and the problem of the United
States government's political culture, the organizational deficiency in
our government, the lack of political will, and our society's overall
responsibility.
First of all, looking at the scope of the problem, everybody talks
about this over and over again in the context of the supply and the
demand sides of it. We all have seen from the discussions thus far in
these various panels how many different agencies in the U.S. govern-
ment are involved, and how many different aspects of the problems
they face. Let me give you briefly, for example, the situation in one
country such as Peru.
The United States historically had both a crop eradication pro-
gram and an enforcement program. It was also trying to assist the
country's economy, which was increasingly collapsing. It had a demo-
cratic problem trying to stabilize the nation's democracy. It was deal-
ing with a country that might lead a debt cartel in terms of the United
States in the context of a growing problem in terms of the payments of
overseas debts. The United Stafes faced all of these kinds of problems
and, in effect, had multiple objectives with respect to its drug agenda
and its other substantive policies without a way of absolutely working
out a coordination between them.
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My instructions, for example, included breaking the Soviet connec-
tion, which had over a $3 billion military investment which required a
whole series of purposes and policies on the part of th United States
government. At the same time, we were supposed to stabilize the gov-
ernment and have it pay its debts and destroy its largest earning crop
for the government, where you obviously were recognizing less than full
desire to do that on the part of the government, even though it provided
lip service to it.
Now that's just to briefly give you a sense of the problem of multi-
ple objectives and multiple agencies. I would like to talk to you briefly
about what I would call the U.S. government's political culture. The
first acronym that I encountered when I went into the United States
government was CIA. I like to put it this way: The greatest myth was
the sign that was placed on President Truman's desk which says "the
buck stops here." The whole objective that I encountered in the United
States government is what I would call "destruction of the buck."
If there can be any problem, you will become a problem if you
pass the buck. Buck is the main thing that has to be destroyed. For
example, anyone who has had some experience probably watched with
great interest the latest and probably one of the more recent public
examples of buck I have seen. The buck suddenly seemed to fall for
Saddam Hussein on the American ambassador. Then the buck went to
the Assistant Secretary of State. That pretty well got passed up almost
immediately to the Secretary of State and the President, which got
sabotaged by an article in The Wall Street Journal. Then it got shifted
to Congress, which got its transcripts published with respect to its visit,
and the buck finally got destroyed by passing it on to the U.S. farmers.
What we have, in effect, is that you want to be part of the action,
but you don't want to be responsible for it. And that requires knowing
how to handle the buck. So our first issue here is the whole question of
being able to have some responsibility, to have some action, but not
being able to have responsibility for any of the adverse consequences.
That's why State can make progress, but the problem gets worse.
DEA can make progress, but the problem gets worse. Every agency can
report progress, but it gets worse. Another example for us was in terms
of our crop eradication program. What I couldn't figure out was how
we ever got to the figure of 60,000 hectares to eradicate. The target
was 6,000 a year, and then obviously the problem would be over in ten
years.
The problem, of course, was we would eradicate. We'd get 5,000,
but the next estimate we had was 120,000, and, of course, then the
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problem was how do you figure this out. So it was intelligence that
became the problem because they haven't told us what the proper num-
ber of hectares was. So we passed this stuff around and around and
around. So my first sort of general statement for you is that the govern-
ment, in terms of the straight foreign policy line of the thing, has to
have some idea of what its objectives are and someone has to get the
buck. Ambassadors don't want it.
Now, the next aspect of the scope of this problem is the retreat or
the flight to multinational issues. They say, well, we'll give it to the
U.N. Don't hold your breath. The U.N. will take what it wants to take,
which is what I would call the soft target. What we found the U.N.
wanted to do was to get only involved a little bit with some kind of
experimental program with alternative crops, but it didn't want to be
linked in any way with enforcement or anything that might make it a
target for anything else. So your problem is if you're going to rely on
the U.N. for initiative, I am afraid you're in for a slight
disappointment.
Also, in terms of the international dimension, I think one of the
more promising areas is clearly the international financial regime. But
if you look at that, and you go through and you look at :Kerry Amend-
ments and you look at Vienna Conventions, and you look bilaterally,
the essential motivation behind it is some sort*of coercive punishment
pattern. Now the problem with the coercive punishment pattern, you
can always see in the ABA reports is the bankers are saying, look, just
when we're getting into the system of freer transactions and all the
rest, along comes the government and wants to squeeze down on us and
find and impute to us all kinds of motivations for why we're committing
offenses to get around it.
Some of them will tell you it looks to them like a lawyers' employ-
ment act; that they will find out and have to be trying to protect them-
selves for how they are transmitting funds. I suggest, and this will be
the general idea here for you, that what you've probably got to do with
respect to greed is fight it with greed, and try to find some kind of
incentives in there for them to get a piece of the money that they're
going after to make sure that they would find, kind of a push to pick it
up or track it.
Within this, there's also an enormous aspect that involves Ameri-
can domestic responsibility. I'm convinced that the American public
does not know, for example, the full implications of what the Marion
Barry trial had for our standing with respect to going out there and
pushing on governments to curtail economic activities and crack down
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on people when they basically look at the United States' attitudes on
the drug consumption situation as barely ludicrous.
So we have there, in terms of the spectrum of the problem, some-
thing that encompasses an enormously complex implementation side in
the foreign field, a number of false starts probably in the multinational
regime field, and a clearly inadequate domestic attitude toward the
consumption and use of drugs. Now, the second area on this that I'd be
talking about is in terms of taking some kind of initiative, since clearly
this thing is organizationally fundamentally inadequate.
I do not mean to impugn individuals' or groups' efforts or atti-
tudes. But the position that's been allocated for coordinating this effort
does not even have Cabinet status. It has a primitive staff, and if you
really look at the efforts that are going to be involved, they've got to
have assets from everything from Education and Agriculture to De-
fense, Justice, State and the rest. So what you're really looking at here,
from an organizational structure, is no clear indication that the United
States is serious whatsoever in having some kind of a structure that
would coordinate and provide a forum for discussing all these extraor-
dinarily complex problems.
Thirdly on this-which is linked to my area-is the lack of politi-
cal will. This is a very complicated problem. I suspect that what you
really have when you determine will is budget allocation. It's sort of a
standard political science measure to say that you've really allocated
values in your political system when you fund them. Recently, we have
had an opportunity to see what we do when we do go to war, or what
we think we are about to get in the Middle East. Command and control
is centralized. Assets are moved and mobilized, and in terms even of
the conflict area, if you know the way the structure is, usually the am-
bassador would have overall command with respect to the problem of,
let's say, Saudi Arabia. You put in a military operation. He doesn't run
it. It's now directed in terms of the operations designed to meet that
war or conflict, and it is something that is outside of the normal way
you do things.
So you have some idea of what it is you do with respect to waging
a war when you have political will and you go about deciding to do
something about it. Now, normally what I think is the case when you
have something like this-and you don't have the budget allocation-is
that one month of Desert Shield is more than the entire budget for the
war on drugs. You ask what's going on, and you say, well, obviously
the issue is still a rhetorical one for your political leadership rather
than one of fundamental commitment. So if you don't have the alloca-
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tions that are made to the conflict that demonstrate the allocation of
values, you do not have a full commitment. You are managing the
problem, not attacking it.
Now in that regard, you get to the fourth area of where I see the
responsibility lies. I suspect that most of us agree that politicians and
leadership react to heat from below, and if there is not enough heat
there, they're not going to do the things that they think are necessary
for the policy agenda. So ultimately in this, if we are becoming serious
about what this problem is all about, there is a societal responsibility, a
responsibility for the elements of society to begin to address what this
is all about.
Now let me just give you some ideas of how devastatingly danger-
ous this thing is to the United States. One of the things the Americans
are still relatively unaware of, although Bennett has been putting this
stuff out now increasingly, is what this is doing to American children.
We are looking at better than ten percent of the American live births
that are now addicted. When you start adding that up in terms of the
cost to society, it is going to become absolutely astronomical.
If you look at the other aspects of it, one of the things in terms of
education, and I'm just going to touch on this briefly because obviously
I don't have a great deal of time for you, but if you're going to be
serious about this, you've got to realize that the United States as a
society has got to be supporting those values in the American popula-
tion that are self-restraining. If you continue to support, and if the
United States and if massive amounts of money and the popular cul-
ture continues to move towards self-indulgence, then the social struc-
ture, the social value system, and the rest, reinforce the problem that
drug activity is exacerbating. And the society is failing in providing the
moral structure whereby its own people are going to be able to provide
the milieu to resist it.
And therefore, whether you realize it or not, you will also be un-
dermining the pressure you're going to be generating on Congress be-
cause the more it sees its own society disintegrating, the less there will
be a coherent expression of outrage and protest to what is happening in
the culture at large. In addition to this, you have to stress the problem
of what is occurring with respect to the security involvement. People
are now aware, for example, of the Bloods and the Crips in Los Ange-
les. The Bloods and the Crips type problems are eme:rging into the
smaller cities and towns of the United States and we are going to have
an increasingly massive security problems inside as more and more
groups move into this type of activity throughout our societal structure.
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Very briefly, my sort of five categories of recommendations are as
follows: one, there must be an organization to coordinate the complex
interaction of the domestic and international anti-drug fronts. In other
words, you have to have a system that coordinates the problems of mul-
tiplicities of objectives inside the program itself as well as with respect
to the other agendas of the United States government. This structure
must be able to use all the agencies, departments, and other U.S. assets
in the coordinated way with direct support and accountability to the
President and Congress. So I've been talking, and I'm really thinking
here, in the context of a new type of National Security Council struc-
ture. The head of this, however, would not be someone like the NSC
chief, who is not approved by Congress. You want to give him the same
status in terms of his coordinating arrangements as you give an ambas-
sador or you give a Cabinet head. It's a presidential appointment ap-
proved by Congress so everybody is on it. It's got to be a special or-
ganizing structure, and it's got to be the plug into and have access to
every single one of these kinds of assets that impact in terms of the
United States' domestic and international structures.
Two, the policy with respect to producing countries must have a
coherent consensus on attacking the full range of producing problems.
If the relative priorities, for example, the United States government
vis-a-vis debt, democracy and development of drugs are not thrashed
out, then each country's problems will be approached in terms of purely
ad hoc settings of priorities. Most of you will see that this stuff is not
done-and you don't have, in terms of the U.S. government, anybody
to say, look, how do you handle the problem. I've got a government
here. I know this guy is trying to stay, but he can't go after his growers
right now, he's running for elections. What do you want me to do? So,
it's got to be discussed. It can't be sort of hidden underneath so that
the buck system works.
Three, we need as a promising area a coherent international finan-
cial regime. This has to be constructed. Most of what I've suggested of
the existing net regime are based on penalties and punishments. What I
think here is a necessity is to move this in terms of an incentive pattern
or incentive system of some sort that will involve these guys in going
after this stuff because of greed, not because of fear that you're going
to haul them into court. Then they'll become increasingly, by abstrac-
tion, part of your problem because they're going to always be scared
and they're not going to cooperate. It's sort of my view of the human
nature of these things.
It's a sort of CIA in the State Department. These guys aren't cyn-
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ics. They're scared. That's what they are. They don't want to have their
throats cut, and they want to go up. You know, narcotics is a dead end.
When we were in there, we tried to make it so that we were able to get
one guy in INM to get an ambassadorship because most of them say if
we get in there and nothing works, we're going to die.
Four, we've got a huge responsibility in our domestic sector where
we've got to start networking all those groups in our society that are
concerned about this. They can't keep operating alone. For example,
we started worrying about kids in junior high school and watching the
druggies and all of the crazy attitudes that were in there. It was creat-
ing an environment in terms of the way the teachers behaved and the
students behaved in which you had to consciously fight drug value cul-
ture. Look what the UN is promoting. This whole John Lennon thing is
part of the drug culture of our society. So we have got to get serious
about this. In that context, we should start talking about drug testing.
But when you have got all this permissiveness out there, you can't go
anywhere with it because everybody says, God, my rights.
Five, we've got to recognize that our constitutional legal-political
system cannot undergird the society to destroy the predominant value
system in the United States of self-restraining activity. To the degree
our system is increasingly encouraging a domestic social environment
that is self-regarding and selfish, we are in trouble. Thank you.
(Applause.)
DR. MOORE: Our next panelist is Pat Renee Shapiro. Ms. Sha-
piro is a graduate of the Yale Law School where she served as the
editor of the Yale Law Journal from 1982 to 1983. She has been in
private practice in both the United States and Japan, and. currently she
is the attorney adviser in the Office of General Counsel for AID, and
one particular area of responsibility of hers is narcotics-related legisla-
tion and policy issues. Pat Renee Shapiro.
[The following is a summary of Ms. Shapiro's comments:
Ms. Shapiro is with the Agency for International Development
which is a foreign affairs agency of the U.S. government, involved in
administering economic assistance programs overseas to developing
countries. She spoke of the importance of dealing with the drug supply,
since most of the illicit drugs consumed in the U.S. are coming from
foreign countries, more specifically developing countries. These devel-
oping countries have very low per capita income and GNPs where eco-
nomic production and sale of narcotics represents a major part of their
income.
In order to deal with the narcotics problem the United States must
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do two things: first, it must provide economic and financial assistance to
these countries in order to free them from their dependence upon nar-
cotic production. This may be done by reducing the restrictions that we
traditionally have placed on promoting crops which would compete
with the United States, and providing these countries with diversified
crop alternatives as well as other economic income substitutes. Second,
the United States must educate these countries as to how narcotic pro-
duction adversely affects their own countries.]
DR. MOORE: Our next speaker is Kenneth Bleakley. Ken
Bleakley is a senior Foreign Service officer now serving as the Senior
Deputy Coordinator and Director for International Communications
and Information Policy. Previously, he served as the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for International Refugee Assistance and Deputy
Director of the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff. He was the
Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador from
1981 until 1984. Mr. Bleakley served in Washington as the Deputy
Director of the State Department's Operations Center, as the Special
Assistant for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Other overseas assignments that he has had in-
clude Panama, Bolivia, Spain, and the Dominican Republic.
I will not go into a lot of the other very impressive background in
his career. Let me just say that he has also served as a former Presi-
dent of the American Foreign Service Association, and is certainly one
of the most highly thought of members of the Foreign Service of the
United States. It is a great pleasure to introduce Mr. Kenneth
Bleakley.
MR. BLEAKLEY: "A pound of gold, Sefior, or an ounce of lead."
That's the choice that many of the participants in criminal justice sys-
tems around the world face when they're dealing with narco-terrorism.
It's not surprising that to a greater or lesser degree many systems fail
when they're presented with that sort .of a challenge, and we're seeing
the results of it today in ways that Ambassador Jordan has outlined, I
think, fairly impressively, as to what the impacts are on our own soci-
ety and the societies around the world.
Meeting the challenge of the pound of gold offered to impover-
ished people everywhere is the type of work in which the Agency for
International Development has been engaged. Ms. Shapiro, I think, has
outlined very nicely some of the attempts we're making there. What I'd
like to address today is this question of criminal justice systems of
other nations. What happens when they fail? What can we do to sup-
port other nation's' efforts to restore those systems to health? What can
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they do for themselves?
My experience in El Salvador, where every element of the system
failed with disastrous results for the people in El Salvador and for the
rest of the world, demonstrates that when a system collapses it's not
easily repaired. It's an enormous job. Even with the dedication of a
government committed to reform, with the dedication of attorneys and
other concerted citizens, with the support of friendly nations, attorney
generals of the United States prepared to commit themselves to the
effort and participate in it, and the United States to back it up with our
own assistance funds-even then the system is hard to :estore.
And so when we face nations around the world today who have to
address the challenge of narcotics and terrorism, intertwined as they
are, you face a problem that is, indeed, daunting, and that does require
the sort of coordinated, integrated approach that was outlined by Am-
bassador Jordan a few minutes ago. Let's take it step by step and see
what goes into this. These are my recommendations as to where we
begin our initiatives.
First, the training and equipping of police and investigative units.
We can't know that there's a problem of laboratories, of production of
raw materials, of transit and trafficking unless law enforcement author-
ities are aware of it themselves and prepared to do something about it.
We can help. Drug enforcement agencies and other agencies of the
U.S. government participate directly in this effort. But ultimately, if
we're going to succeed in knowing what's happening, it's going to re-
quire better training and better equipping of police investigative units
in the host countries themselves. They have to be committed to it. We
have to help them develop that commitment. We also have to supply
the expertise and some of the background if it's necessary in order for
those efforts to be achieved. And here we are legislatively constrained.
Because legislative constraints were put in for good reason, they have
to be looked at with care. When circumstances require, exceptions can
be made as they were in El Salvador and have been done in other areas
with respect to the narcotics process.
But that is step one. Step two, when you find there is a crime, how
do you enforce putting a stop to the crime itself, detaining those who
are responsible? I know that an earlier session addressed the role of the
military in this. And indeed, we are dealing with a crisis of such broad
proportions that the role of our military and that of other nations be-
comes essential, if there is to be enforcement against that ounce or sev-
eral ounces fired from an automatic rifle of lead against those who
would attempt to bring this about.
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But enforcement has to take many forms. We've referred to this
problem of buck passing, and indeed it is one. But let's not undervalue
the impressive nature of this buck. In Bolivia, for example, to which
we've heard some earlier reference, a new government comes into
power, a government which indicates its intent to, for the first time,
make illegal the production of coca anywhere in its national territory,
except for a small amount for their traditional medicinal uses.
How do you go about enforcing that when you have over 300,000
people in your population who are solely dependent on it for their liveli-
hood? We talk of programs like crop substitution. A hardy crop like
coca is not going to substitute in terms of revenues. The best you can
hope to do is to show people that they will not starve if they obey the
law and leave that crop. How do you do that in the short run? Cash
payments are what they were offered by the narco-traficantes. Can we
match that?
I'll tell you it sticks in the craw of a lot of bureaucrats in Wash-
ington and a lot of concerned citizen taxpayers to talk about handing
out piles of money to people not to produce coca. And yet if you're
going to deal with the problem of enforcement and deal with the reality
of a national government having to confront its own citizens, frequently
in remote areas and frequently armed, you're going to have to offer
them some alternative. It's got to be an alternative that is meaningful
when compared to Jose going by and being able to put pesos in their
hand before they ever plant the crop that might yield these kind of
results. In El Salvador the problem was different. There you had an
active insurgency going on, and it required direct military support in
terms of training and assistance by the United States.
Step three in this process. Let's say we found out about the crime,
we've captured the criminals. They then go into a criminal justice sys-
tem, a criminal justice system which is suffering from a lack of funds
and from the kind of threats to which we alluded before. Many of you
are familiar with it. The justices of the peace trying to operate their
offices on budgets of maybe ten dollars or so a month without typewrit-
ers, lacking skills and education themselves, lacking support staff or
protection.
This can reach chronic proportions, as it does in many of the starv-
ing nations of the world. In the Caribbean, you just begin to see some
of this deterioration taking place. AID did a study a couple of years
ago. A fine criminal justice system in place left by some of the former
powers in the area, but now beginning to crumble as books disappear
from the library or grow out of date and national law libraries begin no
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longer to be able to provide the support for attorneys. You see the same
sort of deterioration of the justice of the peace system. Arid so the third
element that has to be addressed is how you're going to go about
strengthening the far reaches of the criminal justice system, the attor-
neys, the judges, who are responsible for making it work on a day to
day basis.
Having taken that step, you then have the problem of evi-
dence--of presenting convincing material that can be seen in courts. In
many cases, the producing nations that we're talking about lack any
sort of way of developing criminal tracing, being able to examine the
materials that were involved, to determine that, in fact, an illegal con-
trolled substance was involved. Fingerprinting, ballistics tests, all of
those things require criminal laboratories. Nations that are lacking
these techniques need help in developing them. They also need to be
prepared to devote their own resources to this element of the process.
The next step is in many ways the toughest of all because it's
where we require the real commitment of citizens. Amazingly, in my
experience of over 25 years in the Foreign Service, mostly in areas in
great conflict, developing nations, I've seen time and again that the
people are always there. The courageous lawyers and prosecutors, indi-
vidual citizens, who are willing to take jobs in government, willing to
volunteer their own efforts frequently at tremendous cost! to their own
practices and their own time, in order to reform systems and make
them work.
It's the nature of human beings that the good will always be there
along with the bad and will react to it, and that's probably the greatest
strength that we have in this battle overall. They have to be supported
internationally: supported not just with money and with technical train-
ing, but equally important, with the kind of moral support that we have
brought to so many of these conflicts. And their efforts have to be rec-
ognized, even when the efforts fail. We heard the example even within
the United States government, that fighting this battle may not be ca-
reer enhancing. It certainly isn't for those who are out on the front
lines and risking their lives at it, and with very little in return.
The international community can recognize this, that it is to those
people that falls the job of trying to reform their criminal laws, trying
to reform the system in ways that makes it possible to put narco-trafi-
cantes behind bars, and not simply to find that the system that can be
used and manipulated to their advantage. Having gotten 'this far in the
process, and we've made a lot of steps to get this far, from enforcement
through criminal systems that work to having the buildings and so on,
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it then becomes necessary to answer that direct threat of the bullet.
And that means judicial protection units such as they have in
Costa Rica, such as we tried to develop in El Salvador, so that the
judges, the witnesses, those who participate in the process, can, in fact,
exercise their integrity and bring criminals, whether they be in the nar-
cotics field or in other areas, to justice without having to fear for their
lives as they walk out the courtroom door.
If we've gotten this far, and if we've gotten the conviction, you
then have the prison system. And we've seen in Colombia and else-
where the problems that come up in trying to keep people in jail even
when they have been convicted, and the lengths to which the narcotics
business particularly with its bankroll, with its alliances, with .the ter-
rorists around the world, are prepared to go in order to break their
cohorts out of prison.
And so the prison system needs to be strengthened, protected, en-
hanced, but also kept as something which is a legitimate instrument of
national authority and not itself a part of a system of human rights
abuses. Human rights abuses we approach usually from the point of
view of what it means to our moral integrity as a country. But it also
means something to the moral integrity of those countries which are
affected, and countries which abuse human rights as a consistent pat-
tern are not going to be able to enforce their laws against criminals in
an effective and consistent manner.
If we can do all of those things, putting together the various steps
that would go into an effective system, we must also recognize that
above all else this must be an effort by the nations concerned, and not
just an effort that's supported by the United States and the rest of the
industrialized world. This has to be not just a concerted U.S. effort, it
must be an international effort. If the U.N. can't play that role, then
other organizations are going to have to play it. But we can't go it
alone. We don't have the resources. We don't have all of the skills that
are going to be necessary to make this work, nor do we have all of the
solutions.
Europe and Asia are equally affected by this plague. And they,
too, have to play their role in it. But together we can help to put these
steps together for a criminal justice system. And so if we can have
nations committed to the process, if we can take this step by step, then
there are, indeed, legal initiatives that can work to begin to turn this
program around. It is going to have to be coordinated.
Let me make one final pitch which is related to this in one way.
When we talk about coordination, communications, my present job,
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strikes me as being particularly important in the international control
of narcotics. When we're dealing particularly in our north-south com-
munication links, they're weak. They're particularly weak when it
comes to transfer of data and large amounts of data.
Fiberoptic networks which are now going pretty much east to west
around the world have not yet developed in north-south ways that make
it possible to transmit pictures of terrorists, narcotic offenders, the mas-
sive amounts of data that are necessary in order to trace their move-
ments, or to assist nations in integrating the effort between the rural
areas where the crops are grown, where their laboratories and where
the transit routes are, and the national capitals where they're trying to
control this movement.
And so we are, in addition to the types of steps that I have pro-
posed on a bilateral basis, also going to have to address, and we are
trying to address this in association with our colleagues from AID and
the multilateral institutions, what more we can do in order to develop
better communications ties between north and south, between devel-
oped and developing nations so that the gap doesn't grow and the kind
of circumstances that give rise to narcotics in the first place increase. I
think everyone has probably said time and time again it won't be a
process that's done overnight. That's obvious. It needs to be integrated.
That's obvious.
It's multi-dimensional. That's obvious. We know a lot of the obvi-
ous things. The question is are we prepared to use the kinds of sophisti-
cated strategies rather than simplified solutions that are necessary to
bring this problem back under control? Thank you.
(Applause.)
DR. MOORE: Our final panelist is John 0. McGinnis who is
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Council.
John McGinnis is a graduate of the Harvard College and Harvard Law
School, where he was a member of the Harvard Law Review. He was
also a M.A. degree in Philosophy and Theology from Balliol College,
Oxford. He was a law clerk to Judge Kenneth Starr, and an associate
at Sullivan and Cromwell in New York before joining the Justice De-
partment in 1985.
I first met Mr. McGinnis at a conference that the ABA Standing
Committee ran several years ago on the issue of treaty interpretation,
and it is one of the clearest and most forceful presentations on the issue
that I have heard to date. It was obvious that some of his training had
been at Oxford, and indeed, it brought to my mind the famous com-
ment that Lon Fuller made in his debate with H.L.A. Hart, which was
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the one that was the English tradition: the clarity and the Oxford and
the debating style and speaking was such that whether right or wrong,
they were always clear. It seems to me that while John McGinnis from
what I can tell was strongly right on that occasion, I have never had an
occasion to disagree with him. He is also clearly right on those
occasions.
So, John, we look forward to hearing from you.
MR. McGINNIS: Thank you. Today I want to begin by disclaim-
ing that what I am going to say is not in any way an official Depart-
ment of Justice position. I've discussed it with no one at the depart-
ment. It represents largely my own thoughts, and it is really a series of
speculations, not a program of actions, but a prolegomenon to a pro-
gram of actions.
My subject today will be essentially new legal initiatives to combat
narcotics and narco-terrorism and the way that the United States can
take these initiatives through shaping international law in what seems
to me to promise to be a new age of international law. And before
giving examples of such initiatives, it seems to me necessary to defend
two theoretical propositions, which are both disputed by different
groups.
First, that customary international law may be an effective weapon
in any area, particularly in the war against drugs, and second, that the
United States government is in a position to wield and shape it. As to
the first issue, in the past decades, international law has correctly, in
my view, been viewed as largely worse than ineffective. When the world
was divided into two competing power blocks divided by fundamentally
different ideologies, there was necessarily little space for fashioning
rules of conduct.
Indeed, given that communist states while ostensibly expressing
adherence to norms of international law systematically violated them,
international law came to be seen, correctly in my view, as a one set of
constraints on the West, a set of constraints which actually hampered
its struggle against totalitarianism. Moreover, because of these divi-
sions between East and West, there was little opportunity for effective
enforcement even of shared norms. For instance, the U.N. acts as an
enforcer only through its security council where the USSR had a right
to a resounding "nyet." Even most regional blocs were themselves
driven by the split between communists and the west.
With the demise of the Eastern bloc, it is perhaps not too much to
say, however, that an opportunity for a new age of international law
may be upon us. There no longer seem to be the irreconcilable differ-
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ences between the two huge blocs that create inseparable obstacles to
construction of orders and institutions to combat international
problems. Moreover, as we have witnessed recently, there is dramati-
cally an increased willingness on the part of the U.N. to play a useful
enforcement role as well as an increase in the authority of regional
associations.
Thus, I think we should look towards international law generally
as a source of area for initiatives, and in particular, it seems to me an
area of initiatives in the war against drugs and narco-terrorism where
there is such a community of interest between East and West. Indeed, I
think there may be no greater agreement on any proposition in the East
and West today than that opiate is in danger of becoming the religion
of the masses unless action is taken, dramatic action, to stop the
growth in drug trade and narco-terrorism. In short, I think while we've
long been used to watching international law being used as a shield to
protect wrongdoing, we should think of it now as a sword to attack
wrongdoers.
The second reason for turning to international law is that the exec-
utive branch-the branch which the framers created to act with, in the
words of John Jay, "dispatch," may take initiatives without, in many
instances, waiting for authorization from Congress. As Curtis-Wright
reminds us, "in the vast external realm of foreign affairs, the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the na-
tion." This vast external realm certainly includes international law, and
thus, the President, through his agents in the executive branch, is the
chief exponent of the United States' view of international law before
the world.
Moreover, the President's exposition is not static but dynamic, i.e.,
the President and his agents do not simply discover and follow norms of
international law, but in large measure participate in their creation.
The creative aspect of his role stems from the nature of international
law itself. Customary international law is not a rigid canon or rules,
but an evolving set of principles founded on common practices and un-
derstanding of many nations. It is understood that this evolution can
occur by a state reshaping international law and creating rules that
take account of new realities or even occasionally by departing from
prevailing customary international law principles. Thus, a state may
seek to promote a new understanding of an old rule or even a new rule
of international custom or practice.
Thus, in essence, we should think of the President acting through
the executive branch perhaps as a judge in a new golden age of the
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common law of international norms with the power to create as well as
to discover. Indeed, given the importance of the United States in shap-
ing international law, the importance we have from being the most
powerful country in the world, it is not too much to see the President as
the Master of the rolls in international law.
The rest of this talk will be devoted to a brief discussion of the
possible examples of the creativity that may be used in the struggle
against drugs and narco-terrorism. I think there are already public ex-
amples of it. It may not have been noticed widely, however, but one of
the justifications formerly given in both presidential statements and in
legal briefs for the United States intervention in Panama was to restore
a government that would be able to carry out its obligations under the
Single Convention on Narcotics.
There is an obligation on countries to prevent their territories from
being used as a haven for smuggling drugs into the United States. To
be sure, this was not the only or the primary justification for United
States intervention in Panama, but it serves as a precedent, at least in
an extreme case, and a warning that willful failure to abide by the
terms of the convention or other international norms can justify a pro-
portionate response by the United States. In this regard, the doctrine of
self-defense should be considered as also authorizing proportionate re-
sponses to territories where the government is failing in its obligation to
prevent drugs from flooding into neighborhood countries.
This result, I think, can be derived directly from international law.
The duty to use diligence in preventing attacks on neighboring nations
from a country has been clearly established in international arbitral
decisions for many years. As the arbiter recently stated in the Island of
Palnus case:
territorial sovereignty involves the exclusive right to display the ac-
tivities of a state. This right has a corollary duty, the obligation to
protect within its territory the rights of other states and in particu-
lar their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and war to-
gether with the rights with which each state may claim for its na-
tionals and foreign territories.
Now, prevention of the importation of drugs, which may cause
much greater social damage than isolated terrorist attacks seems,
should be evaluated under the same principle. As Judge Gee said in
rejecting a claim that a drug pusher could not be punished more
harshly than a murderer,
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except in rare cases the murderer's red hand falls on one victim
only, however grim the blow. But the foul hand of the drug dealer
blights life after life, and like the vampire of the fable creates
others in its owner's evil image, others who create others still,
across our land and down our generations, sparing not even the
unborn.
I think Judge Gee's remarks pungently show that a failure to curb
drug trafficking in a state can be in many ways as damaging as failure
to control terrorist attacks and have to be evaluated under the princi-
ples of self-defense and proportionality. Of course, I want to emphasize
here that in considering proportionality and self-defense, I am not sug-
gesting that the United States will be justified and certainly not pru-
dent in declaring war against countries that do not control their drug
trafficking problems. But once, however, it is recognized that self-de-
fense and principles of proportionality are triggered in looking at drug
trafficking and narco-terrorism, I think it becomes clear that sover-
eignty can be seen in a different perspective, and that perhaps the ex-
traordinary efforts of the United States or the sort of multinational in-
stitutions that we may need to attack this program can be understood
in a new perspective.
If nations that cannot control drug exportation are seen as having
complete sovereign rights, which cannot be infringed upon at all, it
may be much harder to create these multilateral institutions that may
lessen the autonomy of such nations in order to control this problem.
However, I think we see that in a new perspective when we understand
that really drug trafficking can be understood as a threat to other na-
tions to invoke the rights to self-defense, whether individual or collec-
tive, and thus create the foundation for the restructuring of interna-
tional organizations to delimit sovereignty in a way that will perhaps
effectively combat this problem.
Before discussing what sort of organizations they may be, I want
to give a practical example of something short of war in which the
principle of self-defense, I think, is important. For instance, there are
instances in which Country A may consider assistance to another coun-
try's air interdiction program against drug trafficking. And in so doing,
Country A must consider whether Country B's interdiction program
complies with the relevant international agreements, such as the Chi-
cago Convention on International Civil Aviation.
One of the salient principles of this convention is that its proce-
dures entail warning and request to land and does not authorize the
downing of civil aircraft. Indeed, you may recall this convention was at
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issue in the KAL 007 dispute. And I think these principles are, of
course, very sound. But the Chicago Convention on International Civil
Aviation does not in any way trump the principles of self-defense, and
when a country, Columbia for instance, is faced with essentially an in-
surrection from drug traffickers which have, we've heard on this panel,
so much money that they essentially create an imperio in the country, I
think there may well be justification for treating these not as civil air-
craft but military aircraft or seeing drug traffickers as essentially an
equivalent to a Barbary pirate state, and so essentially being able to
treat these as military objectives, and so not having the Convention of
International Civil Aviation apply at all. That's important because it
then frees up a Country A, a country like the United States, to give aid
to these countries even if they are undertaking a more vigorous and
military response to such activities.
Finally, I'd like to just end with my point about legal institutions.
Once it is seen that sovereignty has to be bound around by notions of
self-defense against narcotics and narco-terrorism, greater authority for
international organizations and institutions can be considered.
For instance, an international drug police force seems to me a real
possibility under an international organization that would be at least
the equivalent in power and size something like the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization in which the UN nations would bring together and
have access to a variety of funds. The organization would have interna-
tional police that would go into various countries. I think this could
have several advantages because it would not make the United States,
which particularly in Latin America is not viewed in a favorable light,
the central focus of enforcement. This would be seen as an interna-
tional effort. The response to those who complained that this interna-
tional police force infringed on their sovereignty would be the response
that, yes, it does take away some sovereignty to some respect, but that
only proportionately to the damage this is doing to other countries.
So I think this is an area in which we have to consider quite care-
fully the growth of new international organizations to take advantage
of the growth of the new international enforcement norms that should
be seen as arising out of the right of countries to not only individual
but to collective self-defense. In other words, the collective self-defense
under international law in the drug area, in the narco-terrorism area,
should be reflected in a new structure of international organizations to
implement that defense. Thank you.
(Applause.)
DR. MOORE: Thank you, John. Let me summarize a few of the
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issues presented in this panel before opening the floor for questions or
comments. One was a question as to Whether we have in the United
States an adequate mechanism to coordinate between the domestic and
the international side and to coordinate all of the international compo-
nents. I don't know the answer to that, but I can certainly say as one
who chaired in the past an NSC task force that did exactly that for
Law of the Sea, and Myron Nordquist who was the office director of
that is here, currently the Deputy General Counsel of the Air Force, as
he well knows also, that was an indispensable mechanism for carrying
out United States Law of the Sea policy. Had we not had something
like that, to do a good job we would have had to have invented it. So I
don't know the answer to that, but surely that's one set: of issues that
ought to be open for .discussion. Ambassador Jordan had raised that, I
think he presented the issue very, very clearly.
Secondly, we've had a great deal of discussion particularly on the
demand side in looking at the importance of education. One always
looks at a complex system in terms of cost-benefit effectiveness, and my
own instinct is, and this was certainly a recommendation of one panel-
ist, that education may be one of the most cost-benefit effective things
that we can do in this overall setting. To what extent do we have in
place a program of education that every single American child in
school will at some point encounter a very high level, high grade pro-
gram explaining what the costs are to society, what the costs are to
them, what personal use would mean, what the legal dimensions and
what the moral dimensions of these kinds of decisions are. Again, I
don't know the answer, but are these things that we ought to be looking
at.
The third set of issues that have been raised concern public educa-
tion. To what extent have we adequately informed the American people
of the overall cost of this problem, of the continuing trends, of whether
those trends are getting better or worse, and whether we are adding to
the Just Say No campaigns information that enables people to really
understand why at a personal level and at a community level decisions
to use drugs are extremely harmful and damaging.
Fourth, we've had a series of suggestions that we ought to look
much more carefully at a fuller use of United States intelligence assets
and capabilities that are already in place and that are used in the na-
tional security side in general. Again, I don't know the answer to what
extent those assets are currently being used. There may well be a series
of policy issues that need to be carefully looked at, but surely if they
are not being fully used, this an area that we ought to, at least, be
[Vol. 15
94
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/13
Proceedings
raising questions with respect to the use of such assets.
Fifth, we've had a whole series of suggestions made with respect to
creating private incentives to deal with some of this. Could we, for ex-
ample, involve the very helpful involvement one already sees at a com-
munity level? Could we enhance it by a much more effective program
of rewards? Would that turn out to be quite cost effective, for example,
to really create very substantial incentives in the private sector to turn
in drug dealers and to turn in drug activities? With respect to the use
of the law on that, all of us as lawyers have seen the use of treble
damages in antitrust cases. Should we have a network of civil suits
based on treble damages against drug dealers?
Should we be able to create something that operates across inter-
national boundaries that enables one to go after assets even internation-
ally with respect to the involvement of drug dealers and any damage
that may be done? Maybe there are other proposals, but to what extent
might new civil litigation possibilities that would mobilize the private
bar be something that would be possible here?
Sixth, there's been very strong arguments for assistance from a
number of speakers for foreign assistance programs targeted on the ju-
diciary and the rule of law, particularly strengthening the judiciary
branch that is the one out on the front line and told to wear tennis
shoes literally to run away, as we heard in terms of the degree of pro-
tection that can be offered in some of the front line countries on this. Is
this an area that would be particularly fruitful for a country that sup-
ports the rule of law to have a greater rule of law engagement effort,
and to support enhancement of the judiciary and other assistance in
these countries.
To the extent that there is involvement of a nation such as Cuba,
questions have been raised as to the extent to which the United States
has sent protest notes, has lodged claims with respect to monetary dam-
ages under traditional international law, whether or not the claims are
paid, and to publicize those claims and those activities so that the inter-
national community would know what they were. Issues have been
raised in discussions with respect to synergy between the use of auto-
matic weapons and drug dealing. Are we ending up with a series of
these gangs all over the United States with access to automatic weap-
ons that are beholden to a variety of foreign groups? To what extent
does that have serious implications for U.S. national security over the
years?
Is there right now some kind of particularized and very serious
penalty for a combination of automatic weapons or semi-automatic
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weapons and drug dealing? Nine points have been made about placing
emphasis on training of police. And here Ken Bleakley has indicated, I
think correctly from what I have seen, that there are a variety of legis-
lative restraints that grew up in a different era, and it may well be time
to, indeed, may well be past time to reassess those constraints, as yet
another set of issues.
Tenth, we've had questions raised as to whether there are any le-
gal constraints here that may be in place that would prohibit the use of
highly sophisticated infrared radar or other military technologies, mili-
tary intelligence or surveillance technologies that may be in existence
now that might be brought to bear on the drug war.
One point might be raised with respect to ABA involvement.
Given the potential for creation of new legal initiatives and use of the
law creatively, should the ABA set up a task force of governmental and
non-governmental legal experts to try to come up with new ways of
placing legal constraints in the road of drug dealers and those involved
in these operations, both at the international and at the national level?
To what extent could such a task force identify areas, for example,
of current legal constraints that might be modified appropriately that
are otherwise standing in the way of problems? John McGinnis has
raised in a very provocative and thoughtful way simply the extension of
the concept of self-defense to settings of intense threat from drug en-
gagement activities in the territory of nations that are not fulfilling
their obligations to make every effort to stop those activities. He has
raised the issue as to whether we ought not to use the collective defense
analogy, indeed the individual self-defense analogy in this case.
I might add that there is a rich body of literature on this applying
it to the economic area, growing out of the first and second oil embar-
goes. This is not something that ought to be regarded as entirely new
interpretation of the charter. Professor McDougal and others, for ex-
ample, for many years have argued exactly this, that the level of in-
tense threat, if it rises to a level that's sufficiently great, the attack does
not necessarily have to be armed aggression as such. So that's a very
interesting suggestion that John has made. I think it ought to be taken
seriously in triggering an interesting discussion.
John made a suggestion for an international drug police force. Fi-
nally, we heard a superb presentation from Irving Tragen, the Inter-
American Drug Abuse Control Commission, and one asked, given the
importance of the OAS in all of this, whether the United States is do-
ing enough to support the OAS; whether the OAS is doing enough in
terms of what might be done and in a setting in which we have a very
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strong national interest in supporting an organization that has been one
of the most important historically of all regional organizations, the ear-
liest one to be formed, and of great historical interest to the United
States and importance to it over the years. Is this something we ought
to do to continue to work cooperatively and to enhance that relation-
ship in every way possible?
Those are a few of the things, it seems to me, that have been dis-
cussed so far as an agenda, and I will open it up for this point for
question and answer. Yes, Sir?
MR. ANDERSON: John Anderson, a former member of Con-
gress, now with the Nova Law Center. I was wondering, in connection
with the suggestion that Mr. McGinnis just made, about the possibility
of an international police force under the aegis of the U.N. Professor
Jordan was a little bit dubious about inviting a great deal of hope and
confidence in the ability of the international body to deal with that
problem. It occurred to me, and particularly in line with the summary
just given us, a very excellent summary by Professor Moore, about
whether or not we are adequately deploying intelligence assets that are
already in place, would it be possible at a time when we are very much
thinking about a reconfiguration of the role of NATO to use perhaps
NATO in some imaginative way? Even though it's the Andean coun-
tries that are the primary source of cocaine we do have the Sicilian
connection. We have the French connection through Marseilles. We
have, I suppose, the Dutch connection with the port of Rotterdam, all
members of NATO. I wondered whether or not some thought could be
given to the possibility of finding some role, particularly in the deploy-
ment of intelligence assets, of some new definition of a role for NATO
in this area?
DR. MOORE: Who would like to answer that?
MR. McGINNIS: Obviously, I don't know a great deal about
NATO. But I think the resources that NATO has to use have to be
turned into problems that are more pressing than the threat of aggres-
sion from the Soviet Union, which has disappeared. I think that this is
a useful suggestion. I think, however, what is more crucial is that any
initiatives involve the Andean countries in any international approach
to the problem because, again, my concern is that in the past, it has
been seen as simply gringos, I think, versus the Andean countries. And
I'm not sure that simply greater public participation of NATO will
help combat that perception.
AMBASSADOR JORDAN: Let me just make a brief comment.
The problem with multilateral activity is that multilateral activity re-
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quires leadership, and if the United States doesn't know what it's pre-
cisely out to do or to accomplish, it's very hard to get the multilateral
organization to follow. We've had a particularly, I suppose, encourag-
ing example for a lot of people in terms of the changing international
environment, but it took an enormous amount of clear direction as to
what the United States wanted to do in terms of the Desert Shield, the
whole Saudi Arabia, Iraq thing. And you could mobilize people on this.
What I'm saying is that as a precondition for using multilateral
and all of the rest, or hoping for them to pick up the slack, is that we
know what we're doing ourselves. We've got that worked out. With re-
spect, and in that context, the U.N. is far better than NATO is for
Latin America, and the OAS, in my judgment, if it could be revital-
ized. It would be hard to use it to some degree, say, in Peru and Bolivia
and perhaps less so for Colombia. But you would certainly not want to
involve NATO in it. If you didn't use the OAS or U.N., you wouldn't
have a multilateral arm that I think would-
MR. ANDERSON: Well, I thought I made it clear that I was
saying that with respect to the Andean countries, I realized that this
would not be the appropriate organization. We do have a hard drug
problem involving heroin and other drugs that certainly are coming in
from other parts of the world, through NATO countries.
DR. MOORE: We have time for one short question. At this point,
I'm going to call on Irving Tragen of the OAS.
MR. TRAGEN: Thank you, Dr. Moore. I would like to make a
comment at this point as well as a question. And it has to do with some
of the recent comments about multilateralization. I think the most diffi-
cult problem that we face is not clearly identifying what it is that coun-
tries want to do. As the executive secretary of an inter-American or-
ganization, we've spent what appears to be an inordinate amount of
time getting the issues framed. It's terribly important we get the issues
framed. And I can take it almost item by item.
As Mr. Bleakley knows, in the area of law enforcement, one of the
most difficult issues is defining what kind of law enforcement training
you're talking about. What kind of organizations can be involved? Who
does the training? What kind of training, and then once you've done
that, how do you deal with issues like corruption and
professionalization?
Now, unless you phrase the issues and define them precisely, we
end up doing a series of repetitive efforts without being able to evaluate
what we're doing or where we're going. I think in the course of our
discussions over these two days, we dealt with a large number of issues,
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extradition being a very important one. And extradition is in the eyes
of many Latin American countries a cop-out because it isn't facing up
to the legitimate questions of the strengthening and consolidation of
their own law enforcement processes. In my first assignment in Latin
America almost forty years ago, the first judge I dealt with was a fifth
year law student who was assigned to what we would call a municipal
court.
His one year of service, public service, before he received his law
degree, was to be a judge. I don't want to go further than that. El
Salvador has the same system. We're talking about strengthening legal
systems. We have to strengthen them in terms that are meaningful to
Latin Americans, not to us.
What I'd like to suggest is that some marvelous ideas have
emerged, and I think part of what.we need to do now is to engage the
Andean countries in a dialogue. I think what's far better than the
ABA, the bar associations of Latin America or the bar associations of
the U.S., is that we have a good instrument we have in the inter-Amer-
ican bar, which will be meeting here in a couple of weeks. Maybe we
could begin to focus some longer term questions .through dialogue be-
tween these various institutions which can help us then to more pre-
cisely define how you apply these various instruments that you've been
discussing. Thank you.
DR. MOORE: Thank you, Dr. Tragen. Those are, I think, cer-
tainly very pertinent and important comments, and I hope they will be
taken to heart. We are now out of time, but let me just add two brief
points. One is a point that Joe Douglass had made earlier that this
latest discussion has reminded me of. I think it was an excellent sug-
gestion that we try to have some effort, hopefully governmental. But
one would also imagine even the private sector being useful in this, to
go through the records of the fallen regimes in Eastern Europe and to
put together, in fact, the trail and the story of the massive governmen-
tal involvement, because I think that is something that is very impor-
tant for the public record to know as we move beyond governmental
involvement.
So, Joe, I personally think that's an excellent idea. Here's an area
that where our government can work with NATO. In fact, the German
government is going to be in an excellent position to have all the access
to the files of the East German Intelligence Service. It seems to me
that this is an area that for the health of that new German union and
for the health of all the new Eastern European governments, it would
be useful for them to come clean, and to get this on the public record.
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It would also help in such things as Cuban involvemen:, for example.
So I think that's an excellent idea.
(Applause.)
(Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the meeting recessed)
III. GENERAL CONFERENCE SESSION/AUDIENCE DISCUSSION
DR. MOORE: We are trying at this conference something a little
different, which is an opportunity for audience discussion and participa-
tion that would be a little more focused; not simply a question and
answer format, but an opportunity for a real discussion, a real genera-
tion of ideas, an opportunity to say here's an idea, what do we do about
it. Have three people shoot it down if it's got weak parts, and on the
other hand, if things are really good, get them picked up and widely
disseminated around the government or in different areas where people
have been participating. So this is really in your hands. I'm simply here
to field the questions and to try to encourage the interaction among
you.
DR. OLIVER: I'm Philip Oliver with the University of Arkansas
at Little Rock Law School. I was interested, Professor Moore, in your
listing of fourteen things. I think that the one that had at least been
touched on that I think is worthy of greater consideration is that of
legalization. I have thought for a great number of years that as desira-
ble as it would be we were not going to win the war on drugs, and
nothing that I've heard in the last couple of days has made me more
hopeful that we will.
The war is an extremely expensive, costly war, costly for our insti-
tutions, costly for friendly governments, costly in resources. Certainly
there seems to be little hope of winning greatly increased resource allo-
cation. I think that the realities of the American political, situation are
that we're in a time of shrinking resource allocations from government
and not increasing allocations. So I think we're ultimately going to lose
the war anyway, and the costs of continuing it are quite high. I am not
persuaded that legalization is the best course. Particularly, I'm dis-
turbed about all of the emphasis on the approach with the Andean
countries, when just yesterday I learned of developments with respect
to developing synthetic drugs in this country, which seem to me make it
largely irrelevant as to whether we can block production in foreign
countries if people can go into a laboratory here and produce drugs.
DR. MOORE: Could I just clarify before you leave the
microphone exactly what you are proposing, because legalization or
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decriminalization can come in many different proposals. We heard one
proposal the first day of decriminalizing marijuana, and a sharp rebut-
tal by a number from the audience on that. Are you proposing
decriminalization solely of marijuana or of all substance abuse includ-
ing cocaine, crack, heroin, PCP, all hard drugs, et cetera?
DR. OlIVER: Well, I do not have a fully developed comprehensive
plan, but my idea would be full decriminalization. It's been my think-
ing that the most addictive drugs are the ones that most need to be
decriminalized because they are perhaps going to be the most resistant
to other kinds of restraints. I would envision a situation in which we
would perhaps consider some sort of registration of drug addicts, which
I think, while taking the profit element out, would also perhaps make it
somewhat unlikely that people would find it worthwhile to go down and
register as addicts in order to try out a new drug. We could then move
toward a system of providing drugs at cost, which would leave, if in-
deed it is the highest and best use of certain lands, the Andean region's
production of coca. I think this is not at all inconsistent with what I
think I've been hearing: that one of the major things we need to do in
fighting drugs anyway, is education of the American public. We could
simply say we're going to deal with this as basically an American de-
mand problem. And we're going to deal with this by trying to influence
people into thinking that it's not a very good idea to take drugs. But,
yes, it would be what I would envision across the board.
DR. MOORE: Let's open the floor for discussion at this point.
Anyone else care to discuss the issue or raise it? Obviously, this issue
has been joined in the public debate before by a number of people in-
cluding Milton Friedman and George Shultz. We have one comment
from David Martin. Yes, David?
MR. MARTIN: This, of course as you have pointed out, is not a
new proposal. Bill Buckley, who is a very good friend, has been pushing
this idea for a long time. There is a body of scientific literature which
has direct bearing on this. In 1972, they had what they called, I think,
the free access experiment. They took one body of students without any
separate body for comparison. And they gave them free access to
marijuana.
In short, you weren't persecuted. You were not taking forbidden
fruit when you helped yourself to marijuana. Students who had used
marijuana once a week, very occasionally, or twice a week, went up to
one cigarette a day. Students who had used one cigarette a day went up
to three or four cigarettes a day, all in the period of one month's time.
Now, it's deducible from this, if you make drugs more available, more
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easily available, they're going to be used more. And you have to then
ask yourself what is going to be the effect of this greatly increased use
of the quality of human life and the quality of society?
And there is absolutely no question that human beings are reduced
to far less than their potential by abuse of drugs, and that the increase
in drug use would have a disastrous effect on the quality of society as a
whole.
DR. MOORE: Thank you, David. Yes, the gentleman from the
OAS, Mr. Tragen.
MR. TRAGEN: I think we have a very difficult problem here. We
have a difficult problem because I don't think we have yet in this coun-
try faced up to what the drug problem is, particularly in our cities.
Now we have some experiences in the world with legalization. Britain,
for example, ran through the experience of allowing those who were
addicted -to register with the health service and to receive heroin on
demand. That has not, in any way, eliminated the black market in her-
oin in Britain.
We need a lot more analysis of what did happen ina Britain. The
Dutch, as we know, basically allowed the open use of marijuana, and
you can get everything in coffee houses in Amsterdam from cakes made
with marijuana to marijuana tea to the joints themselves. That was on
the supposition that if you had marijuana, you would not go into the
harder drugs. Anyone who has been in Europe recently knows that in
cities like Arnhem which have a policy of acceptance of use, not legali-
zation, you have rioting in the cities because the Germans and the
French are coming up to buy their drugs and, they not only have
brought with them the problem of drugs, but also all sorts of other
criminal activity, including prostitution.
You have city councils all over the Netherlands facing revolt by
citizens because of it. What I do think we need in all honesty is a much
harder look at what we mean by legalization. As Congressman Rangel
asked, are we going to legalize it for kids under the age of sixteen? Are
we going to do it for kids under eighteen? Who's going to distribute it?
Are we going to let Coca-Cola have a patent, or are we going to set up,
as in the state of Virginia, state agencies where you're going to sell it?
What are the conditions under which you're going to sell it? What
degree of purity? What are the standards you're going to apply? I
think our major problem, and I've done a lot of reading of the articles
by Mr. Friedman and Ethan Nadelman and so many very eloquent
advocates who are as concerned as we are about the disorder in the
streets, but they really haven't come to grips with either what the expe-
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rience has been abroad or what the implications of legalization are.
Now we can look at this in two or three different ways. If we want
to really make and have an impact on the use of drugs, maybe the
answer isn't decriminalization. Maybe the answer is in the kind of pen-
alties we impose for first use or second use or third use or the penalties
and sanctions we use for the dealers. We haven't really thought much
of this out.
That's one of the areas where as an inter-American community,
shortly we're going to have to sit down and begin to think it through,
because obviously if it is true that we have 25 million of our citizens,
ten percent of our population, who are now regular, drug users, whether
they're marijuana or cocaine or heroin, we haven't got enough jails.
And I wonder if the best use of our money is to build more jails when
our real answer, our real challenge, is how do we rehabilitate and how
do we eliminate the attraction of drugs? I think we made a lot of mis-
takes in social programs in the past. Maybe we've got to think through
what we do in the inner city. Maybe we've got to go to some of the
things Jack Kemp has talked about. Maybe we've got to go to some of
the things that members of the Congress are talking about in reestab-
lishing inner city programs. But I wonder if the answer is as easy as
legalization because I don't think any of the experiences anywhere in
the world indicate that legalization has eliminated the problem.
DR. MOORE: Thank you, Mr. Tragen, for as always an excellent
statement. Others on this? Yes, yes, sir. And then if you would like an
opportunity at rebuttal or further discussion, you're most welcome.
MR. MIKUS: I am Joseph A. Mikus, a professor emeritus, mem-
ber of the American Society of International Law. I'd like to make
some comments on this conference. Conference on narco-terrorism cer-
tainly is a highly specialized conference and deals only with one aspect
of the public interest in the world. When we spoke about consumption
and certain people tried to put the whole responsibility for the develop-
ment of this traffic on our consumption in the United States. I believe
this is a very false approach because this is not a private, I would say,
law transaction like buying something in a drug store. This is a public
interest issue.
And, of course, it's not the only one. There are many other issues.
I found in the book published just now by Professor Moore, National
Security Law, an item called "global anarchy". We are living in a
world really dominated by global anarchy. Narco-terrorism is only one
aspect. Other aspects are arms, ecology, hunger, drought, refugees and
so on, and wars. We are even now in the middle of an evolution which
1991]
103
et al.: Transcript Of Proceedings
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
may lead to war. So I believe these all are public interests and we
should pay attention to the whole problem as such.
DR. MOORE: Could I just make an intervention far a moment?
Are you suggesting that we can't take these to some extent one at a
time and have to solve all the world's problems at one conference, or
would it be enough to solve narco-terrorism in one conference?
MR. MIKUS: No, it means we have to come to a kind of global
approach to the problem because this is only one section of it. I believe
that treaties are simply agreements among private parties. There is no
enforcement for it. There is no, for example, judicial enforcdment of
treaties. If somebody is not satisfied with the treaty, he would simply
denounce it. And there is no way of enforcing the treaty. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice is practically not international. It"s not a court.
It's an opportunity for arbitration, and we know all that. The decision
of the court depends on the consent of the parties, and certainly this
institution doesn't have very much to do with the justice in the world.
So I believe that we have to organize probably another global confer-
ence about these aspects.
I believe that the International Court of Justice and the United
Nations, as voluntary organizations, don't really have great meaning.
These are social conferences, permanent conferences. As lawyers, we
know that in our country, which has a constitution which controls, for
example, every state and every citizen, that states are not any more
voluntary members of this country. If we speak about law, law is a
pyramid, not an institution having simply a kind of horizontal
dimension.
DR. MOORE: Can I interrupt a moment?
MR. MIKUS: Law is something with vertical dimensions.
DR. MOORE: And perhaps unfairly. Tell me if I'm being thor-
oughly unfair. I frequently am as a chairman. But the problem is I
would like to try to-and indeed, I've been accused of being able to cut
off speakers like Mr. Justice Holmes in the middle of the word "if,"
but as happened here, I really would like to focus precisely on the drug
issue. I think your point is a very good one about the importance of a
whole variety of problems. And I think you would find the audience
very sympathetic to that.
But I've got several others that would like to get in, and we ha-
ven't really perhaps concluded the discussion on the decriminalization.
You go ahead if you want to just wind up.
MR. MIKUS: I would like simply to bring in a new idea. Now we
are really in the middle of a kind of a development which may lead to a
[Vol. 15
104
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/13
Proceedings
war in the Persian Gulf. I have published a book about world public
order. There is a reality in this world, and that's the existence of the
five nuclear powers. These powers really may become a kind of a world
authority. I believe that as you know there is a dispute between Mr.
Buchanan and Mr. Safire about that war, I believe that we just cannot
be a policeman of the whole world. But these five nuclear powers which
have absolute power, they should somehow come together, close a kind
of closed circle and decide things by majority.
For example, in our Supreme Court some decisions are made by
five members against four. So something like that should be used in, as
I say, a closed circle of this pentarchy of five nuclear powers. I would
like to propose this for discussion now.
DR. MOORE: Thank you very much. Let me add is there anyone
else on the legalization issue before we close that off? Yes, go ahead.
Did you want another chance at this?
DR. OLIVER: I would like, yes.
DR. MOORE: All right. Go ahead.
DR. OLIVER: I would just like to make clear that I am not advo-
cating legalization in any sense. Assuredly, these drugs are terribly
harmful, and I think that it is probable that we would have some de-
gree of increase.
I think that we cannot gauge at all because we are sailing in com-
pletely unchartered waters. The world has unprecedented problems. In
particular, the United States has unprecedented problems in these ar-
eas, but the comparison is not whether we want a drug-free world or a
world with legal drugs. The question is between the comparison with
the actual world and perhaps a world that we maybe can achieve
through an outpouring of enormous resources, a continued destabiliza-
tion of friendly governments and so forth, that possibly we can obtain a
significant decrease, but very likely we will sustain all those costs with-
out getting a significant decrease.
So it is between two highly imperfect worlds, and as long as we
are dealing with a situation in which ten percent of our population, and
probably something greater than ten percent of Peru's population, is
engaging in this sort of activity, I think that it's going to be a rather
intractable problem as this conference has demonstrated.
I don't think that it is necessary, at least to have a realistic debate,
that all the details of legalization be worked out. Certainly not all the
details of maintaining the present system have been worked out in ad-
vance, and I certainly do not think that this would be a panacea, but I
do think that it would be quite an improvement.
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DR. MOORE: Before we shift, anyone else on this subject? If not,
let me, again, perhaps unfairly, but as the only one up here at this
point, just add one additional word on this. We had one other person
who wrote to me before this conference saying that they felt there was
not an adequate opportunity to debate this issue, and they didn't see
any advocate of legalization on the program. So I think it is certainly a
fair set of issues given the range of people that have raised it. The last
thing we want to do with our most serious problem is to cut off serious
discussion about the options for dealing with it, and that is a serious
option for dealing with it. And it seems to me it needs to be looked at
very, very carefully.
My own view of it, as a non-expert in this area, and as a person
who is normally very attracted to free market solutions, is unalterably
opposed to legalization. I have personally not seen any legalization pro-
posal that deals with, I think, the two major problems that seem to me
to be left. One is, from what I can tell of legalization, it is highly likely
that consumption would go up in a legalization setting. If we take as
the starting point your concession that these are highly dangerous, and
we live in a world that now understands that as opposed to the 1960s
flower assumptions about the whole world and the taking of drugs, then
it seems to me that is a very, very damning admission to any legaliza-
tion program. I have two little daughters and I suppose I'm representa-
tive of all fathers in that respect. I do not want my daughters to be
living in a world in which they get drawn into that, and my own view is
if we had a setting of legalization, their chances of that would go up. I
don't know by how much, but I suspect by significant amount. My sec-
ond point is that I have never seen a program of legalization which
would eliminate law enforcement problems and any law enforcement
role in the process.
It seems to me that the points made by Mr. Trager. on behalf of
his committee, and the OAS has looked at this very carefully, and
David Martin and others, are really absolutely correct. So I'm inclined
to think that the cost of that solution does, in fact, outweigh the things
you get on the other side. Now having said that, let me say that one of
my closest associates, Robert F. Turner, who is now sitting with me on
the table up here may have entirely different views on this issue. I've
talked to him privately from time to time on it. I don't know what his
own views are, but I can tell you where I stand which is unalterably
opposed to legalization.
And I guess the last thing that concerns me is that I think it's a
completely false solution to the problem. One of the reasons I didn't
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feature it at this conference is because I am personally concerned that
the debate and the discussion about legalization is leading us to spend
our energy on solutions that I suspect will not be helpful in dealing
with something that is going to be very imperfect, that's going to be a
perfectly miserable social fight against this thing for many, many years
to come. But those are just very personal views. Robert F. Turner does
want to express his personal views also.
DR. TURNER: I didn't until you said that. Can I join you?
DR. MOORE: Yes, please do, Bob.
DR. TURNER: Some of you know, last Sunday I came out in
favor in the eyes of many to assassinating Saddam Hussein so why
shouldn't I come out for legalizing drugs today just to be consistent. I
don't favor legalizing drugs, and indeed I don't favor assassinating Sad-
dam Hussein. What I do favor in both cases is not ruling out options
without thinking them through.
One of the pluses to the legalization approach is that it may solve
one of the biggest problems we have today; that is, crime caused by
people who are trying to raise the money it takes to buy drugs at a
price far above their cost because it's illegal. If legalization could get
organized crime and disorganized crime out of the business of trying to
hook kids on drugs for a profit, that would be a plus.
Another concern of mine is one I raised at lunch, and that is, I
don't see us making much of a dent in this problem by attacking the
supply because it's so easy to smuggle. The profits are so great that if
we paved over all of Latin America, the Swiss would start doing it, and
if we shot the Swiss, the Swedes would do it, and pretty soon there
would be somebody down in the basement of the White House doing it
because there is so much money in it. We have to deal with the
demand.
I don't think we're doing enough to deal with demand, and I think
one of the reasons is because the political forces that have responsibility
for these decisions don't want to take the heat of angering the Ameri-
can people. There are too many Americans that want to have drugs,
and there are too many other Americans that don't want to have to
urinate in a bottle, if you'll pardon the crassness of that. But it seems
to me that if we were to legalize, one of the things that we might ac-
company it with is the libertarian argument. I come at this as a liberta-
rian by philosophy, not as an extreme, but as a moderate libertarian, of
limited government, maximum individual freedom of choice within cer-
tain constraints.
It seems to me that one of the problems with normal libertarian
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approach is that somebody has got to pay the cost of treating and sup-
porting all these people. In a libertarian society, you suffer the conse-
quences of your own wrongs. If you refuse to work, you go hungry un-
less somebody else wants to support you. But one of the things I've
been thinking about at this conference is that if we were to take that
approach and to combine it with an approach that says, however, in
order to receive any government benefit which includes a job, which
includes welfare benefits, which includes public housing and so forth,
you have to take a urinalysis and if you flunk that, or some other better
less intrusive test, you are ineligible unless you are engaged in a reha-
bilitation program.
So that at least the people that were on drugs would not be forcing
the rest of us to support them, and then, of course, if engaged in drugs
while in a crime, you would not make that a defense to the crime. The
act of voluntarily taking drugs would be interpreted hopefully as
wrongful conduct and not as-you know, you can't-it's like you're
killing your parents and throwing yourself on the mercy of the court as
an orphan at some point. And the other side of it would be a tremen-
dous educational program aimed at educating school children, voters,
everybody, of the horrible consequences of drugs. But even having said
that, I'm not at this point prepared to come out in favor of legalization.
John and I have some fun debates among ourselves and on the CB
radio to and from Charlottesville, and I have on occasion taken that as
an advocate. But I continue to think the best approach is not that, but
the best approach, if it's going to work, has to deal with the demand
side.
Indeed, one more last point. I teach international law, and I like to
get my students to think, and I was teaching a class on state responsi-
bility right after a class on the use of force. And I said, let me give you
a hypothetical: what if we learned that the Soviet government was pay-
ing billions of dollars to American citizens to kill our government offi-
cials and violate our laws, would that create state responsibility? Well,
of course, it would. And would that allow us to use force in self-de-
fense? Well, most of them thought it would. And I said, well, let's
change it. What if a group of Soviet citizens with the knowledge of
their government were doing the same thing, and their government was
not acting effectively to stop it, would that create state responsibility?
Everybody, virtually everybody agreed. Could we use force? Well, they
were sort of split. They wanted to look at the book again.
And then I said, okay, now reverse it. Now we're a bunch of
Colombians, and we find that private American citizens are offering
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billions of dollars in bribes to our citizens to kill our judges, kill our
president, violate our laws, so they can have this narcotic they want. Is
that a violation of international behavior? Does it create state responsi-
bility, and their eyes got real big, and they said wait a minute. We
know the Colombians are the bad guys in this, but maybe this is more
complex than it looks. I think we have a duty to the rest of the world,
and I think one of the problems right now is our citizens are bribing
the world to violate their laws and give us drugs.
There are a lot of politicians that want to portray that we have a
problem here, that these horrible Colombians are up here and forcing
our people to use drugs. That's now that's happening. It may be con-
venient to get reelected as a politician, but our people are begging them
to give them those drugs, and are offering them billions of dollars in
bribes. We're the problem. Sure, there are evil people down south mak-
ing a buck on this, but until we face the fact that the United States is
the primary market on this and start doing something to get control of
that, I don't think we're going to win this thing. I think we're going to
spend billions of dollars.
We have got drug people out there that have an incentive to hook
children on drugs, and I've not heard all the conference. I've been in
and out trying to defend my unfortunate assassination remarks, and let
me stress I don't believe in assassination. I believe that a lawful exer-
cise of self-defense may be a different situation. From what I've heard,
and I've heard some wonderful material, it's been a great conference.
But I've not heard an answer that makes me think we're going to win
this fight, and that leaves me frightened. I'll not stay and participate in
the debate. f apologize. I've tried to stay out of this one, but when John
dragged me in by saying, by the way, he believes in legalizing this
stuff, I thought I ought to say something.
DR. MOORE: I have two others on the list here, but I can't resist
one comment, Bob, before doing that. That I think it's a very easy
target in my judgment to say that the real problem is nothing but de-
mand, and it is really the evil American people who are taking drugs. I
think the reality, Bob, is that there is a double-barreled problem on
this. It requires someone to supply it. It requires someone to take it. It's
both sides. Any effort to deal seriously with drugs has to have a supply
side component and a demand side component.
DR. TURNER: I think that you're right.
DR. MOORE: There is no magic bullet. I think it is an enormous
mistake to try to focus the whole thing either on demand side or on
supply side or try to allocate blame. The only blame in terms of the
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setting, in terms of governmental setting, is when you get governments
that are, in fact, not committed to the fight against this, and are, in
fact, abetting it. The Cuban government involvement is one we ought
to talk about in the worst kind of blame. The Colombian government is
doing its damnedest to fight this thing. The United States government
is doing its damnedest to fight this thing.
DR. TURNER: I'm not sure that's true.
DR. MOORE: Well, there's a lot more, I think, we can do, and I
think all of us are in agreement of that at this conference. But there is
not some kind of total moral lapse on the part of the American people,
etcetera, in trying to deal with this issue. But I would argue very
strongly that the effort simply to deal with it on either the demand side
or the supply side alone is a major mistake. You've got to deal with it
on both sides.
DR. TURNER: Let me concede on that, John, and say you're
right, but we're neglecting the demand side, and that's important, too.
DR. MOORE: Well, I don't know that we are. This whole confer-
ence focused on it, and we have never, for example, decided that organ-
ized crime on the supply side should be something we would not focus
on. All we would do is work on the demand side, for example, of other
kinds of organized crime issues in this setting.
DR. MOORE: This gentleman here.
MR. APPLE: My name is James Apple. I'm counsel with the Fed-
eral Judicial Center here in Washington. I want to maybe focus away
from the cultural aspects of the problem and discuss briefly one idea
that was thrown out by you, Professor Moore, and perhaps some others,
and that is one method of control using our civil liability system. I was
just speculating as you made those remarks about what would happen,
for instance, if we made corporations and banking institutions liable,
imposed civil liability on them if it was disclosed through the imagina-
tive discovery by our trial lawyers of America that they were engaged
in some kind of drug activities or that the banking institutions were
engaged in money laundering?
That kind of statute would send shivers through the general coun-
sels of the corporations and banking institutions of this country. I think
that statutes like that or ideas like that would begin to focus the corpo-
rate power of this country on this problem because it would be affect-
ing their wallets and their pocketbooks and their profits. To carry that
one step further, I could imagine some kind of system where even coun-
tries who are engaging in drug activities or not controlling them suffi-
ciently would expose their assets in the United States to seizure by
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some civil litigation process.
I think those kinds of legislation, if it were possible, would begin to
focus on the problem in such a way that the corporate powers of this
country would soon realize that it's a problem worth discussing.
DR. MOORE: Let's just build on that for a moment, if I could,
and I'm going to draft someone for a moment from the audience, too,
who has, I think, some unique information about this. I'm wondering,
David Brink, as our past president of the ABA, has the ABA really
looked into a way in which we could mobilize the considerable talents
of lawyers in the United States in trying to devise innovative national
and international laws that can try to combat some of this. Has the
ABA, and there is no reason to pick on the ABA, but the ABA is one
that has the potential here, I think, to mobilize this in a unique way
that I think almost no other organization in the country does, at any
time had some kind of blue ribbon presidential task force on the drug
problem? Do you think that it might be useful if something of that sort
were to be put together that would really innovatively look at new
ideas, et cetera?
MR. BRINK: I think it would be very useful. I do not think that
we have had a task force to design a total program. President Shovan
[sic], the outgoing president of this last year, did have a program
which, I think, was quite helpful in the schools. He went into the
schools in company with the president of the AMA and they pointed
out known consequences from a medical point of view and known
problems from a legal point of view.
While that did not deal with these international problems of in-
terdiction and the like, it certainly served some educational function on
the primary level in the demand side, which I think is so important
however you come out on the issue of drugs on demand or any of these
other issues. The demand side, they're both important, but the demand
side is the most important. If there were no demands, then we would
have no supply problem. And conversely, as this gentleman has pointed
out, if we expend all of our efforts and are able to shut off the Andean
connection completely, some chemist will come up with something that
comes from Minneapolis or somewhere else because there will always
be an answer to the supply as long as there is a demand.
However, back to your original point, I do think that the ABA
could tackle this. I'm not sure everyone would then be-satisfied with the
result, but I think maybe the precedent started by President Shovan
would be pretty good because the involvement of the medical profession
to quantify whatever tests, remedies, chemistry, if you will, may be in-
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volved and to put that into the solutions, might well be helpful. Perhaps
a joint project.
DR. MOORE: Very helpful. I must say I'm very intrigued with
the possibility of some of our best legal minds being brought together
to look at innovative new proposals to try to make it more difficult for
this trafficking to go forward. I had this gentleman and this one back
here, then the lady.
MAJOR PREGENT: Sir, I'm Dick Pregent from the Office of the
Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army. One comment I would like to
hear is your response to the idea that Mr. McGinnis proposed, but
before getting there, the title of the conference is "Strengthening the
Rule of Law in the War Against Drugs and Narco-Terrorism." And it
seems that the majority of the speakers have focused on the importance
of international cooperation. At the same time, I've heard some ex-
tremely powerful people express ideas about unilateral action which are
confusing and to some extent disquieting.
The idea of Mr. Barr's opinion and to some extent what Judge
Sofaer had to say, but specifically with regard to Mr. McGinnis, do
you buy off on the concept, Sir, of expanding the definition of attack to
include justifying self-defense or collective self-defense to include the
failure of the state, which is not supporting narco-terrorism or drug
trafficking, but is simply failing in its effort to suppress it? Do you
support that expanded definition of attacks, or do you think the inter-
national community would buy off on it? I would be amazed to hear
how South American countries and Latin American countries would
perceive this authority of the United States to reach out and touch?
DR. MOORE: Let me respond to that, not because. this is some-
thing I proposed or have my heart in, by saying initially I think it's an
incredibly peripheral issue. This is not the core of how we're going to
deal effectively in my judgment with international narcotics trafficking.
What I can talk about a little bit is something I spent a lot of time on
which is the whole theoretical basis of individual and collective defense
and aggression under the United Nations Charter. The starting point is
that there is a debate among scholars in interpreting the scope of the
defensive right in international law.
There is a large group, indeed by far the largest, that would in-
clude most scholars, most foreign offices, from virtually every country
in the world other than the United States, that would take the view
that the kind of attack which is contemplated for a response is the use
of military force, the use of the military instrument. There is, however,
in the United States at least a group of scholars, Professor Myres Mc-
[Vol. 15
112
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss2/13
Proceedings
Dougal would certainly be among them, who would take the position
that what is really at stake here and what one really looks to in the
scope of aggression is coercion from the territory of a state that is suffi-
ciently intense as to give rise to expectations that in the absence of the
use of the military instrument in response, that there is a very severe
encroachment on territorial integrity and sovereignty, etcetera.
He has taken the position that economic coercion, for example, if
intensive and extreme, and he doesn't mean peripheral kinds of things
that are modest, but the degree of economic coercion that, in fact, is
let's say ending the ability of a whole people to operate and threatening
the starvation of the peoples of a country. That gives right to the rise of
use of the military instrument in response.
I think that there is, and there have been a number of scholars
that have written in support of that position, for example, in relation to
the Arab embargo, the double oil shocks of the 1970s. I think there is a
considerable policy argument in favor of that under the Charter of the
United Nations if you take a purposive and functional approach. The
thing that it's easy to be, that one has to be very careful about here,
though, is shifting from a theoretical basis in saying, yes, it is possible
to have certain kinds of things rise to an intensity that is sufficient, that
the military force can be used in response, and then shifting to a con-
clusion that the ordinary setting in which a government is trying to
some extent to stop drug trafficking from its territory and is not able to
do it gives rise automatically to the use of military force.
I'm not sure of a single setting in the real world-I personally
would not be able to find one that would justify the use of military
force even if you accept the broader theoretical proposition in the case
today. I would find it highly unusual, certainly that it would ever be
applied in a setting where a country, the government itself is commit-
ted in the war against drugs. By the way, as a theoretical proposition,
though, as you well know, in a setting even if a government were theo-
retically opposed to the use of its territory for attacks from insurgent
groups, if it's the use of military force, and they're not effectively able
to stop the insurgence groups from using their territory, you have a
right of collective defense even against their consent to do it.
So it really does go back to that broader question. And I think
that's just a debate, but after having gone into this whole theoretical
discussion, let me just say when you really look at this, in the light of
the reality and the facts in the world, I don't see a single case where
that, it seems to me, is a serious issue in the real world. And for that
reason, I can't find this a particularly important way of trying to re-
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spond to this issue.
JUDGE DONOHUE: Just a response to somebody about the le-
galization of marijuana. Up in my area, the remark came out that they
better legalize marijuana. Otherwise, we won't be able to get a judge, a
federal Supreme Court judge or a state Supreme Court judge or any
federal judge or state judge in about the next five to ten years when
they ask them the question have you ever used drugs. Anid if they an-
swer it, one of the law school deans told me, if they ever ask the stu-
dents in his school, they'd all have to answer yes. So there won't be any
judges if they use that question.
But going back to the real problem. For twenty-five years I was a
judge, and I first met the drug situation back in 1965, and it emanated
from the military. We have a military base next door to our place, and
a corporal started the drug situation back there with codeine, codeine
cough syrup. He started it in the high schools, passing it around to the
kids, and they used to get codeine for a quick high for fifty cents. And
that gradually escalated all the way up so we eventually became a ma-
jor drug center, shall I say, in my area.
Thoughts started coming about how we should try to stall this or
stop this. Judges originally started out sentencing people to jail for use
of drugs, first offender. And the libertarians came out and thought that
was too cruel, too hard. So they came out with what they call the rehab
centers and that we should try rehabilitation and put people on proba-
tion. I remember a fellow, a strong drug user, who became a probation
officer. He told me that the only reason he stopped using drugs was
because he ran into a judge in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, who said to
him, I'm going to give you a fifteen year suspended sentence for fifteen
years. If you get caught using drugs again, you're going to do the fif-
teen years.
He said he got rehabilitated. He rehabilitated himself. I hate to
say, I tried all sorts of programs, about everybody around, to try to find
what the results were and what happened, and I came to one conclu-
sion which is this. First of all, we have to start a program in the
schools. We're trying to say no, the DARE program, just say no to
drugs, but you have got to go a little further than just that. The kids
now are changing from drugs. They're going back to cigarettes and
tobacco. I hope you notice that. You notice we're finding eight and nine
year old kids smoking. And back to that bad habit.
Now, we're going back to alcohol. Somebody said w-. legalized al-
cohol and that solved our problem. It didn't. All we did was create
another problem. I mean what the hell? What's worse than an alco-
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holic, and how tough it is for an alcoholic to get off the program? How
tough it is for anybody to get away from cigarettes or smoking. It takes
a lot of courage and a lot of gumption to do this. So we have got to
start with the program, going back to the children in schools all the
way through, either through using the medium, the television, and
things like that and programs, and put them right in school with the
best people we can get, the best teachers we can get, the best convinc-
ers we can get, to get out and start telling these students right in the
classrooms that this is not good for you, you shouldn't use it, or at least
weigh it before you do it.
Then we have got to start going back to the old property which
some of you earlier alluded to in factors, we have got to start going
back to respect, respect for people and property. We've forgotten that.
Somebody said we're self-indulgent. We just want me. It's the me rule,
the me rule. I'm going to take care of me first, and the hell with you.
We have got to go back and start teaching some respect for people and
property, and it's got to go back to the schools, and it's got to go back
right into the families.
After I retired as a judge, I started a newspaper, and all I'm doing
in my hometown is this thing, respect. I have what I call the empty
game. I call it "excuse me, may I, please, thank you, you're welcome."
Now simple little words, but let me tell you what's happened in one
year in my community. I've got people saying those words. I've got
people holding doors. I'm impressed down here in Washington. I
walked around the streets. People say hello to me. I say hello back to
them. My daughters tell me, I said to them it's amazing how Washing-
ton is so friendly. And she said, well, they're all people from out of
town, they have no friends.
(Laughter.)
JUDGE DONOHUE: Now that's what my children tell me. But
there's a lot to it, but we have got to go back to that. But now let me
go back to the immediate past, which I think we have got to do about
enforcement. We've been sitting on our duffs thinking rehabilitation is
going to work, and it isn't. You can't pat people on the head and say,
get on your way and go out to court, or if we send you to jail, we're
going to send you in the front door and let you out the back door. You
can push this down any way you want-but you have got to establish a
national federal drug court, and basically we go out and if you want to
do it, you have got to go out and staff it with a lot of retired judges.
(Laughter.)
JUDGE DONOHUE: They know how to put people in jail. They
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don't want to come back and work because most judges, once you get
away from the job, you say I don't want to go back and make decisions
again. But bring them back in for a month, two months, -three months,
put them out in those-somebody mentioned using military camps. Put
the courts in the military camps. And you got a jail right next to them
that you can turn into a jail, and the jail is simple. People always say
you have to put up big walls. All you've got to do is put up a fence.
That's a jail. And most drug offenders are not violent people. They're
drug users. They aren't violent people. All you've got to do is lock them
up and say you get out of the habit and make it a drug-free environ-
ment, that's going to be your biggest problem.
But staff if with retired people, with retired judges and retired law
men, so they work three months. For example, in Massachusetts we
have a law for trafficking. It's a mandatory ten year jaiL sentence for
trafficking in cocaine. In 1987, we had 800 arrests for trafficking in
cocaine. We have eighty judges on the Superior Court to try the cases.
Now to try a trafficking, with a mandatory case a lawyer has got to try
it. He can't plea it unless they can make a deal to knock: it down to a
lower case, and if they try the mandatory drug case it's a ten year
sentence. A lawyer has got to try the case. Otherwise, he's got a mal-
practice suit when the guy goes away for ten years.
But to try a trafficking in cocaine case takes on the average of
three to four weeks, and that's when everybody is working. So in Mas-
sachusetts, we have to take every one of our Superior Court judges for
a whole year to try the 800 cases, and we still would have cases left
over. They wouldn't do another bit of work. And that's vhy we've got
to set up a special court, just handling drug cases. Now you could back
it off if you want. The federal courts are backlogged the same way.
They're horrible. All the courts all over the country are backlogged the
same way. We put down hard sentences but you can't do that.
If you don't have the jails, they're going in the front door and out
the back door. That's why I say take these military bases-somebody
said Fort Dix is going to be closed-hell, you could turn that place and
house 10,000 prisoners. You could keep them in company areas, small
areas. You don't have to put them all in one big building. I went down
to South Africa and watched how they ran a jail. All they do down
there is they put three fences around a building. And they put dogs in
between.
DR. MOORE: You're not citing this as a model for the United
States now necessarily in how we set up our judicial system.
JUDGE DONOHUE: Well, I'll tell you what they said. They tell
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me down in South Africa that crime dropped.
DR. MOORE: Well, we do have certain constitutional principles
that are of fundamental importance in our system also--the whole ques-
tion of how we treat people and some standards in doing that.
JUDGE DONOHUE: Oh, no question about it. I'm all for this.
DR. MOORE: I know that, Judge.
JUDGE DONOHUE: But I'm saying this thing here-I'm just
saying how they run a jail. But the part I was going to go back and
finish off with is this thing, and I'm done, and I've had enough to say,
is if we don't establish a central federal drug court, a special federal
drug court, forget the drug problem. We're never going to win if you're
going to use the enforcement method. And I thank you kindly.
DR. MOORE: Judge, thank you very much, from the heart and
very provocative.
(Applause.)
MS. BECKER: I'd like to make a comment, but not in regards to
what he said.
DR. MOORE: Okay. Is there anyone that would like to respond to
that? Go ahead.
MS. BECKER: My name is Donna Becker, and I'm a private at-
torney here in Washington, and I've been here for both days and lis-
tened to most of the speakers, and the first comment I'd like to direct is
to the judge back there. He does have a hope of getting a judge who's
never taken drugs. I've never taken drugs. I don't smoke. I don't drink.
And I'm probably one of the younger people here. But there is some
comments I would like to make, and it seems to me that a lot of the
speakers don't seem to put the rule of law as the most important part
of this conference.
I have heard a number of people who seem to feel that trampling
the Constitution, shredding the Bill of Rights, is something that we
should do without blinking. I don't agree. One person has suggested
that he thinks that widespread drug testing is a good idea. I do not
agree. If I applied for a job at any company that tried to submit me to
drug tests, I would get up and leave, not because I'm a drug user be-
cause I'm not, but because it's a matter of dignity. And the same goes
for protecting our rights and protecting international law.
If you treat people with dignity and maintain the value of our soci-
ety and the rule of law, then you'll get it a lot faster than if you turn
the place into a police state, and I thought that it was very important
to make this point. Thanks.
DR. MOORE: Thank you very much. I think that's a very impor-
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tant point indeed to remind us that one of the critical dimensions of the
problem we're dealing with is, in fact, the full protection of something
we as lawyers and we, more importantly in the democratic process hold
as extraordinarily important, which are a set of guarantees relating to
who we are and what we are and constitutionalism and the rule of law
and the Bill of Rights. Those are things that are of great significance,
great importance to us. They do interact with these problems.
Reasonable men and women may differ in the intersection of how
some of these things interface and what the appropriate balance is, but
we must never forget that those are very critical issues in front of us.
Let me just make a comment. There really are a number of different
ways in which the rule of law is relevant to this issue. One is precisely
that. That on the one hand, we must not forget in the things we try to
do that we set aside the basic guarantees of our own system and in any
way be harmful and set a tradition that's harmful to thatt.
The second is in trying to mobilize the legal profession, to really
get lawyers, as a group, to focus on this, and to say let's use our best
legal brains, our best legal talent, to examine this problem, to expose
them to the best experts on the nature of the problem from the supply
side on one side all the way to the demand on the other, and say where
are the pressure points in this system, in which new laws that are care-
fully crafted with appropriate processes might make a difference in the
process.
Another is to call attention to how the rule of law itself is targeted
in a very damaging, sinister way the kind of targeting, for example,
that's going on against the rule of law in Colombia and Peru and Bo-
livia, to some extent, I suppose at this point. I'm less familiar with that.
But that we learned from our luncheon speaker yesterday has already
begun to creep over into the United States with the killing of judges
and lawyers and prosecutors. That's something also that strikes at the
very core of who we are and what we are in the overall process. So
there are a number of respects where it seems to me the rule of law is
very relevant as it intersects this subject matter.
Yes, the lady back here. And then Mr. Tragen again.
MS. NAGLE: Now, that we are talking about the rule of law, it
struck me-last year I was talking with some of my professors down in
Colombia, and the comment was that some lawyers up here from the
United States have been going down to Colombia to learn a little bit
about the culture, Spanish, and to learn about the rule of law, to be
able to come back here and be able to defend those that are breaking
the rule of law here in the United States by trafficking in drugs.
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Now the whole purpose of this is trying to move lawyers to be
aware of what is happening, and I think the whole purpose of this is to
try to use the rule of law to corner those that are breaking it.
DR. MOORE: That's exactly right.
Ms. NAGLE: So why don't we as lawyers try to have a whole
movement around the United States, for the lawyers to be aware and
say no, I'm not going to defend those that are breaking this rule of law
that is threatening the future of the United States and to the whole
world?
MS. BECKER: How do you know they're breaking it if they ha-
ven't been convicted? In this country, we're presumed innocent until
proven guilty. You can't just point the finger and say that person is a
drug dealer and then everybody abandons ship and leaves the person to
their fate. That doesn't work.
MS. NAGLE: I'm talking about those Colombians, my fellow
Colombians, that are caught in flagrante.
MS. BECKER: If they're caught in flagrante-
MS. NAGLE: I'm talking about those lawyers that already know
and are aware of those that broke the law-
MS. BECKER: If they're caught in flagrante, there should be no
trouble in convicting them according to the rule of law, but that's the
whole point of what I was trying to say. You can't abandon the rule of
law. The whole thing is the rule of law and drug addiction. If you
abandon the Constitution, if you abandon international law, then what
have you got left? Nothing. And if you abandon the rights of the ac-
cused, if you shred the sixth amendment, as Mr. Ratliff suggested, un-
fortunately yesterday, then you've got nothing.
(Laughter.)
MS. BECKER: You've got nothing. We do not have a leg to stand
on, and then it becomes anarchy. So if you want to convict people, fine,
convict them according to evidence, convict them according to rule of
law. If they're caught in flagrante, it should be no problem to put them
away. The fact that we have overcrowded jails would suggest that most
people don't get off so easily. The fact that people want to turn all the
abandoned military based into 10,000 person prisons-First of all, I
don't think turning the United States into one big prison is a very good
idea. Second of all, I don't think it is so easy for defendants to get off.
It just simply is not.
If you abandon that, if you say, for example, that lawyers cannot
accept money because it might be tainted with drugs, then you effec-
tively eliminate the assistance of counsel to the accused. The whole
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point of our legal system is to make sure that everyone's rights are
protected, even the most venal people as well as innocent people. You
can't say only innocent people deserve legal defense. Once you do,
you've abandoned everything that any lawyer should ever believe in,
and in this country, all lawyers are required to say that they will pro-
tect and defend the Constitution. If you do what you're suggesting,
then that is to violate your oath as a lawyer.
MS. NAGLE: So get better prosecutors. But I do indeed know for
a fact that in L.A. I have talked with many a police person, and they
said we have caught people in flagrante, and they have been released.
MS. BECKER: It won't happen every time. It might happen here
or there, but that's part of the imperfection of the systera. I mean you
just have to accept that.
DR. MOORE: Okay. Could I intervene for a moment because, in
a sense, you're debating what I happen to agree with you is an impor-
tant part, but a smaller part of the message that our judge from Peru
was trying to give to us, which was to welcome the importance of try-
ing to educate the bar in general about the nature of this problem. I
think that she's absolutely right. I would share that. Someone from
Peru knows uniquely how judges themselves and the rule of law is
targeted in this overall process. But let me say the only point where I
think for those of us that are lawyers in this that we would differ, and I
would share this difference, is we cannot say that lawyers do not and
that people don't have a right to defend and the lawyers can't do it.
What we're really trying to do in mobilizing the bar is to get the
bar to look at new legal initiatives and ways of dealing with this prob-
lem effectively that will be able to get it under control. [ mean unless
we have the absolute perfect legal system by some kind of accident in
dealing with this problem, most new problems that arise: need laws to
be tailored to deal with the setting. All we're proposing is that this is a
setting where we really need to assemble some of the country's best
experts to get them fully briefed from the experts on the nature of the
problem, and to begin to look at innovative solutions in which law can
fight back at what we have a lot of experience now in knowing can
ultimately become targeting itself, an attack itself, terrorism itself, di-
rected against the rule of law. But I would share your very important
point again about the Bill of Rights protection that everyone has a
right in such a case to be represented by counsel. Any other?
DR. MOORE: Thank you, Bill. David. Irving Tragen and then
David Martin.
MR. TRAGEN: I would merely like to comment on this last dis-
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cussion. I think, it is typical and symptomatic of the problem. We're
dealing with a transnational criminal activity. We talked about supply
and demand, and what makes this different. Both ends of the equation
are controlled by the same people. When we begin dealing with the
characteristics of this problem, whether you're dealing with the cartel
in Medellin or the Mafia in New York or the Mafia in Italy, we get
down to a basic characteristic: seventy to eighty percent of the cocaine
trade is controlled by four or five cartels in Colombia.
We're not talking about free enterprise. We're talking about a
controlled market. We're talking about interlocking directorates that
go across national boundaries. We're dealing with something that looks
like some of the James Bond movies. You remember Goldfinger. They
were sitting around the table. There is every bit of evidence from
materials we've got, we have enough evidence to show the degree of
interrelationship. You sit down and talk to the people from Interpol,
and they tell us that the Italian Mafia controls seventy to eighty per-
cent of the worldwide traffic in heroin including much of the production -
in Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala.
What we've really got is something very atypical under our penal
law. We're dealing with something that is a mixture of the Sherman
Antitrust type case and normal criminal activity. What I was trying to
point out before is if you're talking about law enforcement, what are
we really talking about? In a country like Peru, we're talking about
how the police effectively deal with the problem of controlling produc-
tion. And here I suggest that if anybody wants to analyze this phase of
the police problem, there is an excellent book by Dr. Edmundo Morales
called, "Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru," published in 1989 by the
University of Arizona Press. It's a fascinating book.
On the cover is a PL-480 bag filled with coca leaf. It explains the
sociological environment in which illicit trafficking occurs. Now the
role of the police in that setting is very different from what it has to be,
say, on the streets of Lima where on most street corners you can get a
joint of bazuka, which is the first stage of manufacturing cocaine, for
less than you pay for a normal cigarette. Then, there is a different po-
lice role in interdicting, the movement of the cocaine under the control
of the Medellin or Cali cartels from Peru to Colombia.
Now I think it's true that almost all of the shipment from Peru
and Bolivia are controlled by the cartels of Medellin. There is very
little indigenous control of the second stage of movement that is after
the initial production by anyone but the Colombian organizations. So
we've got an integrated monopoly. Then we get down, they move into
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Colombia, and you've got another question then. You've got the ques-
tion of the control of chemicals that are required to o:nvert the co-
caine, the coca leaf into cocaine. You've got another whole area of
criminology that has to be dealt with. Then you get into interdiction
again, Then you're into money laundering, and then you get into a
whole range of highly sophisticated police techniques, and finally you're
into what our colleague over here mentioned, getting the evidence,
together.
I'm sure the judge from Colombia can verify that the most diffi-
cult problem she had as a judge was getting her hands on the evidence,
partly because the police aren't trained to collect the evidence and
partly because they're afraid to keep the evidence. In other words, what
I'm trying to say is we're dealing with a transnational criminal activity
controlled by an interlocking directorate. So it really isn't supply and
demand in traditional terms. We have the same people controlling sup-
ply and promoting demand. And under those circumstances, the chal-
lenge, I think, to us as lawyers is to begin to look at the problem in
different terms, analyze the dimensions, and then see to what degree we
can begin, not working with ourselves alone, but with all the other
countries in this chain.
Let's take a country like Bahamas which started out merely as a
transient point, and probably today has the highest incidence of drug
abuse, of drug use, cocaine use, in the world. Why is that? Because
when they identify a corruptible official, they pay him ornce or twice in
cash, and then they pay him in kind, and once you've established he's
an SOB, who the hell cares? He isn't concerned about what he's doing.
He's interested in the money. So you get these sociological human con-
sequences coming out of this activity. What I'm suggesting really is
we've got a package that in international penal law offers us one of the
unique opportunities to be pioneers in examining a whole range of
issues.
That's what I'd like to end with as my contribution because I
think it ties together this last debate that we had because we don't
want to violate the rules of law, but what we've got to do is understand
the nature of the crime, the felony, that we're dealing with.
DR. MOORE: What I would like to ask you as perhaps our best
expert on the real facts of this syndrome and problem, is what would be
the most helpful way for lawyer groups in the United States and Latin
America to be working together on this? Because I also personally
share your sense that notions of blame or anything else are useless.
We're in this thing together, and what we really need is for the top
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levels of the bar and from Latin America and the OAS and top levels
in the United States to be working very closely together to see how we
mutually handle the problem. Are there possibilities here that the In-
ter-American Bar Association might take the lead or the OAS? Should
the American Bar Association take the lead? Should private organiza-
tions seek to bring the two groups together and promote discussions
that might be fruitful in this area? What do you think would be most
helpful?
MR. TRAGEN: I want to start by saying I don't think the answer
is exclusively one thing or another. I think we have different levels. At
the OAS in the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CI-
CAD), as I explained yesterday, we have taken what we have called
legal development one of our two or three top priorities. What we have
done is we've brought together representatives of attorney generals,
ministers of justice, from all of the member countries at that point. We
had eleven member countries in CICAD, and we brought three or four
more. Other countries were also represented. Now we have 22 countries
that participate actively in CICAD, ranging from Canada to
Argentina.
What we did was to bring them together and we said, look, what is
it, how is it that we ought to focus on the problem, and obviously we
can't do everything. They said the first thing we need to do is begin to
get some legal standards common to all of us. What are the five or six
areas that you gentlemen consider to be the most important? The first
one they mentioned was the precursor chemicals because if we can cut
that off, you stop the manufacture of coca leaf into cocaine, etcetera,
and you stop the production of poppy into heroin, and you can stop the
production of cannabis into marijuana.
Now this is very important because the U.S. is the largest pro-
ducer of the chemicals. Mexico produces some. Canada produces some.
Brazil produces some. CICAD convened a group of eleven inter-Ameri-
can experts from Canada to Argentina to develop rules and regulations.
They took as their judicial framework, as I pointed out before, Articles
twelve and thirteen, of the 1988 U.N. convention, and we designed a
model regulation, which we are now working with countries to try to
get applied. This is one level.
Now we are going through a similar exercise in money laundering
and bank secrecy. These have to be dealt with by representatives of
governments. That's one area in which government to government, in
the OAS, really is the best inter-American instrument for this process.
Then we have another whole area that we haven't really looked at
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which is judicial cooperation. As I think Judge Luz Nagle knows very
well, Latin American and U.S. legal systems are very different. I grad-
uated from Boalt in 1945, and I went to Chile to get my master's, and
the first thing I had to do was unlearn much of the way in. which courts
proceed, many of the principles of our law go back to code law as dis-
tinct from, I remember I studied under Max Radin, when we were
dealing with Roman law, and to go back to a whole new mind-set.
We've got to get judges talking to judges. We've got to begin to
understand how their systems work, and we've got to begin to under-
stand how we can begin to work together. If I were a judge in Colom-
bia, not understanding the U.S. system, and I received a request for
extradition, my instinct would be to say that doesn't look like an order
that would come out of my court. It isn't done the same way. So I
think one of the great things that the Inter-American Bar and the
American Bar can do working with our Latin American colleagues is
begin a dialogue outside of government among the principal leaders in
jurisprudential thinking in the hemisphere and see how we can focus on
these issues.
Fortunately, we have a great ally in the Italians, and they have a
great school at Syracuse dealing with penal law, and I think we might
find a way of building this tripartite relationship, Europe, the United
States, Latin America, to begin to open up some dialogue. I think this
is a very important part of this equation and not merely limited to the
drug problem, but it would probably have a favorable impact on other
elements of penal law as well as civil law.
I think a third party that we need to do is in terms of a different
kind of exchange among legislators. We now have the inter-parliamen-
tary fora and we have parliamentary groups from the U.S. that go to
Latin America. They have the Latin American parliamentary forum.
They have the Andean parliament forum. But we really haven't struc-
tured many of these things to get legislators to begin to talk to legisla-
tors with a different kind of setting.
I remember that there is an AID program aimed at--I don't know
what they're calling it now-modernizing the judicial system or mod-
ernizing legislation. You can't use those words. We aren't modernizing.
We're helping them to examine, as maybe we need to examine, some of
the systems and processes we use. I think we could go on, but what I
really believe is once again you disaggregate and you begin to identify
different instruments for different purposes. I think you know from
your many years of experience within the U.S. executive branch,
there's a tendency to want simple, general answers, and they want to
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put it all on one sheet of paper, and that doesn't really lend itself to the
kind of thinking that we need to do.
I think if you start disaggregating what the issues are, then I think
you can find a lot of different tools to use and maybe it ought to be the
ABA that takes the lead in creating that kind of consortium view of the
resources that we have available to do it.
Let me close by referring to an experience I had. As the AID Di-
rector in Bolivia in 1966 when Chief Justice Warren came to Bolivia,
my first political experience had been ringing doorbells for him when
he was running for governor in the mid-'40s. I was quite overwhelmed
to have the Chief Justice of the United States as my charge in Bolivia.
What I found was that by introducing a question here and a question
there, a debate could be started, a discussion could be started, between
the Chief Justice of the Bolivian Supreme Court and the Chief Justice
of the U.S. Supreme Court, and they began to see how totally different
their systems were. And that's part of what we have to do. But, if we're
going to bridge the gap in this interdependent world dealing with this
transnational kind of problem, then we've got to begin to understand
what it is we're talking about.
DR. MOORE: Thank you. That was very helpful indeed.
(Applause.)
DR. MOORE: I'm going to take David Martin as the last question
here. Yes, Sir. This gentleman will be the real last question. I tell you
that. We'll take you now, and then I'll take David as the last question.
MR. WHITLOCK: Thank you, Professor Moore. I'm Bill Whit-
lock. Two things. I wanted to make an observation just to underscore
what Mr. Tragen was saying. At lunch, Congressman Smith observed
that he did not think that we were quite turning the corner, and I
agree. In order to turn the corner we must get to a situation where we
experience control. I think intrinsic to everything you were saying and
some of the other observations is we cannot be too specific. When we
want to get control, we get very specific in all your points which is
whatever circle we're in, whatever opportunities we may have to ad-
dress the problems, if we can be very specific when we address them
and those fourteen points that you observed or set out as a challenge or
suggestion to us earlier today, Professor Moore, every one of those ele-
ments gave us an opportunity to be very specific in our circle, and to
say how best can we deal with it.
Once we get specific, we have control. Once we get a sense of con-
trol we start to be able to turn the corner, and that's, I think, what
we're trying to do. If I may, just a brief report. Earlier I mentioned to
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Professor Moore that I was down at the FIPSE, the Fund for the Im-
provement of Post-Secondary Education, and I thought it might be of
interest to the conferees to know that the Department of1 Education is
seeking proposals for a program entitled "Approaches to Accountabil-
ity in Prevention Programs, Drug Prevention Programs al: Higher Edu-
cation," and they are seeking proposals. Their focus is on promising
new theoretical approaches to the individual and institutional leader-
ship and responsibility and encouraging the formulation of new theoret-
ical ideas.
It's about fourteen or fifteen small grants, but it's an effort on the
Department of Education-there are other projects that they have in
the works-and back home or with some of your educational institu-
tions, if it was something that you thought you wanted to pass on, you
might want to suggest that they contact the Fund for Improvement of
Post-Secondary Education, the Department of Education. Thank you
very much.
DR. MOORE: Thank you very much. David Martin is our final
speaker, final participant.
MR. MARTIN: I have one comment I want to make. and one pro-
posal. The comment has to do with Bob Turner's definition of the liber-
tarian attitude. If people want to smoke, let them smoke. Well, I al-
ways believed that the heart of libertarian philosophy had to do with
the right of the individual to decide for himself. This is the situation
where you run into certain contradictions. You give people the right to
decide whether they will indulge in narcotics or not, and in effect, if
they decide the wrong way, you are denying them of the :right to make
a free choice, a choice of their own for the rest of their lives.
They become slaves thereafter of the particular drug they imbibed
when they made this faulty decision. Certainly if they realized what
would happen, they would not have done it. So I don't think freedom of
choice can be considered as an absolute value in covering all cases,
certainly not where the freedom of choice may be stripped from the
individual for the rest of his intellectual life.
Then I spoke yesterday about the hearings on marijuana which I
organized and conducted. And about the almost universal opinion of
the experts who testified that one of the effects. of marijuana was that it
interfered with the process of maturation so that it affected young ad-
dicts who had been marijuana addicts perhaps more than two or three
years. These were the critical years of their adolescence. They never
matured. The doctor who headed up the Phoenix House in New York,
which was the biggest national rehabilitation institute, Mitch Rosen-
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thai, told us that he was very afraid that if we failed to stem the mari-
juana epidemic, we would find ourselves confronted not in the far dis-
tant future, but in the very near future, with a large population of
young adults who had never matured and who would have to be in the
society one way or another for the rest of their lives.
This evidence, as I say, was confirmed by the other experts who
testified. Now there is such a thing as the crime of genocide, and if one
believes that the punishment should bear some relationship to the grav-
ity or scope of the crime, then obviously the crime of genocide deserves
the maximum possible punishment. We have in the case of narcotic
trafficking a crime which I believe is equivalent to the crime of geno-
cide. It is a crime sui generis, as one might say, compared with other
crimes for which people are sentenced to long terms in prison. It quali-
fies as genocide because every year at least several thousand people,
possibly as many as 10,000, are killed in, the United States as a result
of narcotics overdoses, and much more important than that is it quali-
fies, in my opinion, as a crime of genocidal magnitude because it de-
stroys human capacities and human abilities to make free judgments,
judgments that reflect the personality, the true personality of the per-
son who is making them.
I believe that if the expression genocide has validity, then there
should be such a thing as narco-genocide as a crime punishable by
death. So in this one case, I am certainly in favor of the enactment of
legislation that would qualify narco-genocide, establish it as a crime,
punishable by the death sentence. That's my proposal.
DR. MOORE: David, thank you very much for a very interesting
proposal, and provocative new title to be attached to some of this be-
havior. I would like to thank all of our participants and experts who
participated in the whole program, joined in the discussion with us. We
are much indebted to you, and I certainly learned a great deal out of
this, and hope that we'll be able to distribute some of these materials
more widely, and if so, that it will make a contribution in dealing with
this problem. So we are dismissed, and thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the meeting adjourned.)
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